1. By this appeal the judgment and decree given by the Ist Additional District Judge, Nawabshah in Reference No,68/71 has been challenged. Briefly the relevant facts are that in the year 1971 an area of 30-05 acres of land specifically described in the body of the reference was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of water supply scheme of the present appellant No,3 and the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector whereby he awarded the compensation for the land at the rate of Rs,5,000 per acre plus compensation for trees, crops and structure on the land. He also awarded compensatory acquisition charges at the rate of 15% of the amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 8% from the date of taking over the possession i.e, 23-9-1970 till payment. The owners of the land did not accept the award and at their instance the Land Acquisition Collector made the reference to the District Court for determination of compensation which was heard by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Nawabshah, who modified the award to the extent that compensation for land was awarded at the rate of Rs, 1,25 per sq. ft. and the compensation for trees, crops and structure was .maintained as was allowed by the Land Acquisition Collector.' The compulsory compensation for the acquisition was maintained at 15% but rate of interest was reduced to 6% simple interest from the date of taking over of possession till the deposit of the amount in the Court. Being aggrieved by this appeal has been filed by the present 3 appellants. I have heard Mr. Abdul Hai Memon, Advocate with Mr. ..H. Burney, Advocate for respondents and Mr. Riaz Ahmad, Advocate for the appellants Nos.1 and 2 and also Mr. Kazi Mohammad Saleh, Advocate for appellant No, 3.
2. At the very outset Mr. Abdul Hai Memon has taken plea that the appeal is not maintainable for the two reasons, firstly that the memorandum of appeal was signed and filed in the Court by an Advocate who was not competent to do so on behalf of the present appellants Nos.1 and 2. The second plea taken by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the land was acquired for the Municipal Committee, Nawabshah, appellant No,3 who are local authority and they could not file this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, Advocate who has signed this appeal and filed the same in Court on 24.5-1984 was not a law officer appointed by the Government, therefore, he could not do so unless he was specifically authorised to do and such objection was taken by the office. Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, Advocate has filed a statement in Court on 27-5-1984 to the effect that he was putting his appearance on the authorisation of the soliciter to the Government of Sindh but no such authorisation has been placed on record. Mr. Abdul Hai Memon, learned counsel for the respondents, has referred certain documents which are placed on record by him. The first document is a notification dated 11-4-1984 published in the Sindh Government Gazette of April 26th of the same year which shows that the terms of office of Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, AA-G. expired on 11-4-1984. The second document placed by him on record is also a notification dated 24-1-1985 which shows that Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, Advocate is appointed as Assistant Advocate-General, Sindh against the newly-created post at Hyderabad. From these two notifications the learned counsel has argued that at the time this appeal was filed Mr. S.Sarfraz Ahmad was not holding the post of Assistant Advocate-General Sindh and, therefore, he could not have acted as an advocate on behalf of the present appellant Nos.1 and 2 unless he had some authorisation from the Government. The Advocate for the respondents has also referred to a letter written to the soliciter from the Office, Board of Revenue, Sindh dated 24-5-1984 bearing No, 12-145-84-Rev-II (11)1464 dated 26-5-1984 which shows that the sanction given for filing appeal was communicated to the soliciter Government of Sindh. In turn the soliciter to Governnment of Sindh wrote a letter to the Advocate-General, Sindh on 3-6-1984 requesting him to file appeal against the impugned judgment. He has further referred to another letter dated 31-7-1984 written from the office of the present appellant No,3 to the Section Officer of appellant No,1 which shows that the appeal had already been got filed through private Advocate"
3. Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, Advocate of Hyderabad. As against this Mr. S. Riyaz Ahmad has submitted that though the appeal was filed by the Advocate for the appellant without any letter of authority and sanction but his this act has subsequently been rectified as the sanction had been given by the Government through their letter dated 26-5-1984 and the directions given by the soliciter to the Advocate-General Sindh, vide letter dated 3-6-1984. Be as it may, a plain reading of these two letters would show that the sanction was accorded by the Board of Revenue which was communicated to the soliciter Government of Sindh who had requested the Advocate-General, Sindh to file the appeal but these 2 letters do not show if Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, a private Advocate at that time was authorised to file the appeal on behalf of the presents appellant Nos.1 and 2, Rather the letter of 31-7-1984 bearing No, PA/CMC(MON)/38 of 31-7-1984 shows that the appeal was got filed