DECISION ' These are 2 appeals filed by Daily Mashriq against the order of the reinstatement of two of their Katibs whose services were terminated in June and August, 1990 respectively. As the facts and the evidence in both grievance petitions is almost identical; I propose to dispose them of by one order.
The circumstances in which these appeals have arisen in brief, are as follows:--
2. Respondent Nafees Ahmad Bazmi contended that he was working as a Calligraphist since 1984.
However, neither any letter of appointment had been issued to him nor he was given the benefits to which he was entitled as a permanent employee. As a result of these hardships, he had sent a representation on 12-8-1990 that his grievance be redressed. On the receipt of this representation, instead his services were terminated on 19-8-1990. He had sent a grievance notice as envisaged under the law, but, the employer had declined to accept the same whereupon he had filed the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court. In the case of Muhammad Ashraf, the other respondent, it was averred that he was working as a Katib with the present appellants since 1980.
The rest of the facts--the sending of the representation and consequent termination are identical with the other case.
3. The present appellants in written statements maintained that the respondents were wholly temporary hands and as such, the petitions were not competent.
4. The learned Presiding Officer agreeing with the contentions of the present respondents had allowed the petitions resulting in these appeals.
5. Respondents Nafees Ahmed Bazmi in the grievance application had not clearly mentioned the date of his employment and had stopped by saying that he was working with the appellants since 1984. In the written statement filed by the appellants it was specifically mentioned that he had been taken by them in September, 1984, as a temporary hand. It, therefore, seems rather intriguing that the certificate issued by them, which is on the record as Exh. At page 9 of the original record bears the date 7-7-1984. It is further said that he had left the job in June, 1985 and had been re- employed on a temporary basis on 30-6-1990. The case of Muhammad Ashraf, the respondent in the other appeal is on a better footing because on the showing of Mr. Yousuf Zaidi, the Resident Manager of the appellants, he had been working "somewhat on continuous basis."
6. It is also to be seen that the representations made by both the respondents for the recognition of their status, canvassing for the benefits of employment as permanent employees are dated 12-8- 1990. Mr. Yousuf Hassan Zaidi; who is the only witness in both the cases; admits their receipt unequivably. No reply had been given to either of them and they were removed from service on 19- 8-1990 which would be surely after the receipt of the letters. If the respondent, Nafees Ahmed Bazmi had left the services on 30-6-1990, as alleged, there should have been some reply denying the averments. Nothing of the sort had been done and the services of both the respondents were terminated on 19-8-1990.
7. The Resident Manager admits "Katibs are essential workers for the publication of the Newspapers. It is correct that Columns cannot be written without Katibs." It is no body's case that the publication of the paper was erratic. I am clearly of the opinion that the respondents were working on a continuous basis as alleged by them and as has been found by the learned Presiding Officer and it was only when they had taken the issue with the employers that they had incurred the wrath of the management and were removed from service. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellants that they were temporary hands in the circumstances of the case is without any pith and substance.
8. It is further said that the respondents had not followed the procedure of grievance notice as contemplated under the law. The envelopes sent by the two respondents are on the record with the endorsement of the postman that these had been declined and returned. It is an admitted position that the addresses mentioned on the letters, in question are the same as on 12-8-1990. It is also not the case of the appellants that there was a change of address involved later on when summons were served upon them. It is also to be seen that the termination of services took place soon after the service of the representations in both the cases dated 12-8-1990. The notice would be deemed to have been duly sent and served, as envisaged under section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads as under:- "27. Meaning of service by post.--Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression. 'serve' or either of the expressions 'give' or 'send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of the post.
9. It is true that the presumption is rebuttable, but, nothing has been done by the appellants to rebut the same. There can be no manner of doubt that the notices were duly sent as alleged by the respondents and the appellants had declined to accept them. So there can be no grievance on that score either.
10. The employees of Newspaper industry according to the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act of 1973; are governed by the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and their services under Section 4 of the aforesaid Act cannot be terminated without a good cause shown in writing. It is not the case of the appellants that any letter had been issued to them, not to say showing of any good cause.
11. No circumstance has been made out to take any exception to the impugned orders passed by the learned Presiding Officer, I will, therefore maintain the impugned order and dismiss both the appeals.