1. This order will dispose of C.M.A.547/92, C.M.A. 549/92 1 C.M.A 623/92 and C.M.A. 625/92 in Suits Nos.
2. 230/92, 231/92, 252/92 and 253/92 respectively.
3. The, plaintiffs in these suits imported various quantities of cargo of shredded iron scrap from England. The shippers, M/s. Newman Clarkson and Company Limited, of Hartfield, England, shipped on board the vessel (the defendant No.1) -at South Sheilds (U.K.), the aforesaid cargo for delivery to the plaintiffs respectively at Karachi; and the Master, as agent of the owner, issued prepaid bills of lading. The cargo was loaded on board the vessel on the 10th December, 1991, and the vessel sailed from Newcastle, UX, on, the 17th December, 1991. It is the case of the plaintiffs that, in normal course ' the vessel with cargo should have reached Karachi within 15 to 20 days i.e. Latest by the 6th January, 1992, but in fact did so on the 27th February, 1992. -It -is alleged that the delay in arrival was caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage and that the master/shipowner neglected and failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at the commencement of the voyage and further failed to take - proper safety precautions against the ordinary perils of sea. It is further alleged inter alia, that, as the result of the delay, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover various amounts from the defendants. The particulars of the claims in the suits are set out below:-- S.No,Claim S.No. S.No, S.No. S.No. 230/92 231/92 252/92 253/92
(1) Difference in market price at the post of destination @ Rs,200 PMT25,20,000 8,46,104 8,00,000 8,00,000
(2) Mark up for the period of delayed delivery namely 74 days 15,03,996 5,04,990 47,360 47,360
(3) Additional stevedoring @ Rs, 123 PMT 15,49,800 5,20,353 4,92,000 4,92,000
(4) Estimated cargo claims @ Rs, 175 per M/ton. 22,05,000 7,40,341 7,00,000 7,00,000
(5) General Expenses @ Rs, 50 per M/ton. 6,30,000 2,11,526 2,00,000 2,00,000
(6) Difference of demurrage on account of actual F.O.950 PMT against agreed 1400 PMT due to Ramazan.5,10,800 1,71,546 5,10,800 5,10,800 Alongwith the plaints, the plaintiffs filed applications under Rule 731 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules and the vessel was arrested by orders dated the 26th March, 1992; in Suits Nos.230/92 and 231/92 and by orders dated the 9th April, 1992, in, Suits Nos. 252/92-and 253/92.
4. Mr. Shaiq Usmani, the learned counsel for the defendants, submitted that zone of the claims in the suits, with the possible exception of item No.1 above, fell within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court and were not covered even by paragraph (H) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction.: of the High Courts Ordinance, 1980, which confers Admiralty jurisdiction on this Court in respect of "any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of the goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship." Here lied on the case of Company Continental (France) SA. v.
5. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and 2 others PLD 1986 Kar. 447. In that case, the. Plaintiff's ship was arrested in an Admiralty Suit riled by the defendant Nb.2 but subsequently the order of arrest was recalled and the plaintiff claimed that due to illegal arrest of the ship it had suffered loss. The contention of the defendants-- that the claim was in tort and, therefore, this Court had no jurisdiction, was rejected but it was held, on the facts of the case that the claim did-. Not arise from the agreement and had no nexus with it. The decision, therefore, does not support the defendants' case. In the case of The Antonis P Lemos (1985) 1 AER 695), the defendants/shipowner chartered a vessel to Sammisa Limited who sub-chartered it to the plaintiff who, in turn, sub-chartered it to Agri Industries. The sub-sub-charter contained an express guarantee by the plaintiff that the vessel's maximum draught on arrival at the port of discharge would; not exceed 32 feet in salt water. When, however, the vessel- arrived at Port. Said her daught exceeded 32 feet in consequence of which she- had. To be lightened before berthing and the delay in her discharge occurred. The plaintiff had to pay cost of lightening, which they would not otherwise have had to pay. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed damages. The claim, was founded solely on tort of negligence and was not founded on any breach- of any contract made directly between the two parties to the action. The question was whether the claim came within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court under section 20(2)(h) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, which is in the same terms as section 3(2)(H) of our own Ordinance of 1980. The primary contention on behalf of the defendants was that section 20(2)(h) applied only to claims of a purely contractual character, founded on some agreement of the kinds referred to in it and made directly between the two parties to an action, and that the paragraph did not extend to other claims founded on tort, even though such claims were connected, directly or indirectly with such an agreement. The contention was rejected by Sheen, J.
