1. ' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The petitioners have called in question the order passed by the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 10-10-1989 allowing the appeal of the respondent No, 3 and remanding the case to the learned IVth Labour Court Sindh for disposal on merits.
2. ' The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that respondent No, 3 had been employed by the petitioners as Helio Operator. On 7-10-1989 the petitioner charge-sheeted the said respondent on the ground that he was in the habit of absenting himself from duty without permission. Thereafter a domestic enquiry was held where the said respondent was found guilty and consequently a show- cause notice dated 7-10-1987 was issued to the respondent calling for his explanation within four days as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Thereafter the petitioner was dismissed from the service on 2-2-1988. The respondent thereafter sent an appeal to the petitioners, dated 6- 3-1988, requesting them to reinstate the respondent in service. The said appeal was. Replied to by' the petitioners by their letter dated 21-3-1988 rejecting the respondent's request. Thereafter the respondent sent two more petitions dated 31-3-1988 and 18-4-1988 respectively and the last petition according to its caption was referred to as a "grievance notice" under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Both the said petitions were replied to by the petitioners vide their letter, dated 26-4-1988 and the request of the respondent to be reinstated in service was once again turned down. The petitioner thereafter filed a grievance, petition before the learned IVth Sindh Labour Court on 11-6-1988 but his petition was dismissed by the learned Labour Court on a preliminary ground viz. That the said petition was barred by time. We may reproduce the relevant observations, giving reasons which weighed with the learned Labour Court for arriving at such conclusions, which are as follows:-
5. The question of limitation being very crucial and important legal plea, the same is to be 'decided first, and, in this regard, it is seen that the contention of the petitioner is that he had sent his grievance notice on 18-4-1988 after the departmental appeal dated 6-3-1988 and the revision petition dated 31-3-1988 filed by him were dismissed and had filed the grievance petition after the said grievance notice dated .18-4-1988 was replied in negative vide letter dated 26-4-1988 by the respondent. It was further contended that under the law, petitioner could file the departmental appeal and revision but the same has been denied by the respondent in their reply statement and also at the time of cross-examining the petitioner. Under the circumstances, it was duty of the petitioner to prove that under the law, he had right to file the departmental appeal and revision before sending the grievance notice to be followed by the grievance petition but he has failed to do so and, therefore, it is held that the petitioner did not have right in law to file the departmental appeal or the revision.
6. In view of the above circumstances, the first communication of the petitioner dated 6-3-1988 Exh. A/16 produced by the petitioner and which appears to have been received by the respondent on 7-3-1988 is to be considered as a grievance notice. Now this grievance notice Exh. A/16 has been replied vide letter dated 21-3-1988 but there is no admission of the petitioner or any other proof regarding the date on which it was received by the petitioner; however, under the law under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969, the grievance notice sent by the worker himself is to be replied within fifteen days of its receipt by the employer and, therefore, the period of fifteen days in the present matter had expired on 21-3-1988. And, thereafter, the petitioner was entitled to file the grievance petition within the period of two months as prescribed in proviso to subsection (4) of section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969, whereas this petition was filed on 11-6-1988 i,e, about nineteen days beyond the period of limitation without any lawful excuse."
3. ' Aggrieved by the said order the respondent filed appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal which was allowed vide order of the learned Tribunal dated 10-10-1989, as pointed out earlier, and the case was remanded to the learned Labour Court for a fresh decision on merits. The learned Tribunal observed that since the appeal filed by the respondent was entertained and replied to by the petitioner the same raised a presumption that there were rules for departmental appeal and entertainment and rejection of the respondent's appeal raised a further presumption that there were also provisions for the representation in such rules and consequently the period of limitation would start from the date when the respondent's representation was rejected by the petitioner.
4. ' We have heard Mr. Muhammad Humayun, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Umar Hayat Sandhu, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Manghi, AA.-G. Who appeared before us on Court notice.
5. ' It may be pointed out at the very outset that the view taken by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal is not correct. Section 25-A of IRO simply provides that a worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing either himself or through his shop steward or Collective Bargaining Agent. Such grievance is to be brought to the notice of the employer within three months of the date on which the cause of action accrued to the aggrieved workman. The grievance notice to the employer in respect of his wrongful dismissal can be sent by the workman by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) which makes the provisions of section 25-A applicable to such grievance notice. It is pertinent to point out that no specified form has been prescribed by the law for such grievance notice. All that the law requires is that a workman before filing a grievance petition before the Labour Court should bring his grievance before the employer in writing. A question, therefore, arises whether the rust appeal dated 6-3-1988 which was sent by the respondent to the petitioner is to be regarded as a grievance notice. If the said appeal is to be regarded as a grievance notice then admittedly the grievance petition filed before the learned Labour Court would become time-barred as the said appeal was replied to by the petitioner on 21- 3-1988 and by virtue of section 25-A, subsection (4), the respondent was obliged to file his grievance petition within two months from the date of communication to the employer or as the case may be from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 25-A. There is, however, no controversy on the point that in case the appeal sent by the respondent to the petitioner, dated 6-3-1988, is regarded as a grievance petition as contemplated by section 25-A of IRO, the petition filed by the respondent before the learned Labour Court was time-barred.
6. ' We would like to point out that any communication sent by an aggrieved workman to his employer in order to be regarded as one under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Need not make any reference to the said section. The Court has to look at the substance of such communication and not its form as none is provided by the law. The appeal dated 6-3-1988 although was referred to as appeal by the respondent yet it contained a grievance made by the respondent coupled with a request to the petitioner to reinstate the respondent in service. Since, as pointed out earlier, no particular form for such petition has specifically been provided by the law, the appeal, in our opinion, was a grievance petition as contemplated by section 25-A of the I.R.O. No doubt, the respondent, after the said appeal dated 6-3-1988, sent two more petitions to the petitioners referring to the second of such applications as a "grievance notice under section 25-A of the IRO" but merely because such notice dated 18-4-1988 was referred to as a grievance notice under the said section of the I.R.O. Would not necessarily lead to an inference that such was the first notice under the said section. In fact, as has been pointed out, the respondent had sent three grievance notices to the petitioner between 6-3-1988. And 31-3-1988 and as was held in the case of S.W.H.
7. Jafferi v. Muhammad Salim Shaikh (1979 PLC 431) where the aggrieved workman sends more than one grievance notice to the employer the period of limitation for the purpose of section 25-A, I.R.O.
8. Is to be computed from the receipt of the first notice. Accordingly we are of the view that the learned Labour Court was right in rejecting the grievance petition of the respondent on the point of limitation and the order passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal reversing the decision of the learned . Labour Court is not correct. The learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has based its order mainly on presumptions which were not possible since none of the parties. Had filed any material before the learned Labour Court from which it could be spelt out that the respondent was governed by any departmental rules framed in this regard by the employer.
9. ' In the result, we allow this petition and quash the order passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 10-10-1989.