' Mst. Shama Firdaus respondent No,3 was married to Nazir Ahmad petitioner in the year 1988 but this marriage was dissolved by pronouncing Talaq, notice whereof was sent by the petitioner to the Chairman concerned. Before this divorce could be become effective the respondent No,3 filed an application under section 9(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 for recovery of maintenance for the last one year and seven months till the date when the Talaq became effective. The Arbitration Council vide its order dated 13th of March, 1990 directed the petitioner to pay maintenance for the period of 18 months at the rate of Rs,900 per month. This order of the Arbitration Council was unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioner before the 'District Collector, Sialkot who dismissed his petition for revision on 24th of March,1991, with the modification that he reduced the rate of maintenance from Rs,900 to Rs,500 per month. Hence this petition.
2. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the marriage had been dissolved by the petitioner by pronouncing Talaq on 11-1-1990 which became effective on 10th of April, 1990, respondent No,3 had ceased to be the wife of the petitioner and could not, therefore, invoke the provisions of section 9(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. This contention of the learned counsel has no force. On the own showing of the petitioner at the time when the application was filed by respondent No,3 i,e. 17th of January, 1991 Talaq pronounced by him had not become effective. Consequently she could approach the Arbitration Council for recovery of maintenance. Even otherwise the Supreme Court of Pakistan has taken the view in Muhammad Najeeb v. Mst. Talat Shahnaz and others 1989 SCM R 119 that even an ex-wife can maintain a petition under section 9 of the Ordinance.
3. It was next argued by the learned counsel that although the Collector has reduced the rate of maintenance from Rs,900 to Rs,500 he has not specified the period for which the maintenance was to be paid and therefore, the order passed by him is defective. This argument of the learned counsel is highly misconceived. Except for reduction of the rate in maintenance the Collector had upheld the order of the Arbitration Council which clearly specified the period for which the maintenance was to be paid. It was, therefore, not necessary for the Collector to mention the period in his order.
' This petition has no force and it is accordingly dismissed in liminc.