IRSHAD HASAN KHAN J-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan calls in question the order dated 23-1-1991 passed by Member (Consolidation) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, whereby he accepted the revision petition in the purported exercise- of his suo moto powers against the consolidation of Village Melowal, Tehsil Bhaiwal, District Sargodha, in consequence whereof, the entire consolidation scheme was set aside and fresh scheme was ordered.
2. It is not necessary to go into the detailed facts of the case. Suffice it to say that consolidation scheme of Village Melowal was confirmed in 1984 under the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. The respondents were not satisfied with the result. Consequently, they approached the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation). Their appeal was, however, dismissed on 27.1.1986. The respondents being aggrieved with the said order, filed revision petition before Mr, Manzoor Ahmad Khan, Member (Consolidation) Board of Revenue, who by his order dated 30.9.1986, dismissed the revision. In pursuance of a miscellaneous application dated January, 1988, the Minister for Consolidation, Punjab, Lahore, after calling for the report of the subordinate authorities directed re- consideration of the consolidation scheme of the estate. It may be pointed out that this application was recommended by a Member of Provincial Assembly on 27.1.1988 (Annex. 'C to the writ petition) called for report from the Secretary (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, and on receipt thereof the learned Member (Consolidation) ultimately re-opened the matter in the purported exercise of his suo motu power under section 13 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960.
3. Mr. Dilawar Mahmood, learned counsel for the petitioner, assailed the impugned order on the ground that the Minister for Consolidation has no authority to interfere in the judicial order passed by the Revenue authorities and, therefore, the subsequent order passed by the learned Member (Consolidation) in the purported exercise of his power under section 13 is coram non judice and is tantamount to abuse of official power vested in him. The case was not contested by the learned Member (Consolidation), respondent No. 1 herein, despite notice. However, in the interest of justice, the learned Advocate General was sent for who was not available.
4. Rana Muhammad Arshad, Additional Advocate General, entered appearance on Court's call. He was given ample opportunity to study the case before making his submissions on the legal points involved in the matter. He strongly supported the impugned order arguing that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, in the exercise of his power under section 13 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, was competent to exercise suo moto jurisdiction, if the dictates of justice so demand. Here the impugned order was passed by him bona fide and not with mala fide intention. He further argued that presumption of regularity is attached to all official acts and it cannot be said that either the Minister or the learned Member, Board of Revenue acted for any ulterior purpose. He submitted that the direction issued by the Minister was not relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of the impugned order, in that, the learned Member, Board of Revenue, applied his independent mind while passing the impugned order. He further argued that the Minister, being a representative of the people, was within his right