1. ' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The petitioner calls in question the decision of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 3-10-1991 upholding the order passed by the IV Sindh Labour. Court whereby the grievance petition filed by the respondent was allowed and the respondent was ordered to be reinstated in service with full back benefits.
2. ' The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that respondent No, 3 was employed as workman by the petitioner. He was retired from the service w,e,f, 11-3-1990 on the ground that according to Service Rule 50(b), applicable to the said respondent, he had reached the age of superannuation on 11-3- 1990. It may be pointed out that according to the birth record of the said respondent maintained by the petitioners, he had shown his date of birth as 12-3-1930. The respondent who had joined the petitioners' employment on 20-5-1952 had also shown his age as 22 years. However, before the learned Labour Court the respondent relied upon the certificate issued to him by Civil Surgeon dated 4-4-1990 which showed his age as about 55 years. The respondent also relied upon a certificate said to have been issued by Chairman Malir Union Council, dated 25-3-1960, which showed his date of birth as 19-8-1937. The document was also certified by the Chairman Union Council which showed that such entry had been recorded in the birth register maintained by the Union Council. Although it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the said document was a forgery, nevertheless reliance was placed on the same by the learned Tribunals below for the reasons that the same was a document thirty years old and the provisions of Article 100 of Qanun- e-Shahadat corresponding to section 90 of the Repealed Evidence Act, 1972 were applicable to it.
3. Article 100 of Qanun-e-Shahadat reads as follows:- "100. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.--Where any documents, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested."
4. ' The contention of Mr. Muhammad Riffat Usmani, learned counsel for the petitioner before us has been that, the document relied upon by the learned Appellate Tribunal was a photo copy of a certified copy and hence reliance could not be placed thereon by the Tribunal notwithstanding the provisions of Article 100 of Qanun-c-Shahadat. We would like to point out that this argument has been advanced before us for the first time because such did not appear to be the case of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Tribunal, as is evident from the impugned order. The only contention raised before the Tribunal on behalf of the petitioner was that the said document had not been properly proved in view of the fact that the record of the Union Council had not been summoned by respondent No, 3 before the learned Labour Court. Although an application had been made in this regard but the same was not persued with the result that no such record was produced before the learned Labour Court. The order of the learned Tribunal further indicates that the application in this regard was not pressed by respondent No, 3 for the reason that the record with the Chairman, Union Council had been burnt. Be that as it may, but as is evident from the impugned order, the objection now raised before us by Mr. Riffat Usmani was not raised before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The objection raised before the learned Tribunal has been dealt with by it in the impugned order and the observations made by the learned Tribunal do not appear to be open to exception.
5. ' Mr. Riffat Usmani has also invited our attention to Annexure "A-1" which is the original application form said to have been filled by the respondent on 20-5-1952 at the time of his employment with the petitioners and the same shows that his age on the said date was 22 years.
6. We would like to point out that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, we are not called upon to enter into evaluation or assessment of evidence as would be done by the appellate Court. Even if on the basis of the evidence we agree with Mr. Riffat Usmani and we disagree with the view taken by the learned Tribunal, we cannot substitute our own opinion on facts for that of the learned Tribunal.
7. ' In the result, we find no force in the petition, and the same is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.