' MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.---Intra-Court Appeals bearing Nos.3 and 4, both of 1990, by the Government of Pakistan and others, are inter-connected and arise out of the common judugment of the learned Judge in Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan dated 9-11-1989.
These are, hence, being disposed of by a single judgment.
2. The controlling facts of these cases are Not in dispute. The property in dispute is a composite Evacuee Trust Property. It had three rooms/shops, bearing Nos.6-A, 6-B and 6-C. At the time of the partition, Allah Bakhsh, the predecessor-in-interest of Zafar Iqbal, Saeed Ahmed, Bashir Ahmed and Mst. Sultana alias Pairi (herein respondents Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 in I.CA. No,4 of 1990), was is occupation of one shop described as No,6-C, as tenant, while the other shops/rooms bearing Nos.6-B and 6-A were in possession of Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari and one Abdul Sattar (respondents in I.CA No,3 of 1990) as tenants, respectively. On 28-6-1980, Allah Bakhsh, Sardar Mahmood Khan Laghari and Abdul Sattar submitted three separate applications to the Administrator Evacuee Trust Property, praying therein that the rooms/shops in their possession were in highly dilapidated condition and, therefore, may be sold to them. On these applications, the Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property as well as Evacuee Trust Property Board, submitted reports to the Federal Government for permission to sell these properties in favour of the applicants. By means of order dated 24-3-1982, the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, communicated the sanction of sale in favour of Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari at the rate of Rs,36,000. The applications of Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar, however, were kept pending. It was on 21-3-1984, when the Federal Government comunicated sanction to the Board to make sale of the property bearing Nos.6-C and 6-A subject to the condition that the sale be made through public auction with first right of refusal to the occupants. Pursuant to this order Notices were sent to Abdul Sattar as well as Allah Bakhsh, to participate in the auction being held on 26-1-1985 at about 10 a.m. Feeling dissatisfied with the order of Secretary, Religious Affairs dated 21-3-1984 and Notices issued thereunder, Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar, filed Constitution petitions bearing Nos.68 and 59, both of 1985 respectively.
These writ petitions were accepted by means of common judgment dated 29-11-1989 and the appellants were directed to transfer 6-A to, Abdul Sattar and 6-C to the successors-in-interest of Allah Bakhsh on the same terms and conditions as to the price on which portion 6-B was transferred to Sardar Mahmood Khan Laghari.
3. In disputing the correctness/validity of the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the appellants, raised the following points:- ' Firstly: That the Evacuee Trust properties were dealt with under Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 (Act XIII of 1975). Under section 6 of this Act all evacuee trust properties were vested in Federal Government. Under section 7 thereof, a Trust-Pool was constituted for the purposes of management, maintenance and disposal of these properties.
Under section 3 the Federal Govt. Was to constitute a Board to be kNown as Evacuee Trust Property Board for the management and disposal of these properties. The Board was to be a body corporate. Under clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Act, the Board was given powers to dispose of/transfer or make any endowment of these properties subject to the approval of the Federal Govt. In exercise of powers under Section 30 of the Act the Board with the prior approval of the Federal Govt. Framed Scheme for Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977. Under para. 8 of this Scheme the Board has the discretion to make the sale of the properties through auction subject to the condition that the right of first refusal shall be given to the occupant or the Board may at its discretion accord the approval of sale of these properties in favour of occupant on the basis of 100 years rent, prevailing in 1960 or at the rate of first assessm ent after the inception of Board, in case No earlier assessm ent was available. On the basis of these provisions, it was contended that the Board was vested with the discreticon to make sale of property in any one of the manners indicated above. In this case, the Federal Govt. Had decided to sell the property in occupation of Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari on the basis of 100 years rent prevailing in 1960 and had decided to make the sale in favour of respondents in these two cases through open auction. The discretion of the Federal Govt. Was Not open to interference in Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
(The underlining is mine).
