1. These are the five complaints under section 36-E of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 filed by five different complainants against the same accused.
2. By consent of the parties I propose to dispose of these five complaints by a common judgment as the nature of accusations against the accused is one and the same and the defence led in one case is adopted in the remaining four cases. Copy of the judgment be placed on the record of each case.
3. I,therefore, think it would be convenient to commence a consideration of these cases with its brief history. The complainants claim to be the permanent workmen of the accused management known as Masud Thread Ball Factory, Mauripur Road, Karachi. That their services were illegally terminated by the accused which gave ri;e to the filing of applications under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against the accused by these five complainants before Junior Labour Court No. I, Karachi : That the said five applications were disposed of by learned Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court No. I, Karachi, by consent of the parties on 6-6-1974 whereby it was ordered that the applicants/complainants be paid legal dues as well as dues outstanding under the Memo, of Settlement between the parties dated 7-11-1973.
4. That the complainants paid several visits to the accused for the recovery of their dues but the accused refused to make payment to them and thereby intentionally disobeyed and flouted the lawful orders of the Junior Labour Court No. 1, dated 6-6-74.
5. Hence the instant complaints.
6. The case of the Accused No. 1 proceeds on the footing that the complainants did not at all come to him'to recover their dues.
7. Whereas according to the accused No. 2 who was merely the Personal Assistant of accused No. 2 accordingly she had nothing to do with the management of the factory.
8. When the case proceeded against the accused, accused No. 2 Miss Mussarat was discharged under section 253, Cr. P. C. vide Discharge order dated 2nd October 1974 Exh. 5.
9. Whereas charge under section 36-E, J. R. O. 1969 was framed against accused No. 1 to which the accused pleaded not guilty.
10. Now that the charge has been framed against the accused the point for the determination will be as under: Whether the order under section 36-B of Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court No. 1, dated 6-6-74 was not given effect to, or complied with by the accused ?
11. My finding is as under1'
12. Yes.
13. Rbasons In case of complainant Mashooq Ali he has examined himself and witness Muhammad Aslam.
14. Whereas in the rest of four cases only the complainants have stepped into the box to prove their case.
15. The ocular testimony of complainants is supported by the order of Junior Labour Court and photostat copy of the Agreement Exh. 2 entered upon between the parties.
16. From the cross-examination of the accused it is evident that the fact of the visit of the complainants after the Court Orders and demand of the , dues from the accused, stands unchallenged. All that the accused has attempted to show by way of cross-examination is that he had sent two registered letters to each complainant which fact was categorically and stoutly denied by the complainants. So then there is nothing in the cross- examination of the complainants which induces me to doubt the truth of their evidence.
17. Besides the fact that these complainants had gone to the accused to collect their dues rather stands proved even through the defences led by the accused.
18. W. Muhammad Ismail Exh. 6 during the course of examination in chief admitted in specific and denied in terms that he had seen all the five complainants contacting the accused in connection with the recovery of their dues.
19. So then the evidence adduced by the accused in defence rather belies his case to the effect that the complainants had never visited him for the recovery of their dues. By leading this type of defence the accused introduced a direct inconsistency between the position taken up by him in the first instance that the complainants bad never come to him for the recovery of their dues.
20. For these reasons I come to an irresistible conclusion that the complainants did visit the accused for the implementation of the order dated 6-6-74 passed by the Junior Labour Court but the accused refused to implement the same.
21. Now I would like to discuss the merits of two registered letters Exhs. D. W./l and 2 produced by the accused.
22. These two letters are dated 13-6-74 and 22-6-74 in which the complainants were required by the accused to attend and to recover their dues.
23. At the very outset I might make it clear that the address of the complainants through which these <two letters were sent is c/o 406-Qamar House, M. A. Jinnah Road, Karachi.
24. The postal endorsement as "Refused" does not show as to who was the particular person who had refused the letter. For ostensibly it was sent at the address of 406-Qamar House, M. A. Jinnah Road, Karachi. Besides the postman was not examined by the accused in defence so as to prove the factum of refusal and also to give opportunity to .the complainants to challenge his veracity.
25. Lastly it is not borne out from the record as to how and why those letters were addressed to the complainants on that particular address when the complainants' addresses in their complaints are quite different.
26. The accused has not produced any evidence oral or documentary to even remotely suggest if the complainants had supplied him the address on which these two letters were addressed.
27. As a necessary corollary the overriding effect would be that the service of these two registered letters is not at all proved to be good or satisfactory but it rather clearly shows that an attempt of a drowning man has been made by the accused, having no legs to stand and these two letters are proved to be ex facie a manoeuvred affair and afterthought. By manoeuvring these afterthought letters the accused was under the impression that he would be able to bamboozle his way to the achievement of his objective of not paying dues to the complainants which he like a War Lord refused to pay to the com- plainants, least knowing that the poor workers were now able to earn their livelihood and had come out of the Biblical age. The King pin of the intention was his fond expectation that he would escape payment of dues and thereby dissent the lawful order passed by the Junior Labour Court.
28. Assuming (not admitting) for argument sake that these letters were returned as refused, then in that case it was the bound duty of the accused to have either sent the amount to the complainants by Money Orders or deposited the amount with the Junior Labour Court or the Authority for the Payment of Wages Act. But it appears that no such attempt was made by the accused to exhibit his bona fides.
29. For these reasons I do not attach any importance to these two registered letters especially when it was admitted by the defence witness that the complainants had personally come to the accused to recover their dues. Since it stands proved that the complainants had come to the accused personally to recover their dues there was no earthly reason why the payment was not made to them. Therefore ostensibly the question of sending intimation to the complainants by registered post to collect their dues, did not at all arise, especially when there is absolutely no explanantion coming] forth from the accused as to why he did not make the payment to theid complainants when they had personally come to collect their dues from* him as admitted even by the defence witness Muhammad Ismail.
30. The short account of the affair which I have given above is sufficient for coming to the conclusion that the complainants made abortive attempts to recover their dues from the accused, as per orders of the Court but the accused intentionally failed to implement those orders. An order of the.
31. Court must be given due weight so as to maintain industrial peace.
32. The law is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by introduction of endless technicalities so as to destroy the image and edifice of justice.
33. So then a most damning and weighty evidence for the conviction of thfe accused is brought home to the accused.
34. As a necessary corollary, I come unhesitatingly to the conclusion that any sentence less than S. I. for three months in each case will not be adequate for the offence committed by the accused.
35. The crux of the whole discussion is that finding the accused guilty I] convict him under section 36-E of I. R. O., 1969 and sentence him to sufferlfl S. I. for three months in each case. Sentences to run consecutively. I Accused is present on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled and is remanded to custody.
36. Copy of the judgment be placed on the record of four other cases.
37. Pronounced in open Court in presence of the accused.