' MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, C.J.---This petition is directed against the judgments and decrees, dated 28th of February, 1990 and 24th of May, 1990 passed by learned Qazi Turbat and Chairman Majlis-i- Shoora, Turbat, respectively.
2. The admitted facts in this case are that `Nikah' of respondent No,1 was performed with the petitioner in May, 1986 but `Rukhsati' had not taken place, hence the marriage could not be consumed; however, petitioner contracted second marriage as respondent had not attained majority yet. In the meantime respondent No,1 before joining the petitioner claimed recovery of dower before Family Court, Turbat on 4th of June, 1989. Petitioner contested the suit on various grounds. During trial, in evidence petitioner admitted the dower but stated that he had promised to pay the same as and when he would be in a position to pay and he did not say anything else.
3. Learned Qazi on 28th of February, 1990, decreed the suit of respondent No,1. Chairman Majlis-e- Shoora i,e. The Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal of petitioner on 24th of May, 1990; hence this petition has been filed before this Court challenging the abovesaid two orders.
4. We have heard Mr. Tahir Muhammad Khan, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Advocate for respondent No,1.
5. The crucial point raised by the petitioner fox determination in this petition before us is: "Whether in Sunni law, mere `Nikah' without consummation (Rukhsati) entitles a wife to sue her husband for recovery of dower?"
6. It may be observed that dower is a money or property, which a wife is entitled to receive from husband in consideration of the marriage; it is either prompt or deferred as agreed between the parties. Mulla has defined the dower in the words as under:- "290. 'Prompt' and deferred"dower.--(1) The amount of dower is usually split into two parts, one called 'prompt', which is payable on demand, and the other called 'deferred', which is payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce."
7. In the instant case, on preponderant evidence coupled with the admission of petitioner, the dower to which respondent No,1 is entitled is indeed prompt; therefore, respondent No,1, at her discretior was competent to raise demand and claim the same from petitioner at her own choice.
Filing of suit itself is a clear expression of such demand, therefore, there is absolutely no justification for petitioner to refuse or deny the same.
8. It may further be pointed out that wife's right to get a prompt dower from husband cannot be defeated on the ground of not living with her husband or peforming marital obligations. In our view, to claim prompt dower is independent of any such condition and cannot be restricted or controlled by the factum of living together. The relevant authorities in this case are 1943 Allahabad 1984 and PLD 1%9 (W.P.) Kar.
663.
9. Besides, both Courts, trial as well as appellate, have considered the dispute between the parties and judgments passed by them are based on logical considerations. Obviously both these forums had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter.
10. In such view of the fact, we do not find any defect in the impugned judgments which may warrant interference of this Court in exercise of extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction.
' Resultantly the petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.