' On 26th March, 1989, the learned District Collector; Bhakkar appointed Shamsher Ali son of Karam All as a Headman for Chak No,57/ML, Tehsil and District Bhakkar. This order of the learned Collector was assailed by the affected parties by filing two appeals before the learned Commissioner 'Sareodha Division who proceeded to set aside the order of the learned Collector dated 26th March, 1989 and instead appointed Muhammad Mumtaz, respondent No,1, as a permanent Headman of the aforesaid revenue estate. It was held by the learned Commissioner that the petitioner had a criminal record against him and that he was not a fit person to be appointed for the office. It was held that respondent, Mumtaz, belongs to Awan community and that he was a fit person for the appointment as a Headman keeping in view his unblemished record. Respondent No,2, Shamsher All and the writ petitioner, Muhammad Ali, went in revision against the order of the learned Commissioner which was dismissed by the learned Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue on 6-1- 1990. This order of the learned Member was further assailed by the petitioner by filing a review petition which too was dismissed on 8-4-1991. Appointment of respondent No,1 was finally confirmed by this Court vide judgment dated 28-5-1990 passed in Writ Petition No,592 of 1990.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was appointed as Headman of the village by the learned District Collector, Bhakkar and as such the learned Commissioner and the learned Member, Board of Revenue had no lawful authority to interfere in the choice already made by the learned Collector in that behalf. He argues that petitioner possesses more land and belongs to a majority community of Jat and that this aspect of the case was not considered by the appropriate Revenue Authorities. Lastly, it is argued that the decisions of the learned Commissioner. And the learned Member, Board of Revenue are contrary to the established principle laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court. Mr. Asif Saeed Khosa, learned counsel for respondent No,1 contends that the writ petition is not competent inasmuch as it suffers from the embargo of principle of res judicata as the earlier writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on 28-5-1990. He relied upon the following judgments: PLD 1965 SC 254; PLD 1982 SC 146; 1984 SCM R 196; 1987 SCM R 1698; 1984 SCM R 689; 1985 SCM R 1226; 1984 SCM R 1124; 1986 SCM R 589; PLD 1989 SC 344; PLD 1989 SC 373; 1989 SCMR 1941; 1986 SCM R 1368; 1974 SCM R 171; 1976 SCM R 75 and 1989 SCM R 614.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have read the whole record with care. It is evident that the appointment of the petitioner as a Headman by the learned District Collector on 28-3-1991 was set aside by the learned Commissioner for cogent reasons. This appointment made by the learned Commissioner was upheld upto the level of this Court. This is a question of fact arrived at by the competent Authorities regarding the appointment of respondent No,1 as a Headman of the revenue -estate in question. Finding of fact has been given that the petitioner had a criminal history and that it would not be safe to appoint him as a Headman for collection of the land revenues. In these circumstances, choice made by the Revenue Authorities cannot he interfered with in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Additionally, earlier writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on 28.5-1990 on merits. It is well- settled that the principle of "res judicata" will apply to the proceedings initiated under Article 199 of the Constitution. The controversy involved in the case already stands decided earlier by this Court.
Thus the second writ petition on the same issue is definitely not competent. This being so, writ petition of the petitioner is hit by the principle of res judicata and as such it cannot be entertained being incompetent. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any legal infirmity muchless jurisdictional defects in the impugned order having been passed by the comeptent Authorities. In this view of the matter, Constitutional petition is wholly misconceived on the very face of the record. It being devoid of force is dismissed with no order as to costs.