' Secondly; that the Federal Govt. Had taken into consideration the report of the Board. It was stated therein that the property in dispute was valuable one; that Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari was feudal lord of area; that the property had become unecoNomical and the Department could Not incur expenses on its repair and if the property was sold through public auction Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari would Not allow anyone to participate in the auction. After taking into consideration these circumstances, the sanction was accorded to sell the property in possession of Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari at the price of Rs,36,000 on the basis of 100 years' rent. As regards Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar, they did Not wield such influence and it was in the interest of Trust that these properties be sold to them through public auction in order to fetch highest price.
4. The learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand supported the impugned decision by invoking guarantee provided under Article 4 read with Article 25 of Constitution.
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and perused the record. Fortunately there is Not much dispute about the facts of the case. It is admitted that Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari, Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar were in possession of rooms/shops of a composite property; were tenants of Evacuee Trust Board; had submitted applications that the properties be transferred to them by way of sale. It is also Not disputed that the Federal Govt. By means of impugned orders decided to make sale in favour of Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar through open auction while the property in possession of Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari was sold on the basis of 100 years rent prevailing in 1960. From these facts and the arguments of the parties, the questions emerging for decision are as follows:-
(i) Whether the order of Federal Govt. Dated 21-3-1984 is violative of Article 25 read with Article 4 of the. Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973;
(ii) Whether the impugned order is passed in exercise of authority in arbitrary and capricious manner and so is illegal.
6. Having set down the circumstances of the case, the contentions of the parties and the points for determination, I herein proceed to examine the question No,1 first. The doctrine of inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law, embodied in Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has roots in the divine message contained in the Holy Qur'an, wherein this has been repeated with pre-emptory emphasis. The Holy Qur'an says: {{URDU TEXT}} 'O, ye who believe, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for Allah's sake though it may be against your own selves or your parents or near relations, be he rich or poor Allah is most competent to deal with them both therefore, do Not follow your low desires less you deviate, and if you swerve or turn aside then surely Allah is aware of what you do.
(Al-Qur'an IV: 135)
Further the Holy Qur'an says: {{URDU TEXT}} "He has set up the balance (of justice), in order that ye may Not transgress (due) balance. So establish weight with justice and fall Not short in the balance."
(Al-Qur'an, LV: 7-9)
7. At this juncture I would like to recall the 'Last Sermon ( delivered by the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him): It reads:- "0 Men, Listen well to my words, for I do Not kNow whether 1 shall meet you again on such an occasion in the future. 0 Men, your lives and your property shall be inviolate until you meet your Lord. The safety of your lives and of your property shall be as inviolate as this holy day and holy month. Remember that you will indeed meet your Lord, and that He will indeed reckon your deeds.
Thus so I warn you. Whoever of you is keeping a trust of someone else shall return that trust to its rightful owner. All interest obligation shall henceforth be waived. Your capital, however, is yours to keep. You will neither inflict Nor suffer inequity. God has judged that there shall be No interest and that all the interest due to 'Abbas ibn `Abd al Mutlalib shall henceforth be waived. Every right arising out of homicide in pre-Islamic days is henceforth waived. And the first such right that I waive is that arising from the murder of Rabi'ah ibn al Harith ibn `Abd al Muttalib. 0 Men, the devil has lost all hope of ever being worshipped in this land of yours. Nevertheless he still is anxious to determine the lesser of your deeds. Beware of him, therefore, for the safety of your religion. 0 Men, intercalation or tampering with the calendar is evidence of great unbelief and confirms the unbelievers in their misguidance. They indulge in it one year and forbid it the next in order to make permissible that which God forbade, and to forbid that which God has made permissible. The Pattern according to which the time is reckoned is always the same. With God, the months are twelve in number. Four of them are holy. Three of these are successive and one occurs singly between the months of Jumada and Sha'ban. 0 Men, to you a right belongs with respect to your women and to your women a right with respect to you. It is your right that they Not fraternize with anyone of whom you do Not approve, as well as never to commit adultery. But if they do then God has permitted you to isolate them within their homes and to chastise them without cruelty. But, if they abide by your right then to them belongs the right to be fed and clothed in kindness. Do treat your women well and be kind to them, for they are your partners and the committed helpers. Remember that you have taken them as your wives and endoyed their flesh only under God's trust and with His permission.
