' This is an appeal against the orders, dated 24-6-1989, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,VII at Sukkur, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.
2. The case of the appellant, in brief, is that he was admittedly working as Grade III Officer in Ramayun Branch of the respondents, United Bank Limited when he was charge-sheeted in certain acts of misconduct and after the enquiry, he was removed from the service, vide order, dated 3-5- 1986, which he claims to have received on 15-6-1986. The appellant claims to have filed a departmental appeal on 3-8-1986 and as it was not decided, therefore, he served grievance notice upon the respondents on 3-1-1988 and thereafter filed his grievance petition. The main contention of the appellant is that the charge-sheet was time-barred and vague and the charge of misconduct was not proved against him. The respondent contested the petition on the ground, that the appellant was not workman and that the grievance petition was time-barred. The learned Presiding Officer has only considered the point of limitation and has dismissed the petition of the appellant as time-barred.
3. I have heard Mr. Tauqir Hassan, the learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Sadiq Khan, learned Advocate for respondent Bank and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The order of dismissal was passed on 3-5-1986. There is only word of the appellant that he had received it on 15-6-1986. However, the witness of the respondents in his cross-examination has admitted that the order of termination was served upon the appellant after 2 or 3 days. He has also not produced any documentary evidence of service upon the appellant. As such, I accept the evidence of the appellant that the order of termination was served upon him on 16-5-1986. Under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 a workman has to take his grievance to the employer within 3 months.
There is no specific provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 that the period taken in appeal has to be deducted from this period of limitation. But, it is a settled law, that where the Rules give a workman a right of appeal, the cause of action would commence from the date the appeal is decided. The appellant claims that he had filed appeal on 3-8-1986, but, the respondent denied that any such appeal was filed. One copy of appeal has been filed by the appellant as Annexure `E' which purports to have been received by one Hidayatullah Memon, Steno on 5-8-1986. Neither the appellant in his affidavit-in-evidence has asserted that he gave the appeal to Hidayatullah nor any such question was put to witness Nizamuddin nor Hidayatullah was summoned to prove that the appeal was filed by the appellant. Mr. Tauqir Hassan, the learned Advocate has submitted that even the reply of charge-sheet was received by this Steno, the copy of which has been produced as Annexure 'C'. On comparison of signatures on these 2 documents, they do not appear to be similar. Mr. S. Tauqir Hassan, learned Advocate for the appellant, at this stage while the orders are being dictated, has requested that the signatures be referred to the Hand-writing Expert. In view of the fact that the name of this Steno has not been disclosed either in statements of the witnesses nor the factum that the copy of appeal was given to him has been asserted in the evidence, it will not be proper to grant such a request of the learned Advocate. It is the duty of the party to produce all evidence in its support before the Courts. The parties have to be more vigilant in the cases of this nature, which are apparently time-barred and when such an objection has been raised in the written statement of the respondents. The failure of the appellant to produce proper evidence to explain the delay is fatal to his case. I find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.