1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.---This direct appeal relates to the question of claim of adverse possession by the appellants/defendants' side as against admitted position that ~ the respondents' side are the original owners. The High Court reversed the trial Court judgment dismissing the respondents/plaintiffs' suit and instead decreed the same in the following facts and circumstances: 'The suit land measuring 3 Kanals 1 Marla and bearing Khasra No.896/464 is situated in Gujrat City within the revenue estate of Nawan Noorpur, Tehsil and District Gujrat. It is common ground between the parties that the land is owned by the respondents; it was purchased by their predecessor-in-interest, Dr. Imam Din, by means of a deed of sale dated 13-2-1936. The respondents' case is that they had given the land to Fateh Muhammad, father of the defendant, Haji Muhammad Akram, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants' side, in June, 1969, at a montly rent of Rs.50. Fateh Muhammad paid rent till August, 1974, and as he failed to pay rent "for about a year or so he thus committed himself a defaulter in terms of the Rent Restriction Ordinance". Dr. Muhammad lqbal, plaintiff, instituted proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance for his eviction on 3-5-1976. The petition was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller's judgment dated 31-3-1979 and the appeal of Dr. Muhammad Iqba). Was dismissed by the judgment of the learned District Judge, dated 27-10-1980, on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings, Fateh Muhammad instituted a suit for injunction, restraining the respondents from dispossessing himotherwise than in due course of law--his claim in that suit being that the respondents had agreed to sell the land in suit to him and had received the sale consideration. The suit was once decreed ex parte but was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on 1-12-1982. Thereafter, the respondents "called upon the defendant to vacate the land in dispute, but the defendant having promised to accede to the demand of the plaintiff lingered on the matter on one preex or the other" and had finally refused to vacate the land. It was said that "the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff. As against the defendant firstly in August. 1972, when the predecessor-in- interest of the defendant rendered himself a defaulter in the terms of Rent Restriction Ordinance and secondly, when the defendant came up with a vexatious and malicious plea that he had purchased the land in dispute from the plaintiff and the cause of action continued till 1-12-1982 when he withdrew from such contention and lastly a month before filing of the suit, when the defendant totally refused to vacate the land in dispute"
2. "The defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement. He pleaded that his father, Fateh Muhammad, had been in possession of the suit land since 1955; that the land in suit had since then been merged with his other property and that he had raised construction thereon and -had been in its possession openly as owner. According to him, as the land had been constructed upon, it had thus ceased to be agricultural land. He denied that he or his predecessor-in-interest had taken the land as tenant. His case, therefore, was that he had become owner of the land by adverse possession of more than 12 years."
3. After a serious contest the trial Court dismissed the suit but the High Court in an elaborate judgment, apart from dealing with the two main questions of merits, also tried to distinguish in their application Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act and in a good research work tried to encompass the case-law in that behalf. In so far as it goes learned counsel for the parties could not devote attention to the.. Purely legal issues regarding the interpretation of the said Articles. The arguments, before us were, however, confined to the following finding by the High Court and other related remarks in that behalf:- "Returning to the facts of this case, in the light of what has been said above, it is indubitably clear that the allegations in paras 4 and 8 of the plaint cannot be regarded as allegations of possession and dispossession. In making the allegation that the defendant had been given the land in suit as a tenant, the appellants were being consistent with themselves, in that, that was their case in the eviction proceedings. As the allegation was that the defendant had been placed in possession as a tenant, there was no question of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the appellants.
4. Even if the appellants' case is taken at its worst, namely, that the defendant had taken possession of the land under an agreement of sale, the defendant's possession was obviously permissive in its inception. It must, therefore, be held that in the circumstances of the case, Article 144 and not Article 142 was the proper Article to apply and that it was for the defendant to establish adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years."
5. Learned counsel for the respondents in the very outset requested us to put the learned counsel for the appellants on notice that this appeal must fail on the touchstone of the principle relating to the claim of adverse possession reiterated and laid down by this Court in Mirza Ghulam Hussain v. Ch. Iqbal Ahmad PLD 1991 SC 290; Ali Akbar v. Malook 1991. SCMR 829 and Adam Khan v. Mumtaz Khan 1991 SCM R 832. It was also pointed out that the present learned counsel for the appellants' side had himself appeared in the first noticed case of Mirza Ghulam Hussain.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, to be fair to him accepted the verdict rendered in the said judgment of this Court to the effect that if the starting point in a claim of adverse possession is -relatable to claim of lawful title as well then after a fight on the basis of a permissive possession if that claim is given up or is lost then from that point of time onward only the ,a adverse possession could start. He, however, contended that there was no such claim made from the appellants' side on a lawful title or a permissive possession. Hence on facts this case, according to him, is distinguishable.
7. After hearing both the learned counsel on this very limited controversy, we have found that not only the appellants' side fought the case on the basis of their assumed right and title but also till this Court laid a claim in that behalf. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to grounds of appeal in this Court wherein it is categorically stated that the "plea of the appellants was that in the year 1955 the land was purchased by their predecessor-in-interest for which a sum of Rs.15,000 had been paid". We have also noticed in the deposition of the deceased defendant/appellant as DW/2 that he had asserted payment of Rs.15,000 to the attorney of the respondents/plaintiffs side.
8. After hearing both the learned counsel on this limited question the learned counsel for the appellants remained unable to get out of the verdict of this Court in the latest judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in so far as the legal position is concerned; as also on findings of the High Court on the question of permissive possession of the appellants' side as confirmed and found by us during the hearing of this appeal. Accordingly, it is dismissed with costs.