1. ' By a mutation sanctioned on 15-3-1980, Fateh Muhammad sold 111 Kanals,
12. Marlas of land at Mauza Autran in Tehsil Pindi Gheb to Muhammad Qasam for a sale-price of Rs,15,000. Ghulam Haider as real son of the vendor claimed pre-emption in respect of this sale and brought a preemption suit against the vendee on 3-2-1981, in the Court of Civil Judge, Pindi Gheb. Price paid for the land was disputed by the plaintiff and he expressed his desire to purchase the land upon payment of Rs,5,000, the price fixed in good faith and actually paid for it and the same being its true market value.
2. ' Defendant submitted his written statement, wherein he denied the superior right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff and asserted that the stated consideration in the sale-mutation was fixed in good faith and actually paid as such to the vendor. On 15-6-1981 the trial Court gave effect to the controversial points by raising necessary issues covering claim of superior right of pre-emption, fixation and payment of sale price and the market value of the suit land at the time of its sale, and, thereafter fixed the case for taking evidence from the parties. On 4-11-1981, parties to the pre- emption suit arrived at a compromise. The Trial Court upon recording their statements on 4-11-1981, decreed pre-emption in favour of the plaintiff subject to his paying Rs,14,800 as the price for the land (minus Zar-i-Punjam already deposited in. Court) to the vendee by or before 21-12-1981.
3. Neither in the final order, nor, the decree sheet prepared by it, the Trial Court gave effect to the default-clause. On 9-12-1981, plaintiff preferred an appeal to learned District Judge, Attock, and questioned the pre-emption decree in his favour. Burden of the grounds noted in the memorandum of appeal was against the price fixed for the land. It was stated that the land was Gnair Mumkin and its value was not more than Rs,8,800. It was further stated that the trial Court had wrongly acted on the statement of the counsel for the appellant for fixing the price of the suit- land at Rs,14,800. In a general statement, it was averred that the Trial Court had not applied proper procedure laid down in Civil Procedure Code to the trial of pre-emption suit. In the prayer clause, the price of the suit-land was sought to be reduced to Rs,6,000. Appeal was admitted to hearing on 10-12-1981. It was fixed for hearing arguments on 13-5-1982, on which date, the appellant recorded his own statement in the Court that the matter in dispute has been patched up between the parties and in view of it, a month time may be allowed to him to deposit the purchase-price and his appeal dismissed. Lower Court, after taking down his statement, dismissed the appeal and extended the time for deposit of purchase-price till 13-6-1982, and, observed that in default, pre- emption suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed. It may be of significant interest to note that though the time for deposit of purchase-price fixed in the decree of the Trial Court had run out in course of appeal, yet, neither the appellant had claimed suspension of the terms of the decree relating to deposit of purchase-price nor the Court had suspended the operation of the decree.
4. ' Despite time till 13-6-1982 for payment/deposit of purchase-price, the plaintiff did not comply with the terms of pre-emption decree and failed to pay the decretal amount in time fixed in the decree of the lower Court. Instead, he chose to prefer a civil revision in this Court. In addition to urging that time allowed for deposit of purchase-money was short and judgment and decree of the lower Court was against facts and law applicable thereto, the susbtantial point which weighed with the Court for admitting the civil revision to hearing was that the decree prepared in the lower Court was not in line with mandatory requirements of Order XX, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as "it failed to direct in the decree that in case of payment of purchase-money into Court, the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment. The failure to direct in the decree has made the order as one with material irregularity." The Court noted the contention and relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Shamshad v. Haji Allah Rakha 1980 SCM R 397 admitted the civil revision for examination of the point.
5. ' Though the respondent was represented by a counsel, whose name was duly printed in the cause-list of the day, yet neither the respondent himself nor his learned counsel had come forward to assist hearing of the matter. Consequently , civil revision was heard in absence of the respondent. Muhammad Munir Peracha Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that in making the decree, though passed with consent, lower Court had signally failed to bring it in conformity with the preemptory and compulsive requirements of Rule 14 of Order 20, Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as, it failed to specify the effect of deposit of sale-price in time regarding vesting of ownership rights in pre-emptor and a direction for transfer of possession under the decree to him. In support, learned counsel referred to rule 14(1),(b) of Order 20, Civil Procedure Code.
6. ' Present civil revision is a striking example of frivolous litigation of common occurrence consuming much of the valuable time of the Courts intended for attending to genuine litigation. There is no doubt or dispute that till today, purchase-price fixed in the decree of the lower Court with consent of the parties has not been paid on a mere slim hope of the time being extended because of some defect or fault in the decree. In my view, it is a false hope built upon mere delusion of the petitioner.
7. There is neither fault nor any defect in the decree of the lower Court. It has clearly specified not only the amount of purchase-price to be paid but also the date for it and effect of default in compliance with the terms of decree. What more was required to be specified in the decree was really incomprehensible. Payment of purchase-money into Court by the due date obligated the defendant to transfer of possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment. Vesting of title and transfer of possession was by operation of law and omission in the decree did not arrest or suspend this process. Speaking with respect to the learned counsel, in course of my practice at the Bar for a little over twenty-five years, I must confess never to have come across a decree in the pre-emption suit which had specified a direction for transfer of title and delivery of possession under it. By and large decrees in pre-emption suits would specify the amount of purchase-price, the date for its deposit and the consequence of non-deposit and nothing more. Even omission of a default clause was not destructive of the effectiveness of the decree in pre-emption suit, as found by the Supreme Court in Skeikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Bostan and others PLD 1979 SC 917. In the precedent case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court approvingly referred to a judgment from Supreme Court of India in Naguba Appa v. Nam Dev AIR 1954 SC 50. In the case relied upon, Supreme Court of India, on the omission relating to a default clause in pre-emption decree had taken the view that dismissal of the pre-emption suit was as a result of the mandatory provisions of Order 20, Rule 14 and not by reason of any decision of the Court and the omission to incorporate this direction in the decree could not in any way affect the rights of the parties. A fortiori, the same principle may attract to an omission of the kind pressed in civil revision even if it was necessary to incorporate a direction for transfer of title and delivery of possession in pre-emption decree by the Court. It is agreed that ownership rights in the land were transferable upon payment of purchase-price into the Court by the date fixed in the pre-emption decree. Similar comment shall apply to delivery of possession of the land. First, the plaintiff had to comply with the term of the decree relating to deposit of purchase-price and then could claim ownership rights in the land and delivery of its possession to him. Having failed to perform his duty in time, he is precluded to find fault with form of decree.
8. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the time allowed for deposit of purchase-money was short.
9. Firstly, it was not so, and, secondly the time for deposit was fixed with consent of the parties and could not have been extended without their mutual concurrence. Reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sycd Ahmad Shah and 2 others v. Muhammad Yar and 6 others 1974 SCM R 191 on the point shall be helpful.
10. ' In view of the aforesaid, civil revision had no substance in it. Consequently, it is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs,1,000.
11. Records be returned.