DECISION ' These five appeals are directed against the order, dated 18-12-1989, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,VII, at Sukkur, whereby the learned Labour Court dismissed the grievance petitions of all the five appellants. As the main points of facts and law involved are similar I will dispose all of them by this single decision.
2. I have heard Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Shabbir Ahmed Awan, learned counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. The admitted facts appear to be that the appellants were admittedly employed by the respondents mill as workmen. They formed a Trade Union somewhere in January or February, 1989 and were elected as its office-bearers and sent such intimation by registered post which was admittedly received by the respondents on 5-2-1989. The respondents also filed an application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969, in the learned Labour Court challenging the validity and legality of the Union. The contention of the respondents, however, is that the appellants had voluntarily resigned in December, 1988 and their resignations were accepted on 31-12-1988 when they received their dues in full and final settlement. The appellants, however, claim that they continued to work up to 2-2-1989 and 3rd February being Friday they were refused entry in the mills on 4-2- 1989, because of union activities. Thereafter, they served grievance notice upon the respondents and then filed grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court.
4. The only point that requires consideration is whether the appellants had tendered their resignation and have received their dues in full and final settlement.
5. The respondents have mainly relied upon the applications for Resignation and Receipts of the dues in full and final settlement produced by them before the learned Labour Court purporting to bear the signatures of the appellants. The appellants have denied the signatures. Appellant Khair Muhammad in the cross-examination first admitted his signature on the receipt but subsequently denied his signature on the receipt. He also denied his signature on the application for resignation.
The respondents have not produced any witness in whose presence the appellants allegedly signed these documents. The only witness produced by them is Muhammad Zakaria who does not specifically state that he was conversant with the signatures of the appellants and that on these documents he identified signatures of the appellant. He only states that be has produced the aforementioned document containing the signatures of the appellants which would not indicate that he was conversant with their signatures and identified them. In a question which was put in cross-examination to Mr. Muhammad Zakaria, he admitted that be could not say that the contents of the resignations were in the handwriting of the appellants as the same were not delivered to him.
6. The appellants, on the other hand, have denied that they had resigned in December, 1988 and in support have produced Attendance Card on the `printed pro forma' of the respondents for the months of January and February, 1989 which according to them were signed by one Ali Sher, a Clerk in the mill. The 'initials' of All Sher appears for 1st and 2nd February, 1989 as well as on all the working days of January, 1989. Mr. Muhammad Zakaria admitted that Ali Sher was their employee but denied that he was authorised to `initial' or issue Cards. Mr. Shabbir Ahmed Awan submitted, that as issuance of Attendance Cards was denied by the respondents, it was duty of the appellants to have properly proved Attendance Cards by summoning Ali Sher or by referring the documents to the Handwriting Expert. The initials of Ali Sher on these Attendance Cards are not specifically denied by the witness of the respondent. Mr. Baloch submits, that Ali Sher being employee of the respondents the burden shifted upon them to disprove the Attendance Cards because the appellants had discharged the initial burden by producing the original documents. It is settled law, that in proceedings under 'Labour Laws' the provisions of Evidence Act are not strictly applicable. In such cases we have also to look the surrounding circumstances while considering as to whether the contention of which party was more believable and probable. Had the appellants resigned in December, 1988 it does not appeal to reason that they would have formed union immediately after one month and also would have been elected as office-bearers of the Union, which facts are not denied. Mr. Shabbir Ahmed Awan submits that in the counter-affidavits the witness of the respondents had alleged that Attendance Cards were forged. It is also settled law that proof of 'forgery' is always upon the party who alleges it, and as such except statement of Mohammad Zakaria, as pointed above, there is no other evidence.
7. The only other evidence on which appellants rely is Attendance Register for the month of January and February in which the names of the appellants do not transpire. It is submitted by Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch that these registers have been manipulated by the respondents after the dispute arose between the parties and both of them appraoched the Labour Court. There is no proof of such manipulation, but the registers were in possession and power of respondents. Where two views are possible, the view favourable to workman will have to be adopted, because the 'Labour Laws' are for the benefits of 'Workman'.
8. Keeping in view all oral and documentary evidence produced by parties in juxtaposition, I am of the opinion that the appellants had not resigned in December, 1988 and that they continued to be in service up to 2-2-1989. It is not disputed, that since 4-2-1989 they were not allowed to E resume duties because according to respondents, they had resigned, which contention has not been accepted by this Tribunal.
9. Mr. Shabbir Ahmed Awan, further submitts, that from the Attendance Registers, the number of workmen would be less than 49 in the respondent mills and therefore Second proviso of section 1 of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 would be applicable. This proviso, however, does not exclude the application of clause (3) of Standing Order 12 and it is not the case of the respondents that they terminated the services of the appellants by an order in writing as required under clause (3).
9-A. The case of 'Dil Murad' requires further considerations. In his cross-examination he had admitted, that the 'grievance notice', which was produced by him alongwith his 'grievance application', does not bear his signature. Mr. Baloch submitted, that he made this admission because he was 'illiterate'. However no such clarification was obtained in the re-examination. No other F grievance notice has been produced to show that he served grievance notice upon the respondent, which bore his signature. The workman cannot come to the Labour Court unless he first served 'grievance notice' upon the employer. The grievance notice which does not bear the signature of the workman or the steward cannot be considered as proper 'grievance notice'.
10. In view of the above discussions the Appeal (No,SUK-22 of 1990) filed by 'Dil Murad' is dismissed while other appeals filed by the other four appellants are allowed and the impugned orders of the learned Labour Court are set aside. They are ordered to be reinstated in service with full back benefits. The order to be implemented within one month.