AMJAD KHAN, J.-- This is a revision petition against a postponed preemption decree passed in favour of Syed Nasir Hussain respondent No.1 on 20.9.1982 by a learned Additional District Judge by simultaneously dismissing the appeal of the vendee-petitioners against the first decree for pre- emption passed by the trial Court on 11.2.1979 in favour of Mst. Niamat Bibi.
2. There were two suits respectively brought by the two above-named pre-emptors against the sale effected on 9.12. 1969 in favour of the petitioners. Out of the two suits of the pre-emptors, the one filed by Mst. Niamat Bibi was decreed by the trial Court on 11.2.1979 while simultaneously dismissing the suit of the rival pre-emptor Syed Nasir Hussain. Two appeals were thereagainst filed, one by the defeated pre-emptor and the other by the vendees. Both the. Appeals were heard together and disposed of on 20.9.1982 by a learned Additional District Judge in the manner stated above.
3. Thereagainst the vendee-petitioners brought two revision-petitions bearing C.R. No.l775/D of 1982 and C.R. No.l776/D of 1982 to respectively assail the appellate decree passed in favour of Syed Nasir Hussain and the trial Court's decree passed in favour of Mst. Niamat Bibi which had been upheld in the appeal below. Whereas C.R.No.l776/D of 1982 was dismissed is limine on 22.2.1983 by my learned brother Khalil-ur-Rehman's Khan, J. The present C.R. No.l775/D of 1982 was admitted to regular hearing for considering the question of due payment of Court-fee on the plaint.
4. With the dismissal as above of the other civil revision in the year 1983, trial Court's decree in favour of Mst. Niamat Bibi (since deceased and herein represented by respondents N0.6 to 8) has come to be upheld with the result that the vendee-defendants have already finally and irretrievably lost the land in dispute to her. In the admitting order herein passed on 22.2.1983, there is noticed a contention raised for the said legal-representatives to the effect that decree passed in their favour has already been executed to put them into legal possession of the land in dispute.
5. Learned counsel for the vendee-petitioners has conceded that in that state of litigation there is not left any subsisting interest for the vendee-petitioners to pursue this revision-petition against the other pre-emptor whose decree had to take effect in consequence only of default of compliance of the first decree passed in favour of Mst. Niamat Bibi. He has, however, considered it fit to press this revision-petition on the question of due payment of Court-fee which, he believes, does not have any support on the record in the form either of request for grant of time for the purpose or any order passed by the trial Court for payment of deficient Court-fee. Section 149 CPC does not contemplate any application having to be filed for exercise of power thereunder and it does in fact stand exercised by the trial Court in the order passed on 21.12.1970, requiring the plaintiff to pay the deficient Court-fee before the next date (16.1.1971) after having the index of nett- profits prepared. Then there is a marginal note appearing on the order-sheet as bearing the date 21.12.(presumably relating to the year 1970) to the effect that deficient Court-fee has been paid. The stamp-paper of Court-fee of the value of Rs.,125/-, carrying further Court-fee of the value of Rs.10/- in the form of adhesive stamps, also bears initial of the Presiding Officer with the date 23.12.1970.
Even though trial Court's order dated 21.12.1970 would not have sufficed for attracting any penal consequence for its non-compliance, yet, foregoing shows that pursuant to the above order requisite Court-fee was duly paid before the next date Fixed in the suit and by virtue of the provisions of Section 49 of the CPC the defect, if any, attaching to the presentation of original plaint stands rectified with retrospective effect to the time when the plaint was in fact presented within the prescribed period of limitation. Contention raised in support hereof is wholly untenable in fact and law. The same is accordingly repelled.
6. Furthermore, learned counsel for the petitioners has candidly stated before me that there is no argument available to the petitioners for being raised as regards the merit of the claim decreed. In that situation, rule of law laid down in Rachappa Subrao Jadhey Desai v. Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhey Desai (AIR 1918 PC 188) gets squarely attracted inasmuch as question of Court-fee cannot be allowed to be agitated by the vendee-petitioners by way of a weapon of technicality and more so because no precise objection on the point, beyond a mere denial of correctness of valuation of the suit, was raised in the Courts below.
7. Actually, the revision-petition has become infructuous with the other decree for pre-emption, passed against the petitioners twelve years before, having since been upheld in the other revision- petition. As such, this revision-petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.