DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, IV at Karachi, dated 27-5-1990, whereby the application of the appellant for condonation of delay was rejected and consequently his grievance petition was also dismissed.
2. I have heard Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. S.M.
Yaqoob learned counsel for the respondents. I have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. This case appears to have very long and chequered history. The appellant was admittedly workman employed by the respondents.
' At the relevant time, he was General Secretary of the Union and even at present he is also General Secretary of the C.B.A. Union of the respondents' workers union. It appears that he was charge- sheeted for certain acts of misconduct and a domestic enquiry was held in which he was found guilty and was dismissed on 22-1-1975. Admittedly he served grievance notice upon the respondents within time and then filed petition before the National Industrial Relations Commission urder sections 22-A(8)(g), 53 and 15 read with section 25-A of IRO, 1969, against the respondents and certain of its employees. The learned Single Bench of NIRC by its order assigned the case to the learned Labour Court No, V at Karachi which order was challaned by the respondents in the Constitution Petition No, 656/75 in the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh. The Hon'ble High Court was pleased by its order, dated 4-6-1980 to remand hack the case to the NIRC for decision. The case was decided by the learned Single Bench of NIRC on 29-12-1981, whereby the respondents were convicted for unfair labour practice and the appellant was ordered to be reinstated with certain back benefits. In the appeal, the learned Full Bench of NIRC, vide its order, dated 28-8-1982, set aside the conviction of the respondents, but unheld the order of reinstatement of the appellant.
This decision of the learned Full Bench of NIRC was challenged by both the parties in the Constitution Petitions in the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh bearing Nos,D-731/82 and D-231/83 which were decided by identical order, dated 20-3-1989. The learned High Court was pleased to set aside the order of reinstatement of the appellant on the ground, that as conviction of unfair labour practice was set aside by the Full Bench of NIRC, the NIRC could not grant relief under section 25-A.
The appellant thereafter filed the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court on 22-4-1989 alongwith an application under section 65-B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for condonation of delay. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that there was inordinate delay which was not sufficiently explained including the delay after the decision by the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh, dated 20-3-1989.
4. Mr. Mirza Kazim contends that time taken by the appellant in prosecuting his case before the NIRC and before the High Court in pursuing his remedy could be condoned under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, whereas Mr. S.M. Yaqoob contends that section 14 would not be applicable in the instant case as the NIRC did have jurisdiction to give relief under section 25-A and, therefore, it cannot be considered to be Court which could not entertain the Court jurisdiction. To appreciate the arguments of the parties I A it will be helpful to reproduce section 14 of the Limitation Act.
"Section 14.--(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it;
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it."
5. It may be pointed that the grievance petition is filed under a special-law viz., Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Section 25-A prescribes the period of limitation for filing such grievance petition.
Subsection 9(1) of section 25-A lays down that the grievance has to be brought by the workman to the notice of the employer within 3 months from the date cause of grievance arises. Under subsection (2), the employer shall communicate the decision, in writing to the workman with regard to his grievance notice. Under subsection (4) if the employer fails to communicate the decision within 15 days, the workman shall bring the matter to the Labour Court within a period of 2 months. Thus, the grievance petition has to be filed within 5-1/2 months from the date cause of action arose to the workman. However, section 65(b) of IRO 1969 specially makes applicable the provision of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 in computing the period within which the application is to be made. As such, section 14 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the instant case in view of subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which reads as under: "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law.
(a) The provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) The remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."
6. Section 3 of Limitation Act may be reproduced, as under:- "Section 3. Dismissal of suit etc., instituted etc., after period of limitation.--Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence."
7. Reading all these provisions of law together, it would be clear that section 14 would not be applicable to the case of the appellant, but only section 5 of Limitation Act would be applicable.
Even if the period which the appellant took in pursuing his case before the NIRC and the High Court is condoned still the matter was finally decided by the High Court on 20-3-1989. But the grievance petition was filed on 22-4-1989. There is no explanation for delay in filing the grievance petition from 20-3-1989 when the High Court finally decided the petition, filed by the appellant to 22-4-1989 when the appellant filed the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court, either in the application for condoning the delay or in affidavit in support of that application. As such the grievance petition filed by the appellant was hopelessly time-barred and has been rightly dismissed by the learned Labour Court. I find no merit in this appeal which is therefore dismissed.