' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 3128/88 and 3140/88 which arises under the similar circumstances.
2. The petitioners in both these petitions are owners of chemical plants situated within the municipal area of Sheikhupura. For the purposes of manufacturing Polymer Chips, the petitioners import two chemicals, namely, Mono-Ethylene Glycol (MEG) and Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA), on which octroi duty is leviable and was being recovered by the respondents in accordance with the rates given in the octroi schedule, which at the relevant time, according to the petitioners was Rs,14.52 per quintal. Subsequently, however, an order was passed by respondent No,1 whereby the- lessee was authorized to charge octroi on the goods mentioned above at the rate given against item 32 of the octroi schedule i,e. @ Rs,21.78 per quintal.
3. Aggrieved by this increase, the petitioners filed appeals before the Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura, who dismissed the same. Thereupon two Constitutional petitions were filed (Writ Petition Nos.2246/88 and 1960/87), in this Court, which were disposed of on 7th July, 1987 observing that it was the Taxation Officer who under the rules was competent to adjudicate upon the disputes regarding the octroi rates and not the Chairman. The matter was thereafter taken in hand by the Taxation Officer who vide his order dated 9th May, 1988 upheld the contention of the petitioners that they were liable to pay the octroi duty under item No,43 of the octroi schedule and not under item No,32.
4. This order of the Taxation Officer was challenged by respondent No,2, the Contractor, by filing appeals before the Chairman, Municipl Committee, Sheikhupura, who admitted the same for regular hearing on 24th May, 1988 and issued notice to the respondents to appear before him for 12th June, 1988 and meanwhile, suspended the operation of the order impugned before him. This order of the Chairman, Municipal Committee, Sheikhvpura, has been assailed in these two petitions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of these petitions, had contended that against the order of the Taxation Officer, no appeal was competent before the Chairman of the Municipal Committee and as such respondent No,1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Reference in this connection has been made to rules 216 and 226 of the West Pakistan Municipal Committee Octroi Rules, 1964 and M/s. Chudhary Brothers, Karachi v. People's Municipality, Kotri, Sindh and another 1980 CLC 2026.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that these petitions are premature as the order impugned in these petitions is only of admission of the appeals to the regular hearing and no Constitutional petition can be maintained against such an order. The learned counsel alsosubmitted that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel are distinguishable and in any case the appeal would be competent under the Punjab Local Councils (Appeal) Rules, 1990.
7. The objection on behalf of the respondents that the present petitions are premature is well taken.
The order impugned in these petitions was passed on 25th May, 1988, whereby the appeals filed by the respondent No,4 who is the lessee of the Municipal Committee were admitted to regular hearing and notices were issued to the respondents in the appeals. The petitioners, however, instead of appearing before the Chairman and contesting the appeals or objecting to his jurisdiction, rushed to this Court by filing these petitions. Such a course cannot be countenanced.
As the Chairman had himself fixed 12th of June, 1988 as the next date of hearing, the petitioners should have in the first instance appeared before him and if they were of the view that he had no jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the appeals, such an objection should have been raised before the Chairman. No Constitutional petition can be maintained against the order admitting the appeals to regular hearing, which is purely interim in nature.
8. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the Chairman while admitting the appeals had suspended the operation of the order of the Taxation Officer, they were forced to file these Constitutional petitions. This argument of the learned counsel is not well based. The order C whereby the operation of the impugned order of the Taxation Officer was suspended was purely ad interim in nature. It was open to the petitioners to appear before the Chairman and to apply for vacation of the ad interim order or to contest its confirmation. The mere fact that ad interim order had been D passed by the Chairman, did not entitle the petitioners to challenge that order by filing these Constitutional petitions.
' As a result of what has been stated above, these petitions are dismissed, with no orders as to costs. The respondent Chairman is directed to dispose of the appeals filed by the petitioners, within one month from today.