1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---Sardar son of Karam Din, a displaced person from India, was allotted land in Chak No,100-G.B., District Faisalabad by the Rehabilitation Department in lieu of the land abandoned by him in India. Sardar died issueless survived by his widow. Sardar had three brothers, namely Qutab Din, Ali Muhammad and Ali Ahmed. Ali Muhammad and Ali Ahmed predeceased Sardar. Ali Muhammad had a son by the name Siddiq (petitioner No,1). Ali Ahmed was survived by two sons Bashir and Nazir (petitioners' Nos. 2 and 3 respectively). On the demise of Sardar, the land allotted to him was mutated by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner in the following proportions amongst his legal heirs:-- {{TABLE}} Mst. Qadar Nishan (widow) 1/4 Qutab Din (brother) 1/4 Saddiq (son of his predeceased brother Ali Muhammad) 1/4 Bashir and Nazir (sons of predeceased brother Ali Ahmed) 1/4 ' Qutab Din, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents challenged the above mutation order of land before the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, in appeal which was dismissed on 16-6-1962, as time-barred. On 23-5-1963, Qutab Din filed Civil Suit No, 343 of 1963 in the Court of Civil Judge III Class, Lyalipur, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to inherit 3/4 share out of the estate of the deceased Sardar being his only surviving brother and that appellants being the sons of the predeceased brothers of the deceased Sardar were not entitled to inherit anything out of the estate of deceased Sardar. The appellants resisted the suit and pleaded that the suit is time- barred, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter and that mutation of land having taken place with the consent of Qutab Din, he was estopped from challenging the mutation order. On pleadings of the parties the Civil Judge framed the following issues:- "(i) Whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try this case? ... OPD
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from the filing of this suit? ... OPD
(iii) Whether the suit is barred by time? ... OPD
(iv) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? ... OPD
(v) Whether the defendants are entitled to a share in inheritance of Sardar Muhammad deceased? ... OPD
(vi) Relief."
2. ' On Issue No, 1, the Civil Judge held that after acquisition of property under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, it lost the character of an evacuee property and as such Civil Court had the jurisdiction in the matter. Under issue No,2, the Court reached the conclusion that appellants failed to establish that Qutab Din was a consenting party to the abovementioned mutation order and accordingly answered this issue against the petitioners.
3. Under issue No,3, the Civil Judge found that Article 120 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the case as Qutab Din was found to be in exclusive possession of land and accordingly, the suit was held within time. Under issue No,4, the Civil Judge held that as further relief in the case could be granted by the Settlement Authorities, therefore, the suit for a declaration simpliciter was maintainable. Issue No, 5 was decided against the appellants on the ground that Qutab Din was related to deceased Sardar nearer in degree and therefore, he excluded the appellants from inheriting anything out of the estate of deceased Sardar. As a result of these findings, the suit filed by Qutab Din was decreed.
4. ' On appeal the IInd Additional District Judge, Lyalipur, reversed the findings of Civil Judge on issues Nos. 2, 3, 5 and as a result of reversal of findings on these issues, the judgment and decree of Civil Judge, Lyallpur was set aside. Qutab Din, challenged the judgment of IInd Additional District Judge, Lyallpur in R.S.A.No,585 of 1964, before the Lahore High Court which was dismissed by a learned Judge in Chamber. The learned Judge in Chamber agreed with the findings of Additional District Judge on issue No, 3 that the suit was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and as such it was time-barred. On issue No,2, the learned Judge in Chamber did not agree with the conclusion of Additional District Judge, that Qutab Din was estopped by his conduct from challenging the mutation of property. The learned Judge in. Chamber held that the conditions prescribed under section 115 of the Evidence Act to attract the application of the principles of estoppel were not established by the appellants and accordingly reversed the finding of Additional District Judge on issue No,2. The learned Judge, in Chamber also reversed the finding of Additional District Judge under issue No,1, and held that jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred to entertain the suit as the question of mutation was dealt with by the Rehabilitation Authorities under paragraph 46 and 46-A of Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. As a result of above findings the judgment in appeal passed by the II Additional District Judge, Lyallpur was maintained.
