DECISION These are three appeals against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. I, Karachi, dated October 13, 1973, whereby the learned Labour Court ordered the re- instatement of the respondents. I propose to dispose of these appeals by a common order, as the facts are common to all these appeals.
2. The appellant Taj Muhammad is the father of the other two appellants, namely, Lai Muhammad and Jan Muhammad. They were dismissed for misconduct.
3. The learned Representative, Mr. Rafiq Khan, for the appellant, raised a number of points, which I propose to dispose of separately.
4. He contended in the first place that as the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance), did not apply to the appellant and, therefore, it was not bound to follow the procedure prescribed under Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. There is not much force in this contention. The learned Representative for the appellant relied on the observation of the learned Labour Court mentioned in paragraph 7, of his award, which reads as under:-- "It is true that the applicants in their cross-examination have admitted that less than 50 workmen were employed with the respondents when they were dismissed from service.'* 5. This is, however, not borne out by the record of the case. In fact Taj Muhammad stated otherwise. He stated as under:-- "It is not true that less than 50 workmen were employed with the respondent when I was dismissed from service."
6. It is true that there is no estoppel on a point of law. Therefore, the observation of the learned Labour Court that had the Standing Orders Ordinance not applied to the concern of the appellants, they would not have written that they had been found guilty under Standing Order 15(2)(/v) of the Standing Orders Ordinance has not much force. As I have observed, the reasoning of the learned Labour Court is based on misreading of the evidence, I would hold that the Standing Orders Ordinance did apply to the appellant's establishment.
7. In the second place, the learned Representative for the appellant, contended that when the cause of action arose to the respondents, i.e. on 13th August 1971, when their services were terminated, Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance was on the Statute Book, they should have followed the procedure prescribed and then made the application under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance and not under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. There is not much force in this contention. From 17th October 1970, a worker had a choice either to1 follow the cumbersome procedure under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance or to make an application under section 34 of the Ordi-1 nance. The respondents chose the latter. No other point was urged by the Representative of the appellant. The appeals are dismissed and the award of the learned Labour Court is maintained.