Reason well, therefore, 0 Men, and ponder my words which I Now convey to you. I am leaving you with the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Prophet. If you follow them, you will never go astray. 0 Men harken well to my words.
' Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims constitute one brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and willingly. Do Not, therefore, do injustice to your own selves. 0, God, have I conveyed your message?"
(This translation has been taken from English Translation "The Life of Muhammad (peace be upon him)" by a famous Egyptian Author Muhammad Hussain Haykal).
' This will Not be complete without the mention of precept of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him).
The Hadith of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon him) reported both by Bokhari and Muslim reveals the importance which the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) attached to the doing of justice with absolute impartiality and without any discrimination, whatever. It is reported that: " the Quraish were anxious about the repercussions over the punishment to a Makhzumi women who had committed theft and asked "who will speak to God's messenger about her? Then they said "who except Usama Bin Zaid, the friend of the messenger of God "Accordingly, Usama spoke to messenger of God, who after hearing him said "You are interceding against one of the punishments prescribed by God?" He then got up and exclaimed "what destroyed your predecessors was that when a person of rank among them committed a theft they left him alone, but when a weak one of their number committed it they inflicted the prescribed punishment on him. I swear by God that if Fatima daughter of Muhammad should steal I would have her hand cut off."
8. From the foregoing examination, it is crystal clear that Islam fosters the concept of equality and condemns distinction on the basis of power, wealth and wordly acquisition. The Holy Qur'an teaches the human beings to seek divine assistance in repentance and awe, asks for allegiance to God Almighty without any distinction, of colour, creed, race and poverty. These concepts filtered into Europe through Spain during the period of Renaissance and became foundation of their constitutional evolution in those countries in form of Magna Carta, the declaration of human rights by U.N.O. And fundamental rights in the Constitution of the United States.
' Pakistan was created on the basis of "Two-Nation Theory" rooted on the ideolgy of Islam. On 7th March 1949, the Founding fathers who then constituted the first Constituent Assembly adopted the objectives resolution containing therein the fundamental golden principles of Islam. This Resolution was incorporated as a preamble in the Constitution of 1956, Constitution of 1962 as well as in the Constitution of 1973. It was made substantive part of the Constitution by virtue of Presidential Order No,XIV of 1985 and Article 2-A was incorporated after Article 2 in the Constitution. The Objectives Resolution came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Miss Asma Jillani v. The Government of the Punjab and aNother (PLD 1972 SC 139). His Lordship Mr. Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman, the Chief Justice (as he then was) dealing with the Muslim heritage, held as under: "In any event, if a grund-Norm is necessary for us I do Not have to look to the Western legal theorists to discover one. Our own grund-Norin is enshrined in our own doctrine that the legal sovereignty over the entire universe; belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority exercisable by the people within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. This is an immutable and unalterable Norm which was clearly accepted in the Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the 7th of March, 1949. This Resolution has been described by Mr. Brohi as the "cornerstone of Pakistan's legal edifice" and recognised even by the learned Attorney-General himself "as the bond which binds the nation", and as a document from which the Constitution of Pakistan "must draw its inspiration". This has Not been abrogated by any one so far, Nor has this been departed or deviated from by any regime, military or Civil. Indeed, it canNot he, for it is one of the fundamental principles enshrined in the Holy Qur'an. {{URDU TEXT}} ' Say, "0 Allah, Lord of sovereignty Thou givest sovereignty to whomsoever Thou pleasest; and Though takest away sovereignty from whomsoever thou pleasest. Thou exaltest whomsoever Thou pleasest and Thou abasest whomsoevr Thou pleasest, (Pt. 3, Ch.3 Al 'Imran, Ay, 27)
' The basic concept undelying this unalterable principle of sovereignty is that the entire body politic becomes a trustee for the discharge of sovereign functions. Since in a complex society every citizen canNot personally participate in the performance of the trust, the body politic appoints State founctionaries to discharge these functions on its behalf and for its benefit, and has the right to remove the functionary so appointed by it if he goes against the law of the legal soevereign, or commits any other breach of trust or fails to discharge his obligations under a trust. The functional Head of the State is chosen by the community and has to be assisted by a Council which must hold its meetings in public view and remain accountable to public. It is under this system that the Government becomes a Government of laws and Not of men, for, No one is above the law. It is this that led Von Hammer, a reNowned orientalist, to remark that under the Islamic system the law rules through the utterance of justice, and the power of the GoverNor carries out the utterance of it".