5. ' The decision of the learned Judge, in Chamber in RSA No,585/1964 was challenged before a Division Bench of Lahore High Court by the respondents in Letters Patent Appeal No,8 of 1969 which was accepted, and the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber was set aside, giving rise to the present appeal. Leave was granted in this case to consider whether in view of paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme the A jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred and even otherwise the mutation effected in favour of the appellants was not liable to be interfered with.
6. ' From the resume of the above facts, it is quite clear that the learned Single Judge upheld the dismissal of the suit of Qutab Din (deceased) both on the ground that it was barred by limitation, as Article 120 of Limitation Act applied to the suit and that under paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter was totally ousted and as such the suit filed by Qutab Din was not competent.
7. ' The learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench of Lahore High Court however, reversed the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber after holding that in view of the ratio laid down in Mst.
8. Ghulam Fatima v. Muhammad Hussain and 5 others (PLD 1976 SC 729), the Civil and Revenue Courts were not divested of their jurisdiction to decide a claim merely because it related to property which has not been permanently settled on an allottee under the Act. The learned Judges of LPA Bench also reached the conclusion that the date of mutation in the case was not relevant to determine the point of limitation in view of the rule laid down in Fateh Sher etc. v. Sharif Khatoon etc. (1986 CLC 320) and Fatahuddin v. Zarshad and another (1973 SCMR 248) and accordingly held that the limitation in this case would run from the date of discovery of fraud as the appellants were not in possession of the disputed land. After carefully going through the authorities cited at the bar, we are of the view that the learned Judges of the LPA Bench were not justified in reversing the judgment of learned Judge in Chamber on the issues of limitation and jurisdiction of Civil Court in the matter. With respect to learned Judges of LPA Bench, they did not properly appreciate the ratio decidendi laid down in the case of Ghulam Fatima v. Muhammad Hussain. It is quite evident from the facts stated in Mst. Ghulam Fatima's case that the question of succession in that case related to the estate of a deceased allottee whose allotment was confirmed under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The following observations of this Court at page 741 of the report in Mst. Ghulam Fatima's case will bear out the point canvassed before the Court and the ratio decidendi laid down in that case:-- "Taking first the provisions of the Settlement Scheme, the learned Judges of the High Court have not referred to any provision in the Scheme in or to any other statutory provision under which the settlement authorities can determine question of succession to the estate of a confirmed allottee.
9. Nor could Mr. Bilal refer us to any such provision, and that for the simple reason that there is no such provision. Does this mean that the settlement authorities have to decide the question of succession according to the Shariat? In my humble opinion the latter view would be the correct view. There is a presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of the regular Courts the more so, in respect of subordinate legislation. Secondly, the Settlement Scheme is a very comprehensive scheme and as it contains provisions for determining disputes about succession to persons whose rights have not matured into that of confirmed allottees, prima facie the absence of similar provision about confirmed allottees would mean that the question of succession to the estate of a confirmed allottee was beyond the purview of the Settlement Scheme and was therefore, not a matter which was to be determined by or under the said Act within the meaning of section 25 of the said Act."
10. (The underlining is by us to show the emphasis).
11. From the above-quoted passage it is quite clear that the question of succession in Mst. Gh ;lam Fatima's case related to a deceased allottee whose allotment of land was .:onfirr d under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 (IIL reinafter to be referred as 'the Act' only). This Court accordingly held that as the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Scheme' only) or the Act contained no provisions for resolving the inheritance disputes pertaining to an allottee whose allotment was confirmed under the Act, the normal remedy of resolving such disputes through a civil suit was available in such cases. However, the remedy by way of a civil suit could not be availed in respect of the disputes relating to inheritance of the property of an allottee whose allotment was only temporary under the Scheme and it was yet to be confirmed under the Act, as paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Scheme contained elaborate procedure to deal with such disputes. The absence of provisions in the Act and the Scheme to deal with the disputes relating to inheritance of the property of an allottee,whose allotment has been confirmed, is quite understandable. Section 16 of the Act reads as follows:-- "Section 16. Title of displaced person on land.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the land on which a displaced person is permanently settled under this Act shall vest absolutely in such person."