6. Who heard the case in the first instance, and by the Court of Appeal. In the appeal before the House of Lords, it was contended that the expresssion "arising out of' on ordinary and natural meaning was equivalent of "arising under". T ' he contention was not accepted and it was observed by Lord Brandon (at page 700):-- I would readily accept that in certain contexts the expression, arising out of may, on ordinary and natural meaning of the words used be the equivalent of the expression "arising under", and not that of the wider expression "connected with". In my view, however, the expression "arising out of' is, on the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used, capable in other contexts, of being the equivalent of the wider expression "connected with". Whether the expression "arising out of' has the narrower or the wider meaning in any particular case must depend upon the context in which it is used." , He went is on to hold that (In the true construction of section 20(2)(h) of the 1981 Act, the expression "arising out of" was to be given the wide interpretation of meaning "connected with" under the principle that a domestic statute designed to give effect to an International Convention was in general to be given a broad and liberal construction, and because that was clearly the meaning indicated by Article 1(1) of the 1052 Convention, to which section 20(2) of the 1981 Act was intended to give effect. It was, therefore, held that the plaintiff's claim even though founded in tort, was within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Court because ' it was connected with an agreement relating to carriage of goods in or use or hire of, a ship, namely, sub-charter or sub-- sub-charter notwithstanding that the defendants were not a party to either agreement.
7. The alternative contention in that case was that even if section 20(2)(h) extended also to claims in tort, it only did so if they were directly connected with some agreement of the kinds referred to in it and provided further that the agreement was one made between, the two parties to the action themselves. Sheen, J. Had accepted this contention but the Court of Appeal had rejected the second part of the contention pertaining to the necessity of an agreement between the two parties to the action themselves. It was held, by the House of Lords, that section 20(2)(h) contained no words which, either expressly or by necessary implication, restricted. The agreement referred to in it to agreements made directly between the two parties to an action; and that there was no good reason for importing into section 20(2)(h) restrictive words having that effect.
8. With regard to the claim in tort, it was held, at page 704, that if the plaintiff could establish that their claim arose out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use of hire of a ship then, even if such agreement was not one made directly between the respondents and the appellants, that claim fell within section 20(2) (h). It was further held that if the claim of the plaintiff in that case was sustainable, a, matter which did not presently arise, it could only be because (a) it had been guaranteed in the sub --sub-charter that the vessel's draught on arrival would not exceed 32 feet in salt water, (b) the Master or the appellants were aware of that guarantee and, probably, (c) the sub-charter included provisions that the Master should be under the supervision of the appellants as regards employment and that loading should be under the supervision of the Master, and (d), that it was reasonably foreseeable that if - the vessel's draught on arrival exceeded the maximum draught guaranteed in the, sub-sub-charter, the plaintiffs/respondents would suffer damage in that they would incur additional costs and expenses. It was, therefore, held that the claim based on the above matters plainly arose out of the sub-sub-charter or the sub- charter or both because in the absence of the guarantee in the sub-sub-charter, and the Master's or the defendant's awareness of it, it appeared impossible to contend that the latter owed duty to the respondents to load only such a quantity of cargo as would enable the vessel to arrive at Alexandria with a draught not exceeding 32 feet in salt water.
9. The question of jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts also came up for consideration in the, case of Sui Gas Transmission Company Limited v. m.v. Good Herald 1983 CLC 886. In that case, it was held that claims for damages arising out of agreement relating to carriage of goods fell within the ambit of section 3(2)(H) but the plaintiffs claim for damages for refusal to deliver the goods was, in the circumstances of the case, rejected as not arising from any agreement relating to carriage of goods.
