' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---These are three appeals by special leave from the judgment dated 22-1- 1984 of the Lahore High Court whereby in writ jurisdiction the order, dated 22-12-1977 of the Board of Revenue was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. On 18-6-1965 the Provincial Government issued a notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, for acquisition of land spread over 42 Revenue Estates in Mianwali, including the estates of Silwan and Ghallugara, on behalf of WAPDA for the purpose of construction of the pond area for Chashma Barrage as part of the Indus Basin Replacement Works. The said notification was followed by two further notifications, one issued on 3-2-1967 under section 17 and the other on 28- 4-1%7 under section 6 of the Act. By two separate letters, dated 19-8-1967 and 9-10-1967 the Land Acquisition Collector requested the Deputy Commissioner, Mianwali, that no mutations of alienation should be attested without his permission in respect of land under acquisition as these were likely to complicate his task in apportioning compensations. Apparently, the request met with no response as mutations relating to the land in question continued to be attested by the local revenue officers. The Land Acquisition Collector announced his award on 31-12-1968.
3. On 8-2-1968 WAPDA took possession of 182 kanals of land situate in village Silwan. On 4-2-1970 it obtained possession of the rest of the land falling in that estate. On 5-5-1971 it received possession of land in Ghullugara estate also.
4. Col. Muhammad Hanif was owner of about 1,774 Kanals of land in Silwan and of 295 Kanals of land in Ghullugara. He sold 243 Kanals and 10 Marlas of his land situate in village Silwan to nine persons, respondents Nos.1 to 9 in Civil Appeal. No,83 (hereinafter referred to as the vendees). Five of the vendees were his close relatives. The sale was an oral one and was evidenced by Mutation No,5247, entered on 3-7-1967 and attested on 10-2-1968.
5. On 14-4-1969 Col. Muhammad Hanif transferred his entire holding by way of gift in village Ghullugara to the respondents in Civil Appeal No,84 (hereinafter referred to as the donees) after obtaining permission from the Land Acquisition Collector. The gift was an oral one and was evidenced by a mutation bearing No,1922. The donees were related to him.
6. On 12-6-1968 the vendees moved an application before the Collector, Mianwali, for the correction of the entries in the Khasra Girdawari with regard to the land purchased by them for the harvests of Kharif 1967 and Rabi 1968. Their case was that the land had been under cultivation during the said harvest, seasons, yet it had been erroneously shown as Banjar Qadeem. After an inquiry at the spot by the local Naib-Tehsildar the Collector by an order dated 16-1-1970 allowed the application in respect of three Khasras only.
7. Although the owners of the land acquired by the Provincial Government were entitled to receive compensations only in cash, they started agitating for the allotment of State land. In order to re- settle them, the Provincial Government earmarked an area of 1,34,408 acres falling in 29 Rakhs of Khushab Tehsil and 2 Rakhs of Mianwali Tehsil. The Board of Revenue issued three memoranda to the local officers setting out the schemes for the allotment of reserved land. Of these three memoranda, those issued on 3-7-1968 and 9-9-1968 alone are relevant. In the memorandum issued on 3-7-1968 the following principles were to be followed for making allotments to the affected persons: "(i) the minimum limit of entitlement should be the same as that fixed for Tarbela Dam oustees, i.e,, 4 Kanals irrigated or 16 Kanals unirrigated cultivated land acquired from each land owner;
(ii) the calculation of entitlement should be made ownerwise and not Khatawise:
(iii) the minimum size of allotment should be 15 acres instead of 12-1/2 acres and the maximum 50 acres;
(iv) while calculating the entitlement, the land left unacquired with each owner should be taken into account and the owners who are left with 50 acres or more after acquisition should not be considered entitled to get any land."
