' This appeal by defendants is directed against judgment and decree dated 21-3-1990 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore whereby the suit filed by the respondent for the recovery of an amount of Rs,88,250 filed under Order 37, C.P.C. Has been decreed against the appellants.
2. The respondent filed a suit for recovery of an amount of Rs,88,250 which amount according to the plaintiff became due and recoverable from the appellants under two Performance Bonds issued by the plaintiff in favour of WAPDA on behalf of the appellants in consideration of which the appellants, executed and delivered counter-guarantee to the plaintiff. Appellant No,1 according to plaintiff also executed and delivered Demand Promissory Note to the extent of the amounts of the performance bonds. The plaintiffs case was that the appellant No,1 had to pay premium to the tune of Rs,1,29,500 and Rs,47,010. The total amount payable was Rs,1,76,500 out of which an amount of Rs,88,250 was paid and for the remaining the appellant gave a post-dated cheque on 10-2-1989 of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International Overseas Limited, Lahore i.e. For an amount of Rs,88,250. This cheque was dishonoured therefor; the said amount remained unpaid. The suit was filed for the recovery of the said amount.
3. The appellants were served on 6-12-1989. No application for grant of leave to appear and'defend the suit was filed within the period of 10 days as prescribed by law. However the appellant filed application on 31-3-1990 for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit alongwith an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the said application. In the later application, the condonation of delay was sought on the ground that the appellant had fallen seriously ill and remained on bed w,e,f 14-12-1989 to 18-12-1989. The nature of illness was not mentioned in this application. The learned trial Court after considering the said application and the grounds taken therein held that the application could be moved by the counsel of the appellants therefore, it was found that there was no sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit it was not asserted that the Promissory Notes mentioned in the plaint to have been executed by the appellants and the cheque issued by the appellants in favour of the plaintiff were not executed by him or that the same were without consideration. The main ground urged in the application was that the WAPDA had blacklisted the plaintiff-Company therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the amount sued for.
4. The learned trial Court rejected the said application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit and decreed the suit through judgment dated 21-3-1990 which has been appealed against.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants when questioned has not been able to persuade me that merely because the plaintiff/Company was. Blacklisted by the WAPDA for the purposes of acceptance on their behalf any or surety bonds in future had the effect of relieving the plaintiff from the liability arising in favour of WAPDA under the Performance Bonds issued by the plaintiff on behalf of the appellants. He frankly conceded that the WAPDA in its decision through which the plaintiff-Company was blacklisted issued a direction to enforce the liability under the Performance Bond already issued by the plaintiff. Even otherwise merely because the WAPDA had black-listed the plaintiff Company, the Company does not become non-existence or is debarred from continuing business. The act of blacklisting the plaintiff-Company by WAPDA did not have the legal consequence of relieving the appellants from their liability to pay the amount of premium which had fallen due under the Performance Bonds issued by the plaintiff.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants also did not deny that the amount of premium in all circumstances was payable whether ultimately the plaintiff company does not become liable to pay any amount to WAPDA under the Performance Bonds issued by it on account of due performance of obligations by the appellants in respect of which the said Performance Bonds were issued as security.
7. The learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in passing the decree in favour of the plaintiff in these circumstances, and it was rightly held that in the application for grant of leave to appear and defend no genuine or plausible defence was made out.
8. The impugned judgment and decree for the foregoing reasons, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The appeal fails which is hereby dismissed with costs.