10. The result of the above authorities is that the expression "arising out of in paragraph (H) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance of 1980 is the equivalent of the expression "connected with" and a claim, whether founded in contract or tort, notwithstanding that there is no contract directly between. A the parties to an action, would fall within the Admiralty jurisdiction provided that it arises out of, in the sense of being connected with, an agreement of the kinds specified in paragraph (H) viz. An agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship.
11. The case of. The plaintiffs is that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, that the defendants failed to exercise due diligence to, make the vessel seaworthy, that consequently, the vessel had to undergo repairs during the voyage and delay occurred in its arrival at Karachi and the plaintiffs suffered loss as the result of such delay. Now, the terms of the Charter- party between the shipper and the owner admittedly form part of the bills of lading, signed by the Master --as agent of the owner; and clause 1 of I part II of the Charter party provides: ---The said vessel shall proceed to (Newcastle)...... And there load a full and complete cargo-- -..And being so loaded the vessel shall proceed to (Karachi) as ordered on the signing of the bill of lading.. ...And there deliver the cargo--------- On the signing of the bills of lading the vessel was to proceed to Karachi as provided by clause 1 of the Charter-party which, by incorporation, is a term of the bills lading which are contracts between the parties. It is therefore at least arguable that failure on the part of the vessel to proceed to Karachi and arise there with in normal time amounts to breach of contract and therefore the claim arises from the contract between theparties in any event the agreements in these cases viz the goods or to hire rouse of a ship the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants failed toexercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy the defendants were under satutory obligation to make the vessel seaworthy and it was under statutoryobligation to make the vessel seaworthy and it was reasonably for see able that the voyage of the vessel might be prolongs by reason of its not being seaworthy and that delay would cause loss to the plaintiffs that being so the claims in the suits may be said to be ones in the tort arising from the agreements and thus within the admiralty jurisdiction of this court.
12. Mr. Khalid Anwar submitted that the vessel in normal course should gave arrived at karachi within 20 days from sailing from new castle but delay in arrival occurred due to its unseaworthiness he further submitted that or as established by the report of the surveyors M/S brookes bill & co. That the vessel was defective before voyage and the owner intended to sell it as scrap vessel immediately after delivery of cargo and further that the master owner failed to exercise due diligence to make it seaworthy and to take proper safety precautions against the ordinary perils of sea the detailed report of the surveyors of annexures D to the plaint and the relevant findings therein have been summarised in the surveyors letter dated 20-2-1992 (annexures d-1 to the plaint) as follows : ---------We are of the corroded and wasted condition of the fore peak internals and shell plate which subsequently required emergency repairs both at Malta and at port said constituted a state of the voyage in our view this compartment must have been in an extremely poor structural condition when the shiparrived at the load-port and, although the, vessel encountered adverse weather on a number of occasions during the voyage we do not believe these conditions were excessive or unexpected for those waters at the time of the year here concerned. We do not believe, therefore, that it would be valid to argue the damage, and subsequent repairs, were initiated by stress of weather. In the latter, respect we would add that this argument was not put forward by the Salvage Association surveyors or any of ship---s staff, during our attendance on board and we gained the very clear impression that all parties accepted the fore-peak tank structure must have been in a distressed, condition from the outset and that the weather during this particular voyage was the proverbial straw that broke the camel---s back.
13. We are, of course, now aware that the declared aim of the ship-owners was to sell the vessel as scrap immediately after the subject cargo was delivered to Karachi, although it is contrary to the terms of the Charter-party."