' The memorandum issued on 9-9-1968 was a more detailed one. Paragraph 14 of this memorandum provided:
(i) The floor of eligibility to allotment of land will be half acre of irrigated land or two acres of Barani land under cultivation in the affected areas;
(ii) the calculation of entitlement should be made owner-wise and a person holding half acre of irrigated land or two acres of Barani land. Under cultivation in the affected area and above will be given upto 15 acres (which is considered to be a subsistance holding);
(iii) person owning more than 15 acres of land will be given equivalent area but no one will get more than 50 acres of irrigated land;
(iv) while calculating entitlement, the land left unacquired with each owner would be taken into account and the owner who was left with 50 acres or more after acquisition would not (sic);
(v) if an allotment is made to a person not entitled to such allotment or is in excess of entitlement, it should be cancelled or reduced as the case may be."
8. On 5/18-7-1968 Col. Muhammad Hanif obtained allotment of 50 acres of land in Rakh Nikru Shaheed in pursuance of the scheme contained in the memorandum of 3-7-1968. This was the maximum allotment which he could have obtained under any of the two schemes. Consequent upon correction of the Khasra Girdawari, the vendees too became eligible to obtain land under the scheme of 9-9-1968. Accordingly, on 4-8-1970 they obtained allotments of 15 acres each in Rakh Maikan. Similarly the donees who had obtained land from Col. Muhammad Hanif in village Ghallugara were also able to secure allotment of 15 acres each under the scheme of 9-9-1968 in Rakh Dulleywala.
9. On 28-10-1970 Col. Muhammad Hanif as well as the vendees filed applications under section 17, Colonization of Government Lands Act, before. The Resettlement Officer who was also vested with the powers of the Collector, for the exchange of their allotments in Rakhs Nikru Shaheed and Maikan with the land in Rakh Dulleywala. Their applications were allowed by the Resettlement Officer on the following day, that is, 29-10-1970.
10. It was the case of the respondents in the three appeals that after obtaining land in exchange in Rakh Dulleywala they incurred huge expense in developing it. At present they have their houses as well as orchards therein. In support of their assertion in this regard they have placed certain photographs on the record.
11. On the basis of the agreement among the allottees-of Rakh Dulleywala the land falling therein was divided into four Waris, namely, Wari Awan, Wari Pathan Behram Khel, Wan Pathan Seeru Khel and Wari Pathan Ali Sher Khel. This division was made primarily with the object of settling the persons affected by the construction of Chashma Barrage on tribe-wise basis.
12. The appellants in the appeals before us were owners of land in village Ghallugara. They were also allotted land in Rakh Dulleywala. They were not satisfied with the allotment in the said Rakh and they asked for being settled in village Kalure Kot of Bhakkar Tehsil. In one of the applications they stated: "That the applicants are evictees from village Gullugara Tehsil and District Mianwali. It was proposed by the allotment officer that the evictees from village Gallugara will be allotted the lands in tehsil Bhakkar tribe-wise. The allotment Officer allotted the land as proposed by hint but the land which has been allotted to the tribe of the applicants is barren, sandy and uncommandable. The said land cannot be brought under cultivation even for two centuries because there are sand dunes of the height of about 30 to 40 ft. And there is no plain tract of land which can be brought under cultivation or irrigated by the water to be supplied by the Canal Authorities."
' Their request for allotment of land in village Kalure Kot was turned down on the ground that no land was available there. Soon thereafter they started agitating against the allotments made to the respondents in Rakh Dulleywala. They filed time-barred appeals before the Commissioner, Sargodha Division, against the orders by which Lt.-Col. Muhammad Hanif as well as the vendees were permitted to exchange their original allotments for the land in Rakh Dulleywala as also the order of the Collector by which he had allowed correction of the Khasra Girdawari. These appeals were -dismissed by the Additional Commissioner both on merits and as barred by time. They filed revision petitions before the Board of Revenue.
13. It appears that certain complaints were also made to the advisor to the Governor whereupon a report was called for by the Board of Revenue from the Commissioner, Sargodha Division. The Commissioner made some inquiries and by a letter dated 19-4-1975 addressed to the Board he sought review of Mutation No,5247 on the ground that the sale made by Col. Muhammad Hanif in favour of the vendees was fraudulent inasmuch as its sole object was to create multiple eligibilities for allotment. The Board of Revenue granted the necessary permission. Subsequently, an Assistant Collector cancelled the mutation. As a result the allotments made to the vendees in Rakh Dulleywala were also cancelled. They filed a writ petition in the High Court to challenge the orders of the Revenue authorities in this regard.
14. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court, the revision petitions preferred by the appellants came up for hearing before a learned Member of the Board of Revenue. He had also before him the report of the Commissionet. He issued suo motu notices to Col. Muhammad Hanif, the vendees and the donees, inter alia, to show-cause why their allotments in Rakh Dulleywala be not cancelled. As the matter was being re-considered by the Board, the High Court dismissed the writ petition preferred by the vendees.
15. All the revision petitions were heard together by a learned Member of the Board of Revenue. He, inter alia, held:
(i) The transfers of land made by Col. Muhammad Hanif in favour of the vendees and donees by way of sale and gift were intended to create multiple eligibilities.
(ii) The sale made in favour of the vendees was void, inter alia, for the reason that it was in violation of clause seventhly of section 24, Land Acquisition Act
(iii) The gift made by Col. Muhammad Hanif in favour of the donees was inchoata inasmuch as the possession of the land gifted had not been given to the donees.
(iv) The exchanges of land allowed to Col. Muhammad Hanif and the vendees were illegal as these had been made in violation of the relevant instructions contained in the Colony Manual and Land Administration Manual.
(v) The order directing correction of the Khasra Girdawari was illegal as the proper procedure in making the same had not been allowed.
' Accordingly, he set aside the allotments made in favour of the vendees and the donees in Rakh Dulleywala and directed that the land thus becoming available should be given to the appellants.
Nevertheless, he regularised the exchange of land allowed to Col. Muhammad Hanif and three of the vendees.
16. Both the vendees and the donees filed separate Constitution petitions in the High Court to call in question the legality of the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue. The appellants also filed a constitution petition to challenge the order of the learned Member whereby he had regularised the exchanges in favour of Col. Muhammad Hanif and three of the vendees. A learned Single Judge accepted the writ petitions preferred by the vendees and the donees and declared the order of the learned Member to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. He also dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants. From the order of the learned Single Judge the appellants have come in appeal to this Court.
17. Mr. S.M. Zafar who has appeared on behalf of the vendees has raised a preliminary objection to the competency of these appeals. He states that the appellants have no locus standi to question the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to him, the question whether the sale and the gift were valid and whether the exchanges of allotments were legal were matters of no concern to the appellants. They could not, therefore, be said to be aggrieved by the order made by the High Court; consequently they had no right to come in appeal to this Court. There is little merit in this preliminary objection.It is to be noticed that while setting aside the allotments made to the vendees and the donees the learned Member, Board of Revenue, had directed that the land becoming so available in Rakh Dulleywala should be allotted to the appellants. The High Court took upon itself to set aside the order of the learned Member, thus putting an end to the entitlement created in their favour; in the circumstances the appellants had an interest in getting the order of the learned Member restored. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants had no locust, standi to prefer these appeals. In support of this view reference may be made to a judgment of this Court reported as Muhammad Din v. Ghulam Muhammad Naseem Sindhu PLD 1991 SC 1 where in similar circumstances the persons whose entitlement stood affected by an order set aside by the High Court were held to be competent to come in appeal to this Court.
18. The main grievance of the appellants before us was that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, had after a comprehensive and detailed examination of the record come to the conclusion that the sale and the gift made by Col. Muhammad Hanif were motivated entirely by the object of creating multiple eligibilities in favour of his close relatives. Similarly, after taking into consideration all the circumstances he had found that the correction of the Khasra Girdawari and the exchanges allowed to Col. Muhammad Hanif and the vendees violated the relevant rules and the instructions.
These were findings which he was competent to record and the High Court could not in constitutional jurisdiction interfere with them. On the other hand, in complete disregard of the principles which governed the judicial review of administrative action the High Court disposed of the matter in a fashion which was only available to a .Court of appeal. This was cleary not permissible. In support of this contention reference was made to the judgments of this Court reported as Muhammad Hussain v. Sikandar PLD 1974 SC 139 and Muhammad Sharif Puri v.
Additional District Judge 1985 SCM R 6.
