' The petitioner is accused of an offence under section 10 of Ordinance VII. Of 1979, arising out of F.I.R.
No, 182 of 1988, dated 11-6-1988, registered at Police Station Satellite Town, Gujranwala. After the submission of challan in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, the petitioner submitted an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Before the trial Court, praying that as there is no probability whatsoever of his conviction, therefore, he be acquitted at this very stage. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 11-2-1989, dismissed the application on the ground that there is some incriminating material in the challan submitted by the prosecution and that the petition is premature.
2. The petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order through this petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
Praying that the proceedings pending against him be quashed as it amounts to abuse of the process of the Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that apart from F.I.R., the other material or evidence against the petitioner is in the form of statement of Gul Raana prosecutrix dated 13-6-1988, under section 164, Cr.P.C. Wherein she stated that the petitioner committed Zina- bilJabr with her, but later on in her affidavit, dated 8-9-1988, placed on the record as Annex. 2, she disowned this portion of the evidence: {{URDU TEXT}} ' Learned counsel further submitted that all the public eye-witnesses are not going to support the prosecution case, as this case has been got registered mala fide by the complainant Suleman to oblige Sibtain Shah on account of the dispute between Sibtain Shah and Sagheer Hussain Shah co-accused with respect to the possession of shop where the occurrence took place, because Sibtain Shah wanted to eject Mudassar from the shop in question.
' The learned counsel forcefully argued that the version given in the F.I.R. Is highly improbable, preposterous and absurd. The medical evidence does not support the prosecution case, rather it lends support to the defence version that prosecution has made a mountain out of a mole hill. The submission of the learned counsel in nutshell is that it is a case of no evidence and trial would be an exercise in futility and no useful purpose would be served by summoning the prosecutrix in the Court when she is not going to support the prosecution case and placed reliance on 1976 PCr.LJ 1325.
' In the end, learned counsel contended that even on compassionate/moral grounds trial in this case is against the interest of the prosecutrix, who is married woman and this trial may adversely affect her matrimonial life.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the State has opposed this petition on legal as well as on factual grounds. He submitted that the impugned order is revisable, hence the present petition is legally misconceived, the petitioner should have filed a revision petition. He forcefully contended that the material placed before the trial Court consists of F.I.R., the statements of the witnesses under section 161, Cr.P.C. And the statement of the prosecutrix under section 164, Cr.P.C. Which prima facie discloses the commission of the offence. If, therefore, the allegations disclose an offence, the case cannot be quashed merely because the accused denies the allegations and asserts that he has a good defence, when his defence is yet to come. When version of the prosecution is not implausible and unless some evidence is recorded, the prosecution cannot be quashed at such a preliminary stage. Section 265-K, Cr. P.C. Is an exception to the general rule which requires the guilt or innocence of the accused will eventually depend on the totality of facts and circumstances revealed during the trial and exception has to be construred strictly.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. I find great force in the submission of the learned counsel for the State that ordinarily the guilt or innocence of an accused person will eventually depend on the totality of facts and circumstances revealed during the trial. Section 265- K, Cr. P.C. Is an exception and it has to be construed strictly. The Court would not lightly grant petition under section 265-K or section 561-A, Cr.P.C. If there exists some material to connect the accused with the crime.
6. I have myself examined the material placed on the record and I find that perusal of the same shows that some offence has been commited by the petitioner. I do not want to go into detailed examination of this material at this stage, lest it may prejudice the case of either party. The principle as enunciated in PLD 1965 Lah. 492, is:-- "Doubtless, the power conferred on this Court under section 561-A, Cr. P.C. Is to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts, exist. It is the inherent power of the High Court to interfere with proceedings of the lower Courts at any stage when it finds that an abuse of the process of law is being carried on in the trial of the case, or that such an interference is necessary to secure the ends of justice. There may be a case in which the prosecution on the face of it is illegal. Proceedings in such a case can be rightly quashed even though they may be at the initial stages. There may be other cases where a bare statement of the facts of the case may be sufficient to convince the Court that no case in made out against the accused and if the case is allowed to proceed, it would be a mock trial. In such cases and in other cases where the admitted circumstances of the case do not constitute the offence, this Court can proceed to remedy the wrong forthwith and quash the proceedings."
Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of the present case, I find that this is not a case of 'no evidence'; hence the proceedings cannot be quashed in summary proceedings on the basis of provisions of section 561-A, Cr. P.C., as quashment of proceedings by the Court at so early a stage gives an unfortunate impression of stifling of criminal prosecution, by exercise of an extraordinary power which is given for the dispensation of complete justice, in the forms provided by law.
7. I have carefully considered the compassionate plea raised by the learned counsel referred above. This plea on the face of it seems to be attractive and emotional, but as the justice in blind; this plea too is rejected.
8. For the foregoing reasons no case for interference of this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary power under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is made out, hence this petition is dismissed accordingly.