14. Mr. Usmani contended though not with any degree of conviction that there was no delay because firstly, under clause 3 of the charter-party the vessel had liberty to cal at any port or ports and to deviate for the purpose of saving life and/or property; and secondly, because the vessel had the option, under clause 26 of the Charter party, to, sail via of Good Hope instead of via Suez Canal and if she had sailed via the cape it would have taken longer than it in fact did to reach Karachi. It appears clear that the vessel did not call at Malta or Port said in Exercise of its liberty to deviate but, as will be seen presently , it was obliged to do so in order to have emergency repairs carried via the cape of Good Hope, the defendants not having exercised the option to sail cannot now rely on it to extend the period of the voyage. In any case, it appears doubtful whether clause 26 of the Charterparty was intended to be acted-upon --save in the event, of anemergency making the voyage through the Suez Canal impossible or extremely hazardous . It is significant in this connection that the freight provided for in the Charterparty is on basis that the vessel will sail through, the Suez Canal. Mr. Usmani contended that, in any case the period of delay was less than that alleged by the plaintiffs. According to him the distance between Newcastle and Karachi is6201 nautical miles andthe Vessel speed is 10 to 11 nautical miles per hour so that the time required for voyage from Newcastle to Karachi is about 25 days and not 20 days as alleged by the plaintiffs there is however no evidence to support the contention and-,there; is not even allegation to that effect in the counter-affidavit of the defendants. The counsel for the defendants also contended that delay occurred because the speed of the vessel was reduced by bad weather; and he pointed out that the survey report shows that the vessel encountered bad weather. However, there is no allegation in the counter-affidavit that bad weather had the effect of reducing the speed of the vessel.
15. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs having set up a case of lack of due diligence on the part of the defendants to make the vessel seaworthy and having produced prima facie proof to support their case, the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence is on the defendants. Mr. Usmani himself recognised the principle when he cited the provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971 and the case of Minister of Food v. Reardon Smith Line Ltd. (4951) 2 LI.L.R. 265 wherein it is observed at page 272:-- it seems to me that if one treats the matter purely as a matter of contract, the second sentence in Art. IV, Rule 1, strongly supports the submission made on behalf of the. Ship that . No onus as to seaworthiness is cast on the shipowner, except after proof has been given by the other party that the damage has resulted from unseaworthiness.--- That is also the position under the Charterparty. There is nothing in the. Counter---affidavit of the defendants to show that they exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy It remains to consider whether any or all of the damages claimed by the plaintiff's are too remote or, for any reason, cannot be claimed by the plaintiffs. Mr. Usmani concerned, subject, of course, to his contentions considered above, that the plaintiffs are. Entitled to claim damages on account of difference between market price on the date when the vessel should have arrived and that on the date on which it, did arrive. Mr. Khalid Anwar submitted that if the vessel had arrived on the 6th January, 1992, the cargo would have been delivered during the same month when the price was between Rs.6,100 and Rs.6,175 per Metric ton and that the vessel having arrived on the 27th February, 1992, the cargo, could not have been delivered before the following month when the price of the cargo was between Rs.5,925 and Rs.5,950 per Metric ton. Mr. Usmani did not contest these figures. The difference in price comes to Rs.200 per Metric ton and Mr. Usmani stated that the defendants are prepared to furnish security for an amount calculated on that basis. With regard to the claim under the head "Estimated cargo claims", Mr. Usmani stated, during the argument, that the cargo has now been discharged and -there is a shortage of only 81 Metric tons; and that the defendants are prepared. To furnish security for the quantity of the cargo shortlanded. Mr. Khalid Anwar did not controvert the statement of Mr. Usmani.
16. Mr. Usmani contended that the claims of the plaintiffs under the remaining heads- of claims (set out above) are either too remote, or unsubstantiated and, therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim anything under those heads. He relied on the cases of C. Czarnikow, Ltd. v. Koufos (1967) 2 L.I.R.457 and Compania Financiera Soleada Sa and others v. Hamoor Tanker Corporation Ltd. (1981)
17. 1 AER 856. In (1907) 2 L1. L.R.457 voyage Charterparty was entered into by respondent-owner of .