through, a private Advocate. The record also shows that Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad, Advocate had filed Vakalatnama which is signed by the Chairman, Nawabshah Municipal Committee (appellant No,3) only and is dated 24-5-1984. A reference to Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure would show that any appearance, application or act in or to any Court required or authorised by the law to be made by a party in such Court may be made or done by the party in person or by his recognized agent or by pleader on his behalf. Whereas Order 27, rule 2, C.P.C. provides that persons being ex officio or otherwise to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be recognized agents by whom appearance, act and application under this Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government. 'In view of the above discussion there is no cavil about the legal proposition that the present appeal could have been filed by an authorised agent of the appellants Nos.1 and 2 or law officer duly appointed. However, the question in the present case which requires consideration is that whether Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad on the date he has filed this appeal was a duly appointed law officer or a duly authorised agent on behalf of the appellants Nos.1 and 2. In view of the above discussed two notifications of the Provincial Government, it is an admitted fact that Mr. S. Sarfraz Ahmad on the particular date was not holding office of the Assistant Advocate General Sindh. Also there is nothing on record to substantiate the contention of learned counsel that he was filing this appeal on, behalf of the appellants Nos.1 and 2 under any authority, rather' the above discussed letters show the Advocate-General Sindh was requested to file the said appeal and nothing has been brought on record to show if the Advocate-General Sindh had authorised this Advocate to present this appeal. From the above discussion I am of the view that the appeal on behalf of the present appellants Nos.1 and 2 was not competently instituted.
4. 'Now I will take up the second plea with regard to maintainability of this appeal on behalf of the appellant No,3. The appellant No,3 is the legal authority for whom the land in dispute has been acquired. It is settled law by now that the agency or local authority for whom the land is acquired has no locus standi to make a reference under section 18 or file an appeal from the award given by the Court in the reference. Reliance may be placed on the case of Iftikhar Hussain Shah and others. v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence (1991 SCM R 2193). Reliance is also placed on the case ICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Salahuddin and others (1991 SCM R 15). The further reference is also placed on the case of Pir Khan through his Legal Heirs v. Military Estate Officer (PLD 1987 SC 485) on which the reliance has also been placed in the above-cited Supreme Court judgment. In this case their Lordships have held: From a perusal of the above provisions, it is manifest that section 50(2) expressly and in terms controls section 18 and takes away the right from the local authority or company for whom the land is being acquired to demand a reference under section 18. According to subsection (2) of section 50 a local authority of a company is only conferred the right to appear in proceedings before the Collector or the Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but a reference under section 18 by them is barred (vide the proviso to subsection (2) of section 50). It is, therefore, manifest that whatever may have been the object of the law, in view of plain language of section 50(2), there is no alternative but to give effect to it.
5. Hence, so far as a local authority or a company is concerned, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector becomes final; it has neither the right to ask for a reference under section 18, nor on a parity of reasoning, a right to prefer an appeal against a decision made upon a reference under section 18 of the Act by the Court.
6. We agree and would add that the order of the Civil Court on reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Collector is not an independent order but merely a substitutive order, whereby the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is substituted by the order of the Civil Court, which order then becomes the award. Since, by virtue of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector is fmal and cannot be challenged except by a party which has expressly been conferred the right of apppeal, hence respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who did not have any such right expressly conferred on them, did not have any locus standi to file an appeal.
7. As already observed, no such right is to be assumed on any a prior ground and a right of appeal can be exercised only if it has been expressely conferred on a party by statute."
8. The above-cited case of Pir Khan has also been referred by the hon'able Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Deputy Commissioner, Karachi (1989 SCM R 812). Same legal position has been held in the case of the Pubna Electric Supply Co., v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharyya and another (PLD 1960 Dacca 461). In view of the above discussion I am of the view that the appeal on behalf of the present appellant No,3 is also not competent. The result therefore is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.