' This trust concept of Government filtered into Europe through Spain and even as early as 1685 John Locke rejected Hobbes' leviathan and propounded the theory that sovereignty vested in the people and they had the right Not only to decide as to who should govern them but also to lay down the manner of Government which they thought to be best for the common good.
Government was, therefore, according to Locke, essentially a moral trust which could be forfeited if the conditions of the trust were Not fulfilled by the trustee or trustees as the case may be.
' The trustee under this concept of ours are referred to as" {{URDU TEXT}}"those who are in authority among you" (Pt.4, Ch. 4, Ay.60; Al-Nisa P.207) which against negates the possibility of absolute power being vested in a single hand, for the reference is clearly to a plurality of persons and to an authority properly constituted by law."
10. The effect of Article 2-A incorporated into the Constitution under Presidential Order No, XIV of 1985 came into consideration in Mian Aziz A. Sheikh v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Investigation, Lahore (PLD 1989 Supreme Court 613). His Lordship Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah speaking for the Bench held:- "Article 2-A read with Objectives Resolution of the Constitution according to some jurists, as well as some decided cases, was enacted on account of an observation in the judgment of this Court in the case "The State v. Zia-ur-Rahman and others PLD 1973 SC 49. According to others, it always formed part of the constitutional set of Pakistan. Be that as it may, the present position is that Article 2-A read with Objectives Resolution; the Principles of Policy (which are being enforced by the Superior Courts in an indirect manner.--See Miss Benazir Bhutto's case (PLD 1988 SC 416); Chapter 3-A, Part VII of the Constitution, vis-a-vis the functioning of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court, and Article 227; and other provisions of the Constitution relating to Islamisation, are being interpreted and applied in various situations. This Court No doubt, has for the time being, left open the final verdict on the combined effect of these constitutional provisions and mandates and other parts of our constitutional set up in so far as the question of Islamisation is concerned--See Sardar Ali's case (PLD 1988 SC 287).
Nevertheless in individual cases wherever necessary, the superior Courts are already engaged in the process of interpretation andadjudication in this field. The judicial wisdom is accumulating, experience is being gained and considerable discussion in judgments and otherwise is going on.
All this would ultimately assist the Supreme Court in rendering final verdicts in this behalf regarding interaction and operation of these provisions. That, however, does Not mean that wherever a provision is clear and its effect is clear it would Not be so stated and would Not be acted upon.
' Article 227(1) Not only requires that all existing laws shall brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam but it also commands as a mandate that 'No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions'. It is a command to all law-making bodies and functionaries. It will be aNomalous to assume that although in Article 227 there is a command to all the legislative bodies Not to enact any law which is repugnant to Islamic Injunctions, nevertheless it permits the functionaries of the State at all levels to go on enacting rules like those of evidence which have the force of law and which are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. It is in this context that the earlier made remarks about the conduct of State functionaries in Pakistan get illustrated i,e. None would lay down a rule having the force of law, which is repugnant to injunctions of Islam. In the context of the present case, neither the legislature under the command contained in Article 277 (1) has the power to enact a law in any field including those relating to Taxes, which is repugnant to Injunctions of Islam, Nor any other functionary including the Income Tax authorities has any such power to lay down any un-Islamic rule, which has a force of law."