12. From reading of the above provision,,, it is quite clear that the effect of permanent settlement of land in favour of an allottee is, that such land absolutely vests in the allottee and, therefore, it goes out of the purview of the Act and the Scheme except to the extent provided in sections 10 and 11 of the Act. It is, therefore, quite logical that in respect of all disputes concerning a land which is settled permanently in favour of an allottee in accordance with section 16 of the Act, Civil Courts will have jurisdiction in accordance with ordinary law of the land.
13. ' In the case before us deceased Sardar was a temporary allottee of the suit land under the Scheme and his allotment could only become permanent in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of the Act, read with Rule 7 of the Displaced Persons Land Settlement Rules, 1959, which provided that a displaced person to whom any land has been allotted under the Scheme shall, subject to the provision of subsection (3) of section 15 of the Act be deemed to have been permanently settled on the land so allotted to him with effect from 24th of December, 1964. It is only after the land has been so settled under section 15 of the Act that section 16 ibid would become operative. In the case of Mst. Zainab v. Raji (PLD 1960 SC 229) this Court while examining the effect of the provisions of Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956 on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of matters covered by the Act, held as follows:-- "The Rehabilitation Resettlement Scheme Punjab, under which allotments on a permanent or semi- permanent basis, of evacuee lands in this area, are being made by the Rehabilitation Authorities, was framed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Punjab by virtue of powers derived from section 7(1) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance XIX of 1948, as amended by the Pakistan Economic Rehabilitation (Amendment) Ordinance XVI of 1949. In Act XLII of 1956,, the corresponding provision which authorises the framing of such a Scheme is section 6. This is an exhaustive Scheme, covering pages 385 to 464 of the Evacuee and Rehabilitation Laws Manual, 1957. The Correction Slips, issued in respect of this Scheme, are printed at pages 480 to 506 of this Manual. This Scheme read with the parent legislation, provides a complete Code for allotment of evacuee lands to refugees or other persons and contains elaborate provisions for dealing with the claims made by refugees in respect of lands abandoned in India. Section 4(2) of Act VII of 1956 declares that every order purporting to be made, or signed by the Rehabilitation Authority, in lawful exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act, shall be presumed to have been so made by such an authority and no such order shall be called in question in any Court. Section 11 of the Act comprises of self- contained provisions in respect of appeals from orders of Rehabilitation officers to higher officers in the Department. Section 12 of the Act contains provisions for revision of certain orders by Government. Section 13 lays down that an order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or Additional Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner shall be final, subject to the provisions of sections 11 and 12 and shall not be called in question in any judicial proceedings in any Court.
14. Section 17 bars suits, prosecutions and other legal proceedings against the Central Government or any Rehabilitation Authority or any person acting under the direction of that Government or authority, for anything which, in good faith, is done, purports or is intended to be done, in pursuance of the Act. Section 18 expressly,enacts that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to question any order passed by a Rehabilitation Authority under the Act, is barred and subsection (3) thereof declares that no such Civil Court shall be competent to adjudicate on the rights of or dispossess a person to whom any immovable property has been allotted or leased, by a Rehabilitation Authority or by a Custodian or to issue an injunction or other order, in relation to any act done, or intended to be done, by a Rehabilitation Authority, under the provisions of the Act.
15. ' These provisions are of very wide import and it appears to us that by necessary intendment, these provisions bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain a declaratory suit of the kind under consideration. A declaratory decree, even if passed in such a suit, can be ignored by the Rehabilitation authorities and any order passed by such authorities contrary to a declaratory decree of this kind, would be immune from attack in a judicial proceeding. The Rehabilitation authorities possess the necessary powers to hold enquiries into claims made by refugees and to decide all questions of inheritance, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) under the Rehabilitation Resettlement Scheme, Punjab. Reference in this connection may be made to instructions 46 and 46-A at pp.408 and 409 of the Rehabilitation Manual. It would amount to encroachment on that special and exclusive jurisdiction, vested in the Rehabilitation Authorities, if similar questions were allowed to be agitated in the Civil Courts. The object of the Rehabilitation laws being to settle the refugees on lands and give them certain rights, in as expeditious a manner as possible, such an exclusion of the ordinary Courts' jurisdiction is easily understandable. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the opinion of the learned Judge, who decided Heman v.Fazal that a declaratory decree in such a suit could affect any property in Pakistan. It would amount to no more than a pious resolution and would be a mere essay in futility."
