' MAMOON KAZI, J.---This appeal arises from an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 3-124989.
2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the respondent in the case had filed an application for grant of Succession Certificate and Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of one deceased Abdul Hameed who had expired at Karachi on 3-1-1988 leaving behind respondent as the widow, a minor daughter Aisha Hameed and mother and three sisters and three brothers Thereafter, when Letters of Administration were granted to the respondent vide order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 30-4-1989 the appellant filed an Application (C.M.A. No,1938/89) dated 24-8-1989 requesting the Court for revocation of the Letters of Administration and Succession Certificate. The said application was made on the ground that the said Letters of Administration and Succession Certificate had been obtained by the respondent fraudulently. This application was disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned order, holding that the same objection taken in the said miscellaneous application had already been considered by the Court while granting Letters of Administration. It was further observed that Letters of Administration had been granted in favour of the Nazir and not in favour of the respondent. It is in respect of this order that the present appeal has been filed.
3. It may be pointed out that learned counsel for the appellants, in the first instance, has failed to satisfactorily explain as to how the present appeal is maintainable. When we asked him to explain, he referred to the provisions of section 15 of Ordinance of 1980 which provides for filing of an High Court Appeal against an interlocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that the order impugned before us is not an interlocutory order, the learned counsel was not able to explain the relevant provision of law under which the present appeal has been filed. It may be further pointed out that the learned counsel has also failed to explain the delay which was caused in filing the present appeal as the impugned order was passed by the learned Judge on 3-12-1989 whereas the appeal was presented before this Court on 30-1-1990. No doubt, an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed wherein it has been stated that the counsel on account of his illness could not prepare the appeal within time and further that on his return from Saudi Arabia after performing Umrah on 2-1-1990 the counsel found that his mother had fallen seriously ill. But it may be pointed out that without going into the merits of the said application for condonation, illness of the counsel can hardly be a ground for condonation of delay. If the learned counsel was ill he could have returned the file to the appellant and the appeal could have been filed by some other counsel. In any case, we find that it is not necessary for us to enter into this controversy because the main grievance of the appellant appears to be in respect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 30-4-1989. The present appeal, therefore, in any case, would be time-barred since the same has been filed after any inexcusable delay of nearly a year when the period of limitation provided for filing an High Court Appeal according to Article 151 of the Limitation Act is 20 days.
4. In the result, we find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same alongwith all the miscellaneous applications pending before us with this appeal but with no order as to costs.