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1975 PLC 582

KARACHI WAREHOUSE & CARRIERS WORKERS' UNIONS vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE

Citation1975 PLC 582
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. KAR-143 of 1974
Date1974-05-28
Judge(s)Inamullah Khan
ResultN/A

DECISION The impugned order was passed on the 12th of April 1974, whereby the learned Presiding Officer Sind Labour Court No. II, cancelled the registration of the appellant-Union on an application made by the Registrar of Trade Unions under section 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the 'Ordinance').

2. Their Registration was cancelled mainly on ^ the ground that the appellant-Union had gone on illegal strike without complying with the provisions of the Ordinance. It was alleged that the Union had struck work from the 23rd of March 1974 without complying with the provisions of section 26 of the Ordinance. Mr. K. R. Jan, the learned Representative for the appellant- Union contended in the first place that the application was not maintainable inasmuch as the Registrar cannot be said to have authorised any one to file the said application on his behalf. A Letter of Authority appears at page 9 of the record of the Court. It is dated 30th of March 1974. The Authority was given to Mr. Abdul Sattar Daudpota, Labour Officer, Karachi, to file documents on his behalf. The Order-Sheet dated the 30th of March 1974 reads as under1 "Application received through the Labour Officer of the applicant. Admit. Register. Issue summons to respondent for reply statement. Hearing 15-4-1974." In the meantime it appears that the case was transferred from the Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. V, where it was pending, to the Second Sind Labour Court for early disposal. The Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. II, antidated the date of hearing to the 3rd of April 1974. 1975 Kar. Warehouse & Carreers Workers* Union v. Registrar, 583 Trade Unions {Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal)

3. There is not much force in the contention of the learned Representative for the appellant that the application presented on the 30th of March 1974 was not properly presented. In this connection a reference may be made to section 13 of the Ordinance. The relevant provision of section 13 reads as under1 "The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar: {a)...................................................................................................................

(b) to lodge (or authorise any person to lodge) complaints with the Labour Courts for action against Trade Union for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provisions of this Ordinance." The words in brackets were introduced by Act XXIX of 1973 much later.

No specific Form is prescribed so far for authorising some one to lodge complaint on behalf of the Registrar. I would hold that the Letter of Authority appearing at page 9 of the record of the Labour Court is sufficient compliance of the provisions of law.

4. In the second place it was contended that the Registrar had not given any show-cause notice to the appellant before the alleged complaint to the Court. It is true that no such show-cause notice was given by the Registrar but the law does not require that any notice of show-cause be given before lodging complaint with the Labour Court. At any rate no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the appellant by failure on the part of the Registrar to issue show-cause notice. The appellants had every opportunity to show what they wanted before the Labour Court.

5. In the third place Mr. Jan contended that 23rd was a Holiday and, therefore, the appellants were not bound to work. No such plea was taken before the learned Labour Court. Mere denial of strike would not include the fact that 23rd being the holiday the question of work did not arise and, therefore, the question of illegal strike was immaterial. I would, therefore, hold that in the absence of specific statement to that effect the objection cannot be taken into consideration.

6. In the fourth place it was contended that the Union was not given time to file any affidavit. The Order-Sheet does not support the contention of Mr. Jan, the learned Representative of the appellant. There is no application on behalf of the Union that they wanted to produce any evidence in support of their reply statement. The Order-Sheet of 12th of April 1974 reads as under: "Mr. A. Sattar, Labour Officer present for the applicant. Respondents and their Representative also present. Respondent file reply statement. Arguments also heard today.

Application allowed. Order announced in open Court.** From the above Order-Sheet it does not appear that the Union after filing the reply statement wanted to file any affidavit in support of their objection in the reply statement. Had that been so a request could have been made before addressing the Court that the Union wanted to file an affidavit in support of their contention. At any rate no prejudice can be said to have been caused as the other side was also not allowed to file an affidavit in support of what was stated in the application. It was a best case of no evidence from both sides. I thought over this matter and came to the conclusion that no useful purpose can be served by dismissing the application at this stage as there is no bar for the Registrar to lodge fresh complaint on the same ground. Moreover, it would prejudice the Registrar as the Union can improve its case in the light of the observation I have been making during the course of the arguments. This will cause prejudice to the respondent.

7. Lastly, it was urged that the remedy of the respondent lay under section 57 of the Ordinance and that a complaint under said section has, in fact, been filed before a Magistrate which is still undisposed. There is nothing in the Ordinance to debar the Registrar, if a complaint under1 section 57 has been lodged, to pursue the alternative remedy under section 101 B for cancellation of the Registration. These two remedies are independent! remedies. In the absence of any bar I would hold that the Registrar was competent to pursue his remedy under section 10 of the Ordinance. No other point was urged by Mr. Jan, the learned Representative of the appellant. The appeal, for the reasons given above, is dismissed.

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