This application, under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Has been riled by the applicant for quashing proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge (Central), Karachi.
2. The facts of the case are that on 28-2-1986, applicant Moinul Islam was posted as Sub-Inspector F.I.A. At International Airport, Karachi. On that day four passengers were off-loaded by him as they were found to be in possession of forged U.S.A. Visas and a case was registered against them under section 6(1)(3)(g) of the Passports Act, 1974. In consequence of the same P.Ws. Mst. Nazneen and her brother Saleem were interrogated at the Passport Cell, Karachi; and during their interrogation it was revealed that the applicant and respondent No.2 had received Rs.72,000 as illegal gratification from Mst. Nazneen. Consequently, they were challaned before the learned Special Judge under section 161, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2) of Act II of 1947.
3. After three of the sixteen prosecution witnesses named in the challan, namely, Mst. Nazneen, her brother Saleem and one Saleem son of Shahabuddin were examined by the prosecution, an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Was filed on behalf of the applicant but the same was dismissed by the learned Special Judge vide his order, dated 22-10-1990, as it was held that the remaining thirteen witnesses had yet to be examined on behalf of the prosecution and therefore, the stage was not ripe for filing of an application under the said provisions of law.
4. Thereafter, when ten more witnesses were examined by the prosecution, another application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Was filed on behalf of the applicant, however, it met the same fate as its predecessor as it was held by the learned Special Judge that only three witnesses remained to be examined on behalf of the prosecution and the trial of the applicant and his co---accused was about to be concluded and consequently, the case should be decided on merits at the conclusion of the trial.
5. It is an admitted position that the entire material' evidence has been produced by the prosecution in the case. Admittedly, none of the prosecution witnesses has implicated the, applicant in the case. Even Mst. Nazneen or her brother, Saleem, at whose instance the proceedings against the applicant and the co-accused were instituted have failed to support the case of the prosecution. No doubt, three witnesses are yet to be examined by the prosecution, but admittedly, they are the officers of the F.I.A. Who were connected with the investigation of the case and their depositions in any case, are not going to alter the position vis-a-vis the establishment of any case against the applicant.
6. Mr. Sami Ahmad, learned counsel for the applicant has argued that provision of section 561-A, Cr.P.C., can be invoked by the Court at any stage of the case. According to the learned counsel revisional jurisdiction of the Court is very wide and the same is not merely a power but a duty.
Reliance in this regard has been placed upon Mian Munir Ahmad v. State 1985 SCMR 257 and Syed Manzoor Hussain Shah v. Syed Asghar Hussain Naqvi 1983 SCMR 775.
7. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of M.S. Khawaja v. State PLD 1965 SC 287 that:-- "On the other hand, it is possible to agree with the observation that the circumstances of each case, in which the inherent power is invoked, must be examined with care to determine whether the judicial proceeding is really intended to 'secure the ends of justice' or is really `an abuse of the process of the Court'. To quash a judicial proceeding in. Order to `secure the ends of justice' would involve a finding that if permitted to continue, that proceeding would defeat the ends of justice or in other words, would either operate or perpetuate `an injustice. To find an `abuse', it would be necessary to see in the proceeding, a perversion of the purpose of the law such as to cause harassm ent to an innocent party, to bring about delay, or where the machinery of justice is engaged in an operation from which no result in furtherance of justice can accrue, and similar perverse results."
It may be pointed out that proceedings pending before any subordinate Court may be quashed if it can be shown that pendency of such proceedings would tantamount to harassment of the accused. To hold that the charge against the accused is groundless would require a finding from the Court that from the facts disclosed by the prosecution in the F.I.R. Or the challan, no case is made out against the accused for which he may be tried. Similarly, for holding that there is no likelihood of the accused being convicted in the case, reference to the evidence recorded by the trial Court would be necessary. If from the evidence recorded by the trial Court no case against the accused is made out to sustain the charge, the accused may be acquitted. The High Court while invoking the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Or even the trial Court while invoking the provisions of section 249-A, may acquit the accused at any stage of the case, notwithstanding the fact that some more evidence in the case is yet to be recorded. No doubt, as pointed out earlier, evidence of three of the prosecution witnesses is yet to be recorded by the learned trial Court, but if this Court is of the opinion that in no case the accused is likely to be convicted and their evidence would not materially alter the situation, then, in my opinion, no useful purpose would be served by prolonging the agony of trial for the accused. Once a conclusion is reached by the Court that the charge against the accused is groundless or that charge cannot be sustained on the basis of material evidence, recorded by the trial Court and there is no likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence for which he has been charged, the High Court in appropriate cases may interfere while exercising jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The mere fact that most of the prosecution witnesses in the case have been examined or that the trial is about to conclude cannot be made a ground for dismissal of an application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
8. I have carefully gone through the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, so far examined by the learned trial Court, copies of which have been filed alongwith the present application and I fully agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that none of them has implicated the applicant in this case. As has been pointed out earlier, the evidence of the remaining witnesses would be of formal nature as admittedly, they were only connected with the investigation of the case. Therefore, their evidence is not going to alter the position materially, in any case.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, I find that no useful purpose would be served by prolonging the trial of the applicant. Consequently, this application is allowed and the proceedings against the applicant are quashed.
N.H.Q./M-1639/K