' These Articles again came for consideration in Ittefaq Foundry v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1990 Lahore 121) before his Lordship Mr. Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman. It will be instructive to quote para. No,29 from his judgment which is as under:-- 'Before proceeding further I would like to add a Note of caution to the effect that the precedents from the foreign jurisdiction, Indian, English or American on the questions of Constitutional law, administrative law and public law, have to be approached and applied keeping in view the difference in the pharaseology, scheme, intent and content of the respective Constitutions and the law prevailing in these countries and also the fact that we, in this country are to be guided by our own Constitution and our own ideology. The provisions contained in our Constitution as compared to other Constitutions are more pervasive, wide in content and scope and intended to promote and preserve our own ideology. Besides Articles 4 and 25 which have already been reproduced we have Article 2-A, which must receive particular attention. Article 2-A provides that the principles and provisions set out in the "Objective Resolution" reproduced in the Annex. Are hereby made substantive part of the Constitution and shall have effect accordingly. Then comes Article 3 which provides that State shall ensure the elimination of all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfilment of fundamental principle, from each according to his ability, to each according to his work. In my humble understanding these Articles read alongwith the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution are in No way less in meaning and import than the 'due process of law' clause contained in the American Constitution. Keeping in view the all pervasive intent, meaning and the Scheme of Constitution the rights guaranteed therein are to be secured and preserved. The organs of the State as well as its functionaries while performing its functions, legislative, administrative or executive, have to be careful that None of the fundamental rights are thus curtailed, infringed or in any manner. Violated. I may also add that even the judgments delivered by superior Courts in Pakistan under 1956 Constitution or during the period when the fundamental rights were Not enforceable are to be approached and understood keeping in view the aforeNoted features of the present Constitution."
1.1. From the foregoing examination of the decision of the Supreme Court and the view taken in the case of Ittefaq Foundry v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1990 Lah. 121) ibid, read with Articles 4, 25 and 2-A of the Constitution, I am of the considered view that the doctrine of equality before the law and equal protection is the anchor-sheet of our Constitution. It prescribes that every citizen of the State is to be equally treated and is to enjoy equal protection. This principle nullifies and makes void the State actions which infract these principles unless and until the State can show reasonable classification. The equal protection theory prevents discriminate treatment of individual or a group of individuals at the expense of other individuals or classes of the people similarly situated. Even handed, fair treatment to every citizen is ordained by the Constitution. Under such a dispensation, can I recognise the poverty and weakness of a citizen for according different treatment by the State to these indigent and impoverished citizens. Answer is loud 'No'.
12. Applying these principles to the facts and the circumstances of the case I am clear in my mind that Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari, Allah Bakhsh and Abdul Sattar were similarly situated and the appellant had No authority to accord them a different treatment. I am, therefore, clear in my mind that the argument of the Federal Government that Sardar Mahmood Khan Leghari was a feudal lord and would have obstructed the holding of auction for the purpose of sale of property is totally untenable, unacceptable and is violative of Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. I, therefore, hold that the order to the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 29-11-1989 is Not open to any exception.
13. So far as the second question, that the Federal Government has the sole aurthority to decide the manner of sale, is concerned, I do Not find any substance in this contention. It is well-recognised principle of law that improper, capricious exercise or abuse, of discretionary authority is subject to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd., Montgomery v. The Director and others (PLD 1957 (WY.) Lahore 914), SS Muranda Ltd., v. The Chief Commissioner, Karachi and aNother (PLD 1959 SC 134) and Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (PLD 1988 Lah. 725).
14. In the light of foregoing analysis I do Not find any merit in these IntraCourt Appeals, which are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
(MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ)
JUDGE ' CH. FAZAL KARIM, J.---I agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother but would add a word about the constitutionality of the order in question.