16. ' In the abovementioned case one Allah Diya, a resident of village Humanyoopur, Tehsil Sarhind, District Bassi Patiala State died in India in the year 1946. He was survived by 4 sons, Mehdi Hussain, Faqir Muhammad, Hasan Muhammad and Ahmed Hassan, two sisters, Mst. Raji and Mst. Kariman, and a daughter, Mst. Zainab. On arrival in Pakistan, the family of Allah Diya settled in Chak No,42 S.B., District Sargodha and in consideration of the land abandoned by the family in India, the Rehabilitation authorities allotted them certain evacusee lands. Half of the allotted lands were given to Mst. Zainab and the other half to Allah Diya's sisters Mst. Raji and Mst. Kariman. Mst. Zainab challenged the above allotment of land before the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, which was dismissed. Mst. Zainab, thereafter instituted a civil suit against Mst. Raji and children of Mst.
17. Kariman claiming that her brothers while on their way to Pakistan were killed and that Mst. Kariman also died before the institution of the suit. She accordingly sought a declaration in the suit that she was the sole heir of her deceased brothers and as such she alone was entitled to receive whatever compensation was paid or may be paid in Patkistan in respect of holding of her deceased . Father, Allah Diya. Certain preliminary issues were raised in the suit regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter which was decided in favour of plaintiff, Mst. Zainab. The matter was taken to High Court in revision against the decision of the preliminary issues and the High Court held that the suit was not competent as the jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred and the suit was accordingly dismissed. The matter was finally brought before this Court in appeal and in the above stated background this Court made the observ...Ions reproduced above. The case of Zainab v. Raji overruled the decision of Lahore High Court in the case of Heman v. Fazal (PLD 1955 Lah. 280)..
18. Similarly, in the case Ahmed Din v. Muhammad Shafi and others (PLD1971 SC 762) which is on all fours applicable to the facts of the present case, this Court approved the rule laid down in Mst.
19. Zainab's case. The facts in the case of Ahmed Din v. Muhammad Shafi were, that one Allah Bakhsh who was originally, a resident of Chak No,16/GB, Tehsil Abob Garh, in Beekaneer State in India, migrated to Pakistan and was allotted 130 Kanals and 16 marlas of land in village Tabiala Dost Muhammad, Tehsil Shandara, District Sheikhupura. He died on 11th of August 1952 without a wife or any issue. After his death mutation was attested under para. 67, Part II of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme on 18th December, 1953 in the presence of the appellant in that case. By the mutation order Ahmed Din was given 1/3 share, Muhammad Shall son of Charagh Din 1/3 share, Inayat 7/48 share, Mst. Jan Bibi 1/24 share, Aisha Bibi and Fatima Bibi 7/48 share. Ahmed Din, the appellant did not object to the above apportionment of the land amongst the heirs of deceased Allah Bakhsh and as such separate Khatonis were issued in the names of appellant,Muhammad Shah and Jan Bibi in equal shares. RL-II was also issued to the heirs in accordance with above apportionment of the land. The Khasra Girdawaris of the property in respect of land shows that these lands were only cultivated by Ahmad Din and others and not Ahmad Din alone. After lapse of a period of 8 years Ahmad Din filed an appeal against the aforesaid mutation alleging that he was the only heir being the son of a brother of the deceased Allah Bakhsh. That respondent No,1 Muhammad Shafi was not entitled to inherit anything as Murad Bibi the mother of Muhammad Shafi and sister of the deceased Ahmad Bakhsh had died in India before the establishment of Pakistan. In the same way, Ahmad Din appellant, contended that respondents 2 to 5 in the case who claimed through brother of the appellant Rehmat, were also not entitled to inherit anything as the said Rehmat had also died during the lifetime of Allah Bakhsh. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Sheikhupura, however, dismissed the appeal holding it as time-barred. The appellant thereafter instituted a suit for declaration and injunction. The suit was resisted by the respondents in the above appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the case. The trial Court came to the conclusion that suit was barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of the provisions of section 16 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, 1948 and section 12(1) of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. The Civil Court, however, held that since the parties were in joint possession according to Khasra Girdawari, the suit was maintainable in its present form. The Civil Court, however, did not record any findings on the merits of the case and dismissed the suit on the preliminary objection. On appeal the Additional District Judge, Lahore, overruled the decision on preliminary issues and the case was remanded for decision on merits. In 2nd appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of Additional District Judge and held that after Khatonis and RL had been issued without any objection by the appellant, a change of possession had taken place and, therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the parties were in joint possession was wholly erroneous in law. The Tligh Court also held that after the issuance of separate Khatonis each party was in separate possession of respective share as recorded in RL-II and therefore, it was incumbent on the appellant to ask for possession by way of consequential relief. The High Court also held that the suit as framed was not maintainable and Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The High Court finally held that since the mutation of inheritance was recorded in accordance with paras. 