DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order, dated 14-1-1989 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabad whereby petition of the appellant was dismissed.
2. I have heard Mr. Ahsanul Haq Siddiqui, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Khalil Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. Admittedly the appellant was `Chowkidar' employed by the respondents. He claimed that he also used to work as 'peon', but as held by the learned Labour Court, apart from his own word, there is no evidence in support of his contention. Even the appellant does not specify as to what duties of peon he used to perform. However, the respondent's witness Muhammad Hanif has admitted that it was the duty of the appellant to open and close the gate at the time of necessity.
4. Mr. Ahsanul Haq has relied upon this admission of Muhammad plaintiff and states that 'opening' and 'closing' of the gate, which is admittedly one of the duties of the appellant, involved manual work and, therefore, he comes within the ambit of the definition of workman under section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. He has relied upon the decision of learned Division Bench of Sindh High Court in the case of Rab Nawaz v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 Karachi 175. In that case the petitioner was Chowkidar and the duties performed by him included opening of gate and physical search of trucks etc. It was held therein that "the nature of work done by Chowkidar does not involve his mental faculties but physical exertion and this was sufficient to bring him within the ambit of definition of workman". Reliance was also placed on the case of Security Papers Limited v.
Sindh. Labour Appellate Tribunal PLD 1988 Supreme Court 180, wherein their Lordships observed as under- "It is difficult to give a fixed connotation to the duties performed by a person employed as a Security Guard by an establishment. Obviously different employers may assign particular types of security duties to their Security Guards.. No general rule can, therefore, be laid down in this behalf.
In any case the very idea of a Security Guard involves the notion the person entrusted with this work is employed 'principally to protect the staff, installations and buildings of an establishment, so that if an intruder or an unauthorised person enters upon the premises or does an illegal act, the Security Guard is required to intercept such a person and prevent him from doing mischief even by use of force if the occasion so demands. This being the principal duties in view for the appointment of such a person, the fact that no occasion has arisen or such occasions do occur rarely will be no ground to change the nature of his work."
Their Lordships held the security guard to be workman. In the instant case also the purpose of keeping the appellant as Chowkidar would not only be that he should stand like a 'dummy' but his duties would naturally involve protection of staff, installations and buildings of the establishment so that he may intercept an intruder or an unauthorised outside person from doing illegal act. He admittedly performed manual work of opening and closing the gate. In my opinion, therefore, he would be "workman" as defined in the aforesaid Ordinance and the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 would be applicable to him. His services, therefore, could not have been terminated except by an order in writing showing explicit reasons for his termination as required under Standing Order 12(3). The termination order, produced as Exh. A/2, does not show any reason for the termination of service of the appellant. Such an order is not tenable and is liable to be set aside.
5. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and order the reinstatement of the appellant in service.
6. However, there is no satisfactory evidence on record to show as to whether the appellant during the intervening period was gainfully employed or remained unemployed. As such I award him fifty per cent back benefits. The orders to be implemented within one month.