1. ' WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.--- Investment Corporation of Pakistan, appellant herein, sued Syed Jamaat All Shah and Begum Jamaat All Shah, defendants/respondents herein for the recovery of Rs,19,26,878.26. The detail of the claim is narrated in the plaint as well as the judgments of the lower forums and need not be reiterated as the High Court (first appellate Court) has decided the appeal on the point of limitation alone. The suit was contested, necessary issues in the case were framed and the learned trial Judge, vide his judgment and decree, dated 24-6-1986, decreed the suit of the plaintiff/appellant, but on appeal the same was reversed by the High Court vide judgment and decree, dated 20-3-1989. The instant appeal was filed in this Court which, as per report of the office, is barred by 30 days. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Sardar Abdur Rauf Khan and others v. The Land Acquisition Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Abbottabad and others 1991 SCM R 2164 submitted that the same may be treated as petition for leave to appeal. The learned counsel for the respondents was heard in this respect.
2. Following the cited judgment, we convert the appeal into petition for leave to appeal and grant leave as important question of limitation is involved.
3. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the _merits of the case and have perused the record of the case. Both the learned counsel restricted their arguments to the finding of the lower two forums on issue No,2 relating to limitation. According to the terms of the agreement, dated 11-12-1968, the defendants were to deposit the sale price with Investment Corporation of Pakistan on 13-3-1973 but they did not comply their contractual obligation and neither paid the agreed minimum dividend nor deposited the sale price of the said 99,394 shares in spite of repeated reminders, notices, etc. The plaintiff/appellant, consequently, initiated proceedings in the Court of Collector, Lahore District for the recovery of its dues under section 31 of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan Ordinance IV of 1966. The defendants instituted a suit on 9-10-1973 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Lahore against the plaintiff, Tehsildar Lahore, and the Collector, Lahore District praying that they be restrained from demanding, claiming receiving any amount from the defendants and that they be restrained from taking any coercive steps for the realisation of the aforesaid amount, and for quashing the warrants issued by them. An ad interim injunction was secured by them from the Court concerned regarding maintenance of status quo. The defendants withdrew from the suit on 31-7-1974. The plaintiff specifically claimed exemption under sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act in para. 16 of the plaint which prevailed with the learned trial Judge, but the appellate Court in its impugned judgment did not concur with him on the ground that section 14 was not attracted because the Revenue Officer conducting the proceedings for the recovery of dues was not a Court and section 15 was inapplicable because the injunction passed by the Court directed only stoppage of the recovery rather than institution of the suit.
4. ' For the proper understanding of the present controversy, it is appropriate to reproduce sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act:- "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.---(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of Appeal, against the defendant, shall 'be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any applicant the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a' Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
5. 'Explanation I.-- In excluding the time during which a former suit or application was pending, the day on which that suit or application was instituted or made, and the day on which the proceeding therein ended, shall both be counted.
6. Explanation II.--- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding.
7. Explanation II For the purposes of this section misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.
15. Exclusion of time during which proceedings are suspended.- -- (1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded."
8. The careful reading of the aforementioned provisions of law makes it amply clear that the plaintiff/appellant cannot legally claim the exemption of the period spent in carrying out the proceedings before the Collector for the realisation of debt and the finding of the learned appellate Court in this regard is not open to challenge. However, we are convinced that section 15 of the Limitation Act was fully attracted in the circumstances of the case. The defendants had filed a suit in the Civil Court disputing their liability to pay the amount claimed by the plaintiff/appellant and had sought a perpetual injunction against the plaintiff/appellant restraining them from the realisation of the dues. An ad interim injunction had been issued by the Court on 9-10-1973 which remained operative till 31-7-1974 when the suit was withdrawn. The moot point for consideration, therefore, is whether during this period the plaintiff/appellant could legally embark upon recovery proceedings through a regular suit as permitted under section 31 of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1966) in the presence of the injunction order issued by the competent Court of law or not. As stated earlier the plaintiff claimed exemption in para. 16 of the plaint giving the details of the period during which limitation remained suspended. The defendants in their written statement have admitted the dates of institution and culmination of the proceedings before the Civil Court and also the issuance of stay order and they never agitated that the temporary injunction was only for staying the recovery and not the institution of suit under section 31 of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan Ordinance ibid. As a matter of fact, the Investment Corporation Ordinance authorises the appellant to effect recovery of their dues as arrears of land revenue through Collector and also through a regular civil suit under section 31 of the I.C.P.
9. Ordinance ibid. Consequently, the object of section 31 is the recovery of dues through Collector or Civil Court and since the recovery had been stayed by the injunction order, the institution of suit under section 31 was practically restrained and the mere institution of such suit could have made the appellant liable for contempt and defiance of injunction order under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. After deducting the period from 9-10-1973 to 31-7-1974, in which the injunction remained operative, the suit was within the statutory period of limitation. Therefore, the finding of the appellate Court on issue No,2 is not maintainable and by reversing the same, suit is held as within time.
10. ' Resultantly, we accept this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court for decision of other issues, with costs throughout.