2. The respondents' case before the learned Judge in Chamber was principally based upon Article 25, sub-Article (1) of the Constitution, namely, the fundamental right that "all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law". The basic principle underlying that Article and if I may say so, the rule of that Article is that "the laws must operate equally on all persons under like circumstances". As this Article assures to the citizens the right to be treated equally before law and to the equal protection of law, it must, on the well-settled principles governing the construction of Constitutions, be generously interpreted in favour of the citizens; at least, it must be so interpreted as to ensure fairness in the public administration. Equality before the law and equal protection of the law, to quote from Ong Ah Chuan v. Public E Prosecutor (1981 A.C. 648, 673) require that "like should be compared with like. What Article 12 (1) of the Constitution (which Article in the Singapur Constitution is analogous to Article 25 of our Constitution) assures to individual is the right to equal treatment with other individuals in similar circumstances. In the leading passage in the judgment in Yick Wo's case (U.S. Supreme Cowl Rep. 30 Lawyer's Edition, 220) which according to that eminent Judge, Muhammad Munir, Chief Justice (See Jibendra Kishore Achharayya Chowdhury and 58 others v. The Province of East Pakistan and Secretary, Finance and Revenue (Revenue) Department, Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 SC (Pak) 9 at page 24) has almost become classical in the history of Constitutional law in the United States Mr. Justice Mathews said:- "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance yet if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
Thus though the law may Not, on its face, be discriminatory, it will be violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 25, and hence constitutionally invalid, if in its actual administration it has been carried on in an oppressive and clearly discriminatory manner adversely affecting the liberty and property of citizens in similar circumstances.
3. The question, therefore, is whether the sale of one part of the same property to Mr. Leghari at the price of Rs,3,600 on 100 years' rent basis and the sale of aNother part of the same property through open auction after wide publicity with the right of refusal to the occupants was violative of the fundamental right assured to the writ petitioners by Article 25 of the Constitution. In justification of the impugned order, it was said that the order was made under paragraph 8 of the Scheme prepared by the Board with the prior approval of the Federal Government under section 30 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975; that that paragraph gave a discretion to the Board to dispose of the property either by sale on 100 years' rent basis or by open auction and that the discretion of the Board is Not open to judicial review. True that paragraph 8 permits the Board to sell the property in one of the two modes, but it gives No guidelines to which the Board ought to have regard in determining that the sale be made in one mode or the other.
Had this been a ground of challenge, this would have, in itself, been sufficient to declare paragraph 8 as ultra vires, for, in the words of Mr. Jutice Mathews, the conferment of such arbitrary power 'makes the administration of the statute depend Not on law but on the will of the particular body or individual and thus brings the affected sphere of government within the meaning of government of men and Not of law".
4. It was Not denied that the writ petitioners and Mr. Leghari were, as regards the property to be sold under parapraph 8 of the Scheme, similarly circumstanced. There can, therefore, be No doubt that in selling a part of the property to Mr. Leghari at Rs,3,6000 on 100 years' rent basis and in directing the sale of aNother part of the same property by open auction, the same law was carried on "in an oppressive and clearly discriminatory manner" against the writ petitioners. For in an open auction, everbody including Mr. Leghari will be entitled to bid for the property in question and supposing that Mr. Leghari or for that matter any other moneyed man becomes interested in purchasing the writ petitioners' portion he can outbid and easily out-maNoeuvre the writ petitioners and by raising the price of the property so high as to be beyond the reach of the writ petitioners. The only dissimilarity in circumstances between the writ petitioners and Mr. Leghari, if dissimilarity it can be called, suggested by the appellants' counsel was that if the property in occupation of Mr. Laghari had been put to auction, Nobody including the writ petitioners would have been, in view of his influence in the area, able to bid at the auction. The same reasoning should, in my opinion, apply equally to the property in question, for if Mr. Leghari is so powerful and influential, he would Not allow the writ petitioners to bid at the auction and in any case he will be able easily to outbid them, with the bizarre result that though the writ petitioners and Mr. Leghari are similarly situated, yet Mr. Leghari has obtained the property, but the writ petitioners will most probably Not get it; in any event, he will Not get it at the price paid by Mr. Leghari, and this is how the impugned order works to the writ petitioners' prejudice and is, therefore, discriminatory. This so- called dissimilarity canNot, therefore justify the differentiation in the treatment meted out to the writ petitioners. It must therefore, be held that the impugned order violates the inviolable fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.