46 and 46-A of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme, 1957 the suit was hit by section 16 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property, 1957, and was therefore barred. Finally the High Court also came to the conclusion that suit was also barred by limitation. In appeal against the judgment of Lahore High Court, it was contended before this Court that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain a suit of this kind was not taken away either by section 13 or 18 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956 or by section 25 of the Land Settlement Act, 1958 as no question relating to the evacuee nature of the property was agitated in the suit. It was contended before this Court in the above case, that all that was sought' by the plaintiff in the case was a declaration that the appellant in the case was the sole heir of Allah Bakhsh with a consequential relief of an injunction for restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession. This Court repelled the above contention as follows:- "This contention is, however, now not tenable in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Mst.
20. Zainab v. Mat. Raji PLD 1960 SC 229 where it has been pointed out that the 'Rehabilitation Authorities possess the necessary powers to hold enquiries into claims made into claims made by refugees and to decide all questions of inheritance, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) under the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme Punjab."
21. ' Reference was also made by this Court in this connection to the instructions contained in paras 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation Manual to show that since the question of inheritance to right- holders, as Allah Bakhsh was in the present case, was also to be decided by the Rehailitation Authorities, the matter was in their exclusive jurisdiction and, as such, a similar question could not be allowed to be agitated in the Civil Courts.
22. ' In that case too, Mst. Zainab had filed a suit for a declaration that she was the sole heir of her deceased brother, who had died on the way to Pakistan and that, as such, she alone was entitled to receive whatever compensation was 'being paid or may be paid in Pakistan in respect of the holding of a deceased brother in India. There too, a permanent injunction had been asked for, as in the case before us, for restraining the defendants therein from interfering with her rights. The suit was held to be barred under the provisions of sections 13 and 18 of Pakistan Rehabilitation Act of 1956.
23. ' To the same effect is the decision of a Full Bench of the West Pakistan High Court in the case of Umar Daraz Ali v. Khurshid Ali PLD 1960 Lah. 834: ' There too it was held that the mutations sanctioned by the Rehabilitation or Revenue Authorities under paras. 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme Punjab, which is simply a measure for the resettlement of refugees in Pakistan, do not pertain to inheritance to the estates of deceased right-holders. This is in our view correct, we see no reason, therefore, to differ with the decision of the High Court that such a suit was not mantainable in the Civil Courts.
24. ' We are also in agreement with the High Court that the suit was barred by limitation. The appellant could not take advantage of the fact that he had filed a time-barred appeal from the mutation proceedings, for extending the period of limitation. The period spent by him in prosecuting such a time-barred appeal cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The suit which was filed in 1962 to challenge an order of mutation made in 1953 was, therefore, clearly beyond six years and was, therefore, barred by limitation.
25. ' The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit could not fail merely by reason of the fact that the consequential relief by way of possession had not been claimed is not altogether without substance. If his suit was otherwise maintainable and he was otherwise entitled to the relief it was open to the Courts to allow him to amend the plaint by adding a prayer for possession and paying the appropriate ad valorem court-fee and then to grant him relief even though he had not specifically asked for it. But in the circumstances of this case since we have come to the conclusion that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit was also barred by limitation, it is unnecessary to go into this question. This appeal must fail on that account and is, accordingly, dismissed but there will be no order as to costs."
26. In view of the above-stated legal position we are of the view that the suit instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent Qutab Din was barred by limitation and the question agitated before the Civil Court was also not open to be agitated before the Civil Court in view of Rules 46 and 46-A of the Settlement Scheme. The learned Judges of the Division Bench, however, while reversing the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber heavily relied on the ratio laid down by this Court in Mst. Ghulam Fatima's case. The observations made by the learned Judges in paragraph 10 of the judgment are as follows:- "We do not see any reason to avoid application of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Mst.
