DECISION These are three appeals which are directed against an award of the Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. II, Karachi, dated November 22, 1973. I propose to dispose of these appeals by a common order as they are directed against the same award.
2. Mr. M. A. Khan for the appellants stated that it was only out of abundant caution that three appeals had been filed, as the case of Mr. Muhammad Samiullah Abbasi, was that he was employed by three concerns, who are appellants before me. The learned Labour Court accepted the prayer of the respondent and ordered his re-instatement with back benefits and also ordered the appellant to pay Rs, 200.00 as costs of the litigation.
3. The appeals were called at 9 a.m. Mr. Muhammad Samiullah Abbasi, though served, was absent. I heard Mr. M. A. Khan in the absence of the respondent, but out of caution had the respondent again sailed at 10 a.m. but the respondent was absent.
4. Mr. M. A.
Khan raised four-fold contentions before me, namely :-- (1) That the Arbitration of the Labour Disputes Order, 1972 (hereinafter called the Order of 1972) (Order No. 52), was promulgated on 13th April 1972, and barred the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Mr. Khan, relying on paragraph 4 of the Order of 1972, stated that though it was promulgated on 13th April 1972, but it has been given retrospective effect from lst January 1971. The respondent made the application giving rise to the impugned order on 25th April 1972. Under paragraph 11 of the Order of 1972, the application before the learned Labour Court abated. (2) It was contended that the appellants severally or jointly did not employ twenty workmen and, therefore, the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance), did not apply. (3) That the conclusion of the learned Labour Court that proper opportunity was not given to the respondent, is not substantiated by the facts on the record. (4)
That at any rate, the respondent had asked for re-instatement and in the alternative for payment of all his dues. The learned Labour Court should not have ordered re-instatement of the respondent, but should have, in the circumstances of the case, ordered only payment of his legal dues.
5. I would now proceed to dispose of the contentions raised by Mr. Khan. So far as the first contention is concerned, I have gone through the Order of 1972. lt supports the contention of Mr. Khan. Under clause (3) of paragraph 11, all matters pending before the Labour Court or Labour Appellate Tribunal relating to any matter, which should have been filed before the Arbitrator after lst January 1971, would abate. IA would hold, as the cause of action arose to the respondent much after lst January 1971, he was dismissed on 18th February 1972, that the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the dispute in question.
6. It has been urged at the very outset by the appellant that either severally or jointly, they did not employ twenty workmen and, therefore, the Standing Orders Ordinance did not apply. The learned Labour Court has not considered this point. It is true, the respondent had filed a photostat copy of the document of the year 1966, showing the strength of the establishment, which was certainty more than twenty. It is noteworthy that the respondent did not either summon the register of Attendance of the appellant concern of the year 1972, when he was dismissed or when he made the application.
7. So far as the Standing Orders Ordinance is concerned, it is applicable to the workmen in Pakistan. There is no provision that a notice to show cause should give three days' time. It seems to me that the learned Labour Court relied on the East Pakistan ruling in support of his conclusion that three days' notice was necessary, without verifying the provision of law in East Pakistan and that applicable in West Pakistan. I would hold that three days' notice is not mandatory, so far as the Standing Orders Ordinance is concerned.
8. The respondent was issued a show-cause notice for misconduct on 14th February 1972. He submitted his reply on 16th February 1972, which the Management did not find satisfactory and in the result held an enquiry in which the respondent did not participate. The charge of misconduct consisted of habitual late attendance, habitual negligence in performance of duty and entertaining friends during duty hours. On the face of it, the allegations of misconduct do not appear to be very serious, but must be a matter of record. For instance, late attendance. There must be Attendance Register which could establish that the respondent habitually came to office late.
9. On 26th June 1973, Mr. Nadmi for the appellant filed an affidavit^ stating therein that after' the respondent's services were terminated by the* appellant-company, he was employed by Atlas Autos Limited and was in their employment till 17th April 1973. It is noteworthy that the person, who filed his affidavit was available for cross-examination after he had filed the affidavit in question, but no question was put on this aspect of the case. The respondent, in that view of the matter, was not entitled to back benefits, but should have been awarded only his legal dues.
10. For the reasons given above, the award of the learned Court is set aside. Appeals allowed.