1. ORDER Muhammad Daud Khan (Chairman).--Review petition dated 18th of January 1975 is filed by Mr. M. A. Iqbal against dismissal of his appeal in limine on 29-11-1974. It met the fate due to bar of limitation. Main points involved for determination are: (a) Whether 1he review is competent; {b)
2. Whether any omission or clerical mistake is patent on the face of the final order. The Service Tribunals Act does not confer any right of review or revision on this Tribunal. Statutory Rules, however, fill the lacuna. Rule 22 of the Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules creates such a power in case of clerical or arithmetical mistakes evident in the final order of adjudication. Ignoring limited extension, it is contended by appellant's counsel that if a right is not specifically conferred, it cannot be presumed to have been denied. This conclusion he infers from Supreme Court Ruling (PLD 1969 SC 65) wherein an injunction issued, affected a person who was not a party to the suit. It was held that although not impleaded, he had a right of appeal because of order adversely affecting his rights. Here the right is not lost, by mere omission. It is limited, showing a clear intent at denial, thus debarring any speculatory extension of jurisdiction by parallels. The citation as such has no application to the present set of circumstances. The other rulings demarcate a field sufficiently carved out by rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure. The principle agitated is of locus paenPentiae, i e. an authority could recant from the mistake committed and to substitute a correct order. As already pointed out, rule 22 reflects the extent to which general principle enunciated, applies. Even in the case of Supreme Court, Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, right of review is specifically conferred. It is not supposed to be drawing on its inherent power while exercising such a right. As to High Court and other civil Courts, they are governed by their own letters patent and Code of Civil Procedure. The leamed counsel is of the view that although Supreme Court and High Court have been deprived of its inherent powers, they are presumed in the Service Tribunals Act, which makes entire Civil Procedure Code applicable including section 151, C.P.C. He glibly ignores the rider "for the purpose of deciding an appeal" occurring in subsection (2) referred to above. The Tribunal is deemed to be civil Court only for a particular purpose i e. to the end of deciding an appeal. It does not have inherent power because section 151 only applies when there is no specific law on the point. Besides it concerns itself with Courts of general jurisdiction created by the Code. Here, intent of section 151, C.P.C, is met by the Specific Statutory Rules wherein extent of the powers to review are laid down. Order XLVll will have no application either because of the specific limiting provisions applicable. Tr.C law being as it is, let us see whether any mistake or omission was responsible for erroneous order and the error is apparent on the face of the record or was there any open violation of statutory provisions amounting to clerical or arithmetical mistake. The assumption of an error in the order, is based on amended definition of Civil Servant to include jc-Civil Servants. The amendment of section 2 of the Service Tribunals Act and Article 212 was enforced on 2nd and 4th of May 1974. The Constitution makes amendment retrospective but the Act is silent in this regard. It is urged that amendment of the Act not being retrospective, the limitation will start running against appellant from the date of amendment i.e., 4th of May 1974 and that 6 months therefrom would not permit the petition to be barred except by 2 days. The interpretation placed by the appellant's counsel is not acceptable because general limitation under 'section 4(1) is only 30 days from the date of the departmental order. Six months' period was allowed only to acquaint people with the new law and to act thereunder. The law passed in 19 3 and Tribunal established on 22nd February 1974, an appellant if sufficiently alive to his rights, would have taken first opportunity to file an appeal either during the month of May 1974 or before the limitation expired on 23rd of August 1974. By that time even the High Court had stressed exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal in Service matters (Bajwa's case, decided on 12-7-1974) As already pointed out normal time aljowed being 30 days, 6 months' concession could only be availed from the date of establishment of the Tribunal, that is why no amendment was made in the law to allow extension of limitation in the interest of persons included in the definition of Civil Servant. Under subsection (1) of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, abatement was automatic, to follow enforcement of law, it did not require any order to make it effective. Consequently the time allowed expired on 22nd of August 1974. No excuse is afforded by general abatement order or want of any. The time started to run from 22nd February, 1974 and covers all the cases of persons in Service or out of it, by virtue of amendment of section 2 of the Service Tribunals Act. An appeal filed 3 months after, could not be deemed to have been rejected under mistaken, notion of law. On merit, therefore, there is no occasion to interfere by way of review.
3. G. D. MEMON (MEMBER).--I am in agreement with the above order. The review is not even competent. As already pointed out the provisions of Civil Procedure Code stand restricted in their application by Rule 22 of the Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules. The Tribunal can only initiate such action if there is clerical or arithmetical mistake in its order of final adjudication from any accidental slip or omission. There being noae, no review lies. Consequently the review petition fails for insufficiency of merit and want of right to get the order reconsidered. It is dismissed.