27. Ghulam Fatima's case. It unambiguously pronounced that Civil Courts were not divested of authority in dealing with evacuee property after it was settled by Rehabilitation Authorities on a displaced person. Conversely the cases cited on behalf of the respondents could be distinguished.
28. The decision in Babu Ali Muhammad's case was overruled in Sultan Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddiq (PLD-1973 SC 347) whereby right of pre-emption was held available in case of sale of agricultural land made by a right-holder. On the same analogy there was no reason not to apply the normal law of succession to his demise and make the same amenable to the Civil Courts. Mst.
29. Habib Khatoon's case was based upon its own facts where transfer made in favour of a right- holder was "subject to revision" which was till then pending. Obviously its fate had to depend upon the order passed by the revisional Authority and for that reason the transfer in favour of the right- holder was neither final nor confirmed. No such circumstance was shown to be existing in the present case where the deceased's allotment was permanent for all purposes. Similarly in Shabih- ul-Hassan's case the proceedings under consideration were about cancellation of the allotment.
30. Manifestly Civil Court would not have jurisdiction to see the vires of these proceedings., The point of distinction in the case under consideration was that the allotment made in favour of the deceased was not sought to be cancelled. It appeared to be permanent in terms of section 16 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, inasmuch as nobody had expressed grievance in regard thereto. A scrutiny of the precedent cases cited for and against persuades us to hold that the dictum laid down in Mst. Ghulam Fatima's case is more appropriately attracted to the facts of the present case and the Civil Court was not divested of power to deal with succession of the deceased-transferee relating to land obtained by him under the Settlement Laws. We are unable to subscribe to the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on this point as well and reverse the same."
31. ' We are unable to subscribe to the views taken by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. We are of the view that the ratio laid down in the case of Mst. Ghulam Fatima has been wrongly interpreted by the learned Judges of the Divisions Bench. The learned Judges of the Division Bench failed to notice that the case of a "temporary allottee" under Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is quite different from the case of a confirmed allottee under the Act. In Mst.
32. Ghularn Fatima's case the bar contained in section 25 of the Act was held inapplicable as the dispute of inheritance amongst the heirs of the deceased allottee had arisen after permanent allotment of the land in favour of the deceased allottee. This position is clearly borne out from the passage quoted by us from Mst. Ghulam Fatima's case in the earlier part of this judgment. The distinction between a temporary allottee and confirmed allottee was clearly made out in the case of Zafarullah and 23 others v. MuhammadSiddiq and others (PLD 1980 SC 76). This Court pointed out that in the case of a non-confirmed allottee the question of inheritance will be governed under paragraph 46 of Punjab Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme whereas in case of confirmed allottee the normal procedure available before the Civil Court will be applicable in the case. The observations in Zufarullah's case made by this Court were as follows:-- "It would thus be seen that there is a clear distinction in respect of the question of inheritance of a deceased who was a confirmed allottee and the one whose allotment had not been confirmed when he died. In the case of a confirmed allottee, his inheritance would be governed by the Shariat Act. But in the case of non-confirmed allottee, his inheritance would be governed by para. 46 of the Punjab Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. Now in view of the fact that when Sandhi Khan died on 10-8-1957, he was not a confirmed allottee, evidently the High Court was wholly right to hold that his inheritance was to be governed by para. 46 of the Punjab Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme.
33. ' We also respectfully agree with the view taken by the High Court that the Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to sit in review over the order passed by Rehabilitation Commissioner on 4-11-1959 as Shah Muhammad had never challenged the same before any forum including the High Court. Furthermore, the Settlement Commissioner, without condoning the palpable delay of more than a decade with which the revision application filed before him by Shah Muhammad suffered, could not set aside the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, even assuming that he had any jurisdiction in that behalf. The legal position in this behalf is well settled in Sycd Alam Hussain v. Sycd Shamin Akhtar PLD 1974 SC 35 of which notice was taken by the High Court in support of its conclusion."- ' We, accordingly, accept this appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court and restore the order of learned Judge in Chamber. There will be no order as to costs.