AKHTAR SAID, MEMBER.-The facts of the case are that Munshi Khan etc. Went in appeal to the A.C/Collector against the order of A.C-II grade dated 10.12.1986. In this appeal the respondent was Muhammad Nazir. The AC/Collector vide his decision dated 21.3.1987 rejected the appeal. After this decision of the Collector, it is alleged, that Muhammad Nazir sold the disputed property to one Muhammad Ali the present petitioner. When Munshi Khan etc. Went in a revision petition to the Additional Commissioner -they made Muhammad Ali also a party to the petition alongwith Muhammad Nazir.
2. While this revision petition was pending before the Additional Commissioner by the respondent against both Muhammad Nazir and Muhammad Ali, one of the respondents viz. Muhammad Ali went to the Commissioner in a transfer application, showing lack of faith in the presiding officer of the Court of the Additional Commissioner. This transfer application was rejected by the Commissioner on 14.9.1987.
3. On rejection of this transfer application an appeal was filed with the Board of Revenue on 17.9.1987. The appellant in this appeal obtained a Status quo order from the Board of Revenue on 23.9.1987, restraining the lower court to proceed with the case. This Status quo Order is said to have been despatched by the Board of Revenue to the Additional Commissioner. The date of issue bf this Status quo order 23.9.1987.
4. However, the Additional Commissioner, not acknowledging the receipt of the Status quo order, went ahead to decide the revision petition on 15.10.1987.
5. When the comments of the Additional Commissioner came to the Board of Revenue on the transfer application, the case had already been decided. The two petitioners Muhammad Nazir and Muhammad Ali meanwhile challenged the order of the Additional Commissioner, dated 15.10.1987 and among other things, took the plea that he could not decide this case in view of this Status quo by the Board of Revenue. The appeal against this decision of the Commissioner in the transfer application was withdrawn, as having become infructuous.
6. The point before this Court now is whether during the pendency of the Status quo order issued by the Board of Revenue on 23.9.1987, the lower court could decide the cases or not. I find it useless to go into the factual question whether or not the Status quo order was communicated in time to the Additional Commissioner, although the may be ground to believe that at least legally the communication had taken place. The vital question to determine is the comparative status of the two orders i.e. One by the Board of Revenue restraining the lower court from proceeding in the case and the other the final order of the lower court in the same case deciding it on merits. If we regard the decision of the Additional Commissioner dated 15.10.i987 as valid and still in the field, we shall be rendering the order of the Board of Revenue, dated 23.9.1987 nugatory. If this position is accepted on the ground that the communication had not taken place, it will start a very bad precedent, under which any order of a superior Court impinging on the subordinate courts could be frustrated by tampering with its communication. I'm afraid, this cannot be allowed to happen. If this were allowed to happen, we would, in fact, be conferring a superior authority on the functionaries responsible for communicating the orders of superior courts to lower courts.
Therefore, my view is clear, and it is that a Status quo Order restraining a lower Court from proceeding with a case shall take effect regardless of its communication to that Court in time. Of the two orders, the order of the superior Court must hold the ground and be acted upon. The order of the subordinate Court must vacate the ground. This is in accordance with the law and also in accordance with justice.
7. In the present case the restraining order flowed from a petition challenging the bonafides of the Presiding Officer of the subordinate Court. It would be blatantly unjust to permit the same Presiding Officer to dispose of the case in which his bonafides have been challenged and the superior court, pending that challenge, has restrained him from proceeding with the case. If he has made this error of going ahead and deciding the case, this is a rectifiable order, on the other hand, not recognizing the force of the restraining order of the Board of Revenue in the present case would be an evil which would , if allowed to go uncorrected, open a Pandora's box for all sorts of malpractices in the future.
8. The revision petition of Munshi Khan etc. Cannot be split into two, for the simple reason that it is one revision petition against more than one party, and any of those parties was entitled under the law to obtain a Status quo order from a superior Court, which would then apply to the whole case. If such an order has been obtained relating to the whole case', as is the position here, the entire case must come to a stand still, and it cannot be accepted that the case between Munshi Khan etc. And parties other than Muhammad Ali may proceed.
9. I, therefore, set aside the order of the Additional Commissioner, dated 15.10.1987 and remand the case to the Court of the Additional Commissioner, where it shall be decided afresh on merits. The parties are directed to appear before the Court of the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Multan on 5.11.1990.