19. By way of reply Mr. S.M. Zafar contended that this was a case where the learned Member had not only misread the record but also had misapplied the law. In these circumstances the High Court was justified in interfering with his order in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. In support of this contention he referred to a number of judgments of this Court reported as Noora v.
Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner (1969 SCM R 517), N.M. Khan v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (1970 SCM R 158), Federal Land Commission v. Gul .Bibi (1983 SCM R 818), Amina Begum v. Muhammad Nazir (PLD 1985 SC 260) and Utility Stores Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1987 SC 447).
20. It is well-accepted now that in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction the High Court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings recorded by a special Tribunal. However, its competence to intervene cannot be denied when the decision of the special Tribunal is based on misreading of the record or when the findings recorded by it do not take into account all the material facts or where it makes an error of law apparent on the face of the record. In this context it would be sufficient to quote the following passage from the judgment of this Court in the case of Utility Stores Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, ibid: "It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it 'rightly or wrongly' because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with the law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly, when the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside the jurisdiction and, therefore, a determination of the Tribunal which is shown to .Be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction."
21. The learned Member held the sale made by Col. Muhammad Hanif in favour of the vendees to be void for the reasons:
(1) it had been made after the issuance of the notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, and was thus hit by the bar contained in clause seventhly of section 24 of the Act;
(2) the sale was kept secret from the Land Acquisition Collector;
(3) there was a bar to the attestation of the mutation in view of the letters written by the Land Acquisition Collector;
(4) the sale was not motivated by any business principles but was effected with a view to create multiple eligibilities to obtain alternate land under the resettlement schemes; and
(5) WAPDA had obtained physical possession of the land in village Silwan on 8-2-1968.
' The High Qourt found that none of these considerations was valid and for that reason the learned Member acted illegally in directing the cancellation of the mutation. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we consider that the reasons given by the High Court in interfering with the view taken by the learned Member are unassailable.
22. It is to be noticed that by the mere fact of issuance of a notice under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, an owner of the land does not become divested of his rights therein for under section 16 of the Act the land under acquisition becomes vested in the Government only after its possession has been taken over by the Collector. There is nothing in the Act which would stand in the way of the owner from disposing of the property till he is divested of his rights therein. Of course, in such an event the transferee takes all the risks in purchasing land subject to acquisition proceedings and what in substance he buys is merely the right to receive compensation. Clause seventhly of section 24 to which the learned Member had referred cannot be construed as creating a bar in the right of the owner in alienating his property for it relates to matters which are not to be taken into consideration by the Collector while determining compensations. In fact this clause presupposed that after the D issuance of a notification under section 4, certain transactions may have taken place. This being the legal position the learned Member was clearly in error in holding that the sale made by Col. Muhammad Hanif in favour of the vendees was void as it was effected after a notification under section 4, Land. Acquisition Act, had already been issued. The mutation attested by the revenue officer merely records an event that has already taken place. It has nothing to do with the rights of the owners to deal with their property in any manner as they like. The mere fact that the Land Acquisition Collector had requested the Deputy Commissioner not to attest any mutation of alienation of property has no bearing whatsoever on the rights of the owners of the land with regard to property owned by them. In fact after the issuance of the notification under the said section, hundred of mutations of alienations were attested and the Land Acquisition Collector took notice of these mutations and awarded compensation to the transferees. It is also incorrect to say that the sale was kept secret from the Land Acquisition Collector for he was aware of the sale and he directed payment of compensation to them. The question whether the said sale was or was not motivated by business principles was not a matter for the learned Member to comment upon.
However that may be, the sale consideration was Rs,12,000. The Land Acquisition Collector determined the amount of compensation at Rs,13,550. There was not much difference between the two amounts. It is true that WAPDA took physical possession of part of the land falling in village Silwan on 8-2-1968 but then the sale had already been completed on 3-7-1967 when the mutation was entered by the local Patwari in his register. It is also to be noticed that the land covered by the sale measured 243 Kanals and 10 Marlas whereas WAPDA took possession of only 182 kanals of land on 8-2-1968. It is not clear from the record that the land taken over by WAPDA included the land purchased by the vendees. In the circumstances the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the learned Member erred in declaring the sale to be void and in ordering the cancellation of the relevant mutation on that account.