18. Steamship Heron 11 and claimant charterers (cargo-owners) for carriage of cargo of sugar from Constanza to Basrah. The voyage from Constanza to Basrah was expected to take 20 days but deviations by the vessel extended the voyage by 10 days. The market price of sugar in the meantime depreciated and the cargoowner claimed damages. It was held that the measure of damages laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale applied to breaches of contract for carriage of goods by sea and that in this case the shipowner must reasonably have contemplated that delay in voyage would result in loss to charterers and damages arose naturally from deviation and that, therefore, shipowner was liable for loss in market value of goods. Lord Reid, commenting on the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, observed :-- "I do not think it was intended that there were two rules or that two different standards or tests were to be applied. The last two passages which quoted from the end of the judgment applied to Me facts before the Court which did not include any special circumstances communicated to the defendants; and the line of reasoning there, is that because in great majority of cases loss of profit would not in all probability have occurred, it followed that this could not reasonably be considered as having been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties, for it would not have flowed naturally from the breach in the great majority of cases." and further that: "In cases like Hadley v. Baxendale or in the present case it is not enough that in fact the plaintiff's loss was directly caused by the defendant's breach of contract. It clearly was so caused in both.
19. The crucial question is whether, on -the information available to the defendant when the contract was made, he should, or the reasonable man in his position would, have realised that such loss was sufficiently likely to result from the breach of contract " to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed naturally from the breach or that loss of that kind should have been within his contemplation."
20. Again on the question of remoteness of damages, the same learned Lord said (p.405). ---------.I think that Hall's cast must be taken to have established that damages are not to be regarded. As too remote merely be-cause, on the knowledge, available to , the' defendant when the contract was made, the chance of the occurrence of the event which caused the damage would have appeared to him rather less than even chance. I would agree with Lord Shaw of Dumfermline that it is generally sufficient that event would have appeared to, the defendant as not unlikely to occur."
21. In the case reported in (1981) 1 AER 856, the ownership claimed damages from the defendant for causing wrongful arrest of the ship. The claim included the amount of interest paid by the owners on the amount of the guarantee which was furnished to obtain the release of the ship. The owners' bank had, in addition to charging commission for issuing the guarantee, debited the entire amount of the guarantee to the owners' overdraft account and had charged interest thereon. This was done in pursuance of the owners' own particular arrangements with bank, which were not known to the defendant. It was held that the interest was wholly unreasonable expense to incur and the owners were not entitled to recover it because it did not flow naturally from the wrongful detention of the vessel.
22. On the principles laid down in those cases, a defendant is liable for any loss which flows naturally from breach of contract or which was not unlikely to occur but he is not liable for any loss which occurs due to existence of special circumstances which are not known to him. The same principle is contained in section 73 of our Contract Act and illustrated by illustration (b) to that section.
23. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale and in section 73 of the Contract Act applies to losses arising out of breach of contract. The rule in tort, it appears, is different. Lord Reid said in the case of C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (supra), at page 464:-- "The modern rule in tort is quite different and it imposes a much wider liability. The defendant will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably for seeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, unless the risk is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel justified in neglecting it."
24. In the light of the above principles, the plaintiffs, prima facie, are entitled to claim damages as follows:--- (a)Item No.l.--As stated above the plaintiffs in each of the suits are entitled to claim damages on account of difference in market price at the rate of Rs.200 per Metric ton. The amount of such damages is Rs.25,20,000 Rs.8,46,104, Rs.8,00,000 and Rs.8,00,000 in Suits Nos.230/92, 231/92, 252/92 and 253/92 respectively.
25. (b)Item No.2.--This is a claim on account of "Mark-up for the period of delayed delivery, namely, 74 days". The claim has not been elaborated in the plaint but in the affidavit in rejoinder it is stated: "The financial charges for the delay are also obvious." Mr. Usmani objected that this claim is too vague as no particulars have been given in the plaint. Mr. Khalid Anwar submitted that it is in fact a claim for damages for blocking the plaintiffs' capital during the period of delay. The cargo was imported under letters of credit as is obvious from the fact that the bills of lading have been issued to the order of various banks. The documents under the letters of credit must have arrived shortly after the shipment and the banks must have required the plaintiffs to retire the documents, i.e. Pay the value thereof, immediately thereafter. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that they paid the banks the ;amounts of the letter of credit immediately upon being required to do so and, therefore, there is no evidence that the capital of the plaintiffs was blocked. It, therefore, appears that the plaintiffs did not retire the documents when they were required to do so and were, therefore, liable to pay "mark-up" to the banks. If that be so, the defendants can hardly be held responsible or liable to reimburse to the plaintiffs the amount of money paid by the latter to the banks. The plaintiffs are prima facie, therefore, not entitled to claim anything under item No.2.
