' MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.---The facts leading to this Letters Patent Appeal, briefly, are that oh 27-7-1960 Syed Imam Ali Shah deceased/predecessor-in-interest of Syed Maratab Ali Shah and 3 others, respondents, filed petition under section 7 of the Waqf Properties Ordinance before the learned District Judge, Lahore, for declaration to the effect that House No,24 situated in Mian Mir Sahib, Lahore, was not a Waqf Property, against Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan respondent/appellant. Syed Imam Ali Shah claimed ownership of the house on the basis of title and in the alternative on the plea of adverse possession. The petition was resisted. Issues were framed. The parties led their evidence. The learned District Judge vide his order dated 12-10-1961 accepted the petition declaring that the house was not a Waqf Property. Feeling aggrieved thereby, Chief Administrator Auqaf filed appeal in the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal Syed Imam Ali Shah respondent therein died on 29-9-1973. On 5-2-1978, the appellant submitted application under rule 4, Order XXII, C.P.C. For impleading his legal representatives. On 15-2-1%9 another application alongwith an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, was moved by the appellant before the trial Court for setting aside the abatement on the ground that he had come to know of death of the respondent on 2-10-1977 and thereafter had been making efforts to know the names of the legal heirs of the deceased. The applications were contested. The learned Single Judge vide his judgment dated 15-4-1970 rejected the applications simultaneously, declaring the appeal as having been abated, hence this Letters Patent Appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Syed Imam Ali Shah respondent was properly served in the appeal and had appeared through counsel before the High Court; that the parties did not live near each other, so the appellant could not know about the death of Syed Imam Ali Shah in time, that the learned Single Judge has not considered the grounds when in the application for condonation of delay and in the application for setting aside the abatement and that the provisions of Order XXII, C.P.C. Do not apply to the appeals filed in the High Cout under section 8 of the. Waqf Properties Ordinance. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment.
3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties with care. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. We find that in his elaborate judgment on facts and law as well, the learned Single Judge has discussed the grounds raised by the appellant in his applications dated 5-2-1968 and 15-2-1968 for setting aside the abatement, and also in his application for the condonation of delay and has given sound and cogent reasons for rejecting the same. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy us as to how the provisions of Order XXII, C.P.C. Are not applicable to the appeals in the High Court against the order of learited District Judge passed under section 7 of the Waqf Property Ordinance. On our independent interpretation, we are of the view that the word "appeal" used in rule 11, Order XXII, C.P.C. Includes and covers appeals filed in the High Court under section 8 of the Waqf Property Ordinance. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to controvert the observations made and the reasons given by the learned Single Judge both on the questions of law and facts. We do not see any reaons to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge.
Pursuant to the above discussion, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.