23. The order of the Collector in directing the correction of the Khasra Girdawari was based on the findings of the Naib-Tesildar who had held a local inquiry. Prior to the inquiry the land was being shown as Banjar Qadeem. The respondents were able to produce evidence before the Naib- Tehsildar showing that the entries in the Khasra Girdawari were incorrect and as a matter of fact at least three of the Khasras had been under cultivation. While setting aside the order of the Collector, the learned Member did not comment upon the correctness of the fmdings of the Naib-Tehsildar which were accepted by the Collector but relied upon rules 7.43 and 7.49 of the Land Records Manual to hold that entries of long-standing with regard to soil classification in the Jamabandi could not be changed without a mutation of `Seht Indraj' as required under section 44, Land Revenue Act. Perhaps, it was not brought to the notice of the learned Member that the Collector had not ordered the correction of the soil classification in the Jamabandi but had only directed the correction of entries in the Khasra Girdawari which after a spot inquiry had been found to be incorrect. There is nothing in rule 7.43 or 7.49, ibid., which required a mutation of `Seht Indraj' for correction of the register Girdawari. Thus, the very basis upon which the learned Member proceeded to set aside the order of the Collector was fallacious. The High Court was, therefore, justified in interfering with the order of the learned Member in this regard.
24. The learned Member was of the opinion that Col. Muhammad Hanif had sold the land' to the vendees in order to create multiple eligibilites. This. Was merely ari assumption without any factual basis. It is to be noticed that the sale was effected on 3-7-1967 and the mutation was attested on 10-2-1968.11e first scheme for allotment of land to the. Affected persons of Chasma Barrage was not formulated by the Government till 11-4-1968. Thus, at the time when the sale took place, there was no scheme of the Government to give land to the affected persons. It is, therefore, difficult to support the conclusion of the learned Member that the mutation of sale was intended to create multiple eligibilities for allotment.
25. However, so far as the donees are concerned, the position is different. Col. Muhammad Hanif made the gift on 14-4-1969 when the two schemes of 3-7-1968 and 9-9-1968 had already been announced and he had himself received alternate land to the maximum extent. The argument of the appellants, therefore, that the gift was made in order to create multiple. Eligibilities for allotment cannot be ruled out as unlikely. However, as already noticed, despite notification of acquisition Col. Muhammad Hanif was competent to dispose of the property in any manner he liked till its possession was taken over by the Collector in terms of the provisions of section 16, Land Acquisition Act.
26. It appears that the Government itself was not decided about the date with reference to which the entitlement to allotment of land to the affected persons should be determined. To begin with, it fixed the date of issuance of the notification under section 4 in this regard. Later, it altered it to the date on which the award was announced by the Land Acquisition Collector. After, some further wavering and on the advice of its Law Department it finally fixed the date on which possession was taken from the owners. Is the one relevant time for the purpose. Admittedly, this date was subsequent to the one on which the gift was made to the donees. It is to be noticed that there was nothing in the scheme which could be taken to stand in the way of an alienee from obtaining allotment when the alienor had already obtained an allotment to the maximum extent. That being the position, the allotments made to the donees could not be set aside on the ground that the gift had been made with the object of creating multiple eligibilities.
27. In support of his view the learned Member referred to memorandum No,1924-75-4061-CIV dated 9-12-1975 containing the orders of the Board relating to permission to review the mutation of sale (No,5247) in favour of the vendees. The Board had observed that the fixation of date for the purpose of determining entitlement to allotment of land under the scheme was intended to benefit only bona fide transferees and that those who had purchased land through colourable transactions brought about with the object of creating multiple eligibilities could not draw any advantage under the scheme. It is to be noticed that this memorandum was issued by the Board without hearing the vendees. Apart from that, as already mentioned, a large number of alienations (300 to 350) had been made between the issuance of the notification under section 4, ibid., and the announcement of the award by the Land Acquisition Collector. The Government must have been aware of this position when it fixed the date of transfer of possession as the one with reference to which entitlement to allotment was to be determined. Nevertheless all the alienees were held entitled to receive land in pursuance of the scheme of 9-9-1968 irrespective of the fact whether the alienors had obtained allotments on account of their remaining unalienated holdings.