(c) Item No.3.--This is a claim as stated in para. 10 of the plaint, for "Additional Stevedoring Rs. 123 per M/ton". No particulars of the claim have been given in the plaint. In the counter-affidavit, there is a general plea that the alleged loss does not arise from the contract of carriage. The plaintiffs have elaborated their position in the affidavit in rejoinder by saying, "As is obvious the progress of unloading is only about half the normal rate because of Ramazan. Thus the Stevedoring charges double and the plaintiff has claimed accordingly." During the course of arguments, Mr. Khalid Anwar produced what purports to be a copy of the telex message from the vessel's local agent to its Captain stating that the stevedors charge 25% extra during Ramazan. Mr. Usmani objected, and, I think, rightly, that the plaintiffs cannot bring in new facts and documents by way of rejoinder and by producing documents during the hearing because, in such event, the defendants would have no opportunity to rebut the allegations. A claim for additional stevedoring charges due to Ramazan may be a proper item for damages resulting from the delay but the plaintiffs have not put their claim on that basis in the plaints and the defendants did not, therefore, have the opportunity to rebut it. Further, there is no proof of the usual or normal stevedoring charges so that it is not possible to determine the amount of additional charges on the basis of 100% increase as indicated in the affidavits in rejoinder or of 25% increase as stated in the telex referred to above. It is, therefore, not possible to even tentatively determine the amount which the plaintiff might be entitled to claim. This item, therefore, cannot at this stage be taken into consideration.
26. (d)Item No. 4.-- This claim is on account of estimated cargo claim. As stated above, the total of cargo short-landed, in relation to the entire cargo, is 81 Metric tons. Invoice value of the cargo is U.S. $132 per Metric ton which is equivalent to approximately Rs.3,300 per Metric ton i.e. Rs.2,67,320 for 81 Metric tons. This claim is for cargo pertaining to all the four cases; and there was no dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim this amount.
27. (e)Item No.5.--This is a claim for "general expenses" at the rate of Rs.50 per Metric ton. No particulars of the alleged expenses have been furnished by the plaintiffs and it is, therefore, not possible, even prima facie, to determine whether or not this claim falls within the nature of damages which can be claimed by the plaintiffs. They are, therefore, prima facie, not entitled to it.
28. (f)Item No.6.- This is a claim for demurrage on account of actual F.O. 950 PMT against agreed 1400 PMT due to Ramazan. Clause 6 of the Charterparty (Part 11) provides that the cargo shall be discharged within the number of days indicated in Box 16. Box 16 provides that laytime for discharge will be 1400 M. Tons per working day of 24 consecutive, hours. Clause 7 of the Charterparty (Part 11) provides for payment of demurrage at the rate stated in Box 18 per day or pro rata for any part of day. Box 18 stipulates the rate of U.S. $ 4,900 per day. The total cargo on board the vessel appears. To have been 24,830.160 Metric tons;- and.-in terms of Charterparty, it would have taken over 17 days to discharge it al the rate of 1400 M. Tons per day. However, the rate of discharge during Ramazan, as alleged, being 950- M. Tons per day, the time required for discharging the cargo would be over 26 days, a difference of 9 days. The amount of demurrage, in relation to the entire cargo, for 9 days, at the rate of U.S.$ 4,900 per day would be U.S. $ 44,100 i.e. Approximately Rs.11,02,500 as against the total of Rs. 17,03,946 claimed by the plaintiffs in the four suits.
29. The plaintiffs having established prima facie claim, as above, to damages from the defendants, the defendant No.1 vessel is liable to be arrested. The orders arresting the vessel are, therefore, hereby confirmed but it will be free to leave upon furnishing security for a total amount of Rs.49,66,104 which is made up of the amounts claimed by the plaintiffs, respectively, in all the suits for difference in market price Rs.2,67,320 on account of cargo claims and Rs.11,02,500 on account of demurrage. The plaintiffs' interest in the last two amounts will be to the extent of the cargo of each of them. The total amount of security to be furnished is, thus Rs.63,35,924.