' Briefly the facts of the ease are that the petitioner and respondent No,3 filed nomination papers for. Contesting election to membership of the Cantonment Board, Gujranwala (Ward No,1) on 3-12- 1991. On 5-12-1991 the scrutiny was held by the Returning Officer who accepted the nomination papers of the petitioner and respondent No,3. Respondent No3 preferred an appeal before respondent No,1 against the acceptance of nomination papers of the petitioner. Respondent No,1 accepted the appeal and rejected the petitioner's nomination papers.
2. The learned counsel contends that no appeal was competent before respondent No,1 under the law. He submits that by virtue of the provisions of Rule 12-A of the Cantonments (Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1979, the appeal was competent only against the rejection of nomination papers.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No,1 submits that the petitioner was disqualified to contest the election as he was removed from Government Service on 15-4-1990 and 3 years had not yet elapsed. Hence, by virtue of provision of subsection 2 (g) of section 15 (b) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 read with the provision of subsection (1-A (j) of section 99 of the Representation of the People Act of 1976, a person cannot contest election unless a period of 3 years had elapsed since the date of removal from service. He submits that even if the impugned order is void, no relief can be granted to the petitioner who is otherwise disqualified to contest the election. He further submits that the President of the Cantonment Board enjoys vast supervisory powers in election matters and can be deemed to have exercised the said powers. In this connection he refers to various provisions of the Act including section 15-B-B subsection (2) (a & b) and section 15-D of the Act.
4. The learned counsel for respondent No3 contends that even if the impugned order is void, no relief can be granted in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction as held in the case of Ronaq All v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 2.36). Learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 have also placed reliance on the case of Syed All Shah v. Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani and others (PLD 1990 SC 504).
5. The petitioner was employed as a Laboratory Assistant in the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences, Islamabad and was removed from service with effect from 15-4-1990 on the charges of misconduct. The said institute is controlled by the Government and is legally a department of the Government and the employees enjoy the status of Civil Servants. Hence by virtue of the provisions of section 15-8 (g) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 read with section 99 (1-A) (j) and (k) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, was disqualified to contest the election. His nomination papers were obviously accepted in disregard of the above-referred provisions of law. I am not prepared to countenance the argument that the petitioner may be allowed to contest the election and in case he succeeds his election may be declared to be void by the Election Tribunal, which may order fresh poles in accordance with the law. The impugned order, even if void; has the effect of saving the parties, the electorate as well as the Government functionaries from hardship of a decision by the Tribunal and holding of fresh polls which involve great expenditure and consume energies and time of the parties, voters and the Government functionaries. The impugned order has been passed in aid of justice and to strike it down would amount to perpetuating a manifest illegally. In the case of Ronaq Ali, the Horeble Supreme Court was pleased to hold as under: "An order in the nature of writ of certiorari and mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures manifest illegality then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not be allowed to be invoked."
A similar view was expressed in the case of Syed All Shah in which it was held that the paramount consideration for the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 was whether' setting aside of an order which suffered from a legal infirmity would advance the cause of justice or perpetuate an injustice. In the present case I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioner who was a Government servant and removed on the ground of misconduct on L5-4-1990, was clearly disqualified to contest election under section 99 (1-A) (j) of the Act. Even if the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel is accepted that the grounds of misconduct were not substantiated, the petitioner was still disqualified by virtue of caluse (k) of the above section as a period of two years had not yet elapsed since the date of his removal from service.
6. In view of the above legal position I need not enter into the other argument of the petitioner's learned counsel that the President of the Cantonment Board enjoys supervisory powers and his order was legally valid. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.