There was, therefore, no reason why the donees should have been treated differently.
28. The learned Member held that the gift made in favour of the donees had remained inchoate inasmuch as possession of the land was never delivered. In this context he observed that soon after the gift was made the land was inundated and, therefore, there was hardly any occasion for the donees to take physical possession and that this fact was further confirmed by absence of any entries in the Khasra Girdawari showing possession of the donees. The High Court after re- considering the evidence found the finding of the learned Member to be unsustainable. It stated:- "Regarding delivery of possession, it may be observed that at the time of gift, the land was in cultivating possession of the tenants under the donor viz. Col. Muhammad Hanif and after the gift the tenants attorned to the donees as transpires from the affidavits of the tenants i.e, Annexs. F to F.8 (at pages 29 to 45 of Writ Petition No,1776/78). The names of all the donees had been incorporated as land-owners in possession by Land Acquisition Collector in his record. Cash compensation was also paid to all these donees for the land acquired from them. It is also noteworthy that gift Mutation No,1922 was sanctioned with the prior permission of the Land Acquisition Collector as is evident from the contents of Annexs. 13 and B/1."
' It may also be mentined that the WAPDA took over possession of the land held by the donees on 4-2-1970 whereas the mutation of gift was attested on 14-4-1969. For completion of gift it is not necessary" that in all cases, irrespective of the nature of the property, actual physical possession must be delivered to the donees for when physical delivery of possession is not possible, such possession as the property admits may be delivered. In the present case, as the High Court has noticed; the tenants have filed affidavits si ipporting the case of the appellants. In the circumstances the finding of the lear ned Member that the gift remained inchoate is without any basis.
29. The learned Member held the orders of exchange dated 11-2-1968 of the Resettlement Officer to be illegal on the ground that these had been made in violation of the instructions of the Government which forbade, exchanges of land purchased at an auction or by private treaty. In this regard Me relied upon paragraph 70 of Standing Order No,67 and paragraph 364 of the Colony Manual. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court that the said paragraphs were not attracted here. The respondents obtained their original allotments neither through auction nor through private treaty. On the other hand the allotments made to them were in pursuance of a scheme which had been made applicable generally to persons displaced as a result of the construction of Chashma Barrage. In fact the learned Member himself regularised the exchange of lands in the case of Col. Muhan imad Hanif and three of the vendees by the impugned order. It is to be noticed that the Resettlement Officer was specially empowered under section 17, Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, to allow exchanges. His order could not, therefore, be treated as illegal.
30. One of the grievances of the appellants was that the respondents had been allotted land in that part of the Rakh which was reserved for the affected owners of village Ghallugara and their own tribe. There is no substance in this grievance at all. As noticed earlier, the appellants were not keen to retain their allotments in Rakh Dulleywala and were trying to obtain land in another village in Bhakkar Tehsil. Apart from that, their assertion that the land in Rakh Dulleywala was reserved for the persons displaced from village Ghullugara on tribal basis stands contradicted by memorandum No,8234/RCB, dated 16-4-1972 addressed by the Resettlement Officer, Chashma Barrage Project, Mianwali, to the Deputy Secretary (Colonies), Board of Revenue, and memorandum No,42001/SC dated 25-7-1972 addressed by the Deputy Commissioner, Mianwali, to the Commissioner, Sargodha Division. From these memoranda it appears that the area in Rakh Dulleywala was not reserved solely for the persons displaced from village Ghallugara and that the division of the Rakh into various Wahris' on tribal basis was not intended to exclude persons belonging to different tribes. Learned counsel for the appellants were unable to show that the two memoranda did not represent the true position; consequently the allotment of land to Col. Muhammad Hanif, the vendees and the donees could not be treated as violating the policy of the Government for rehabilitation of the affected persons.
31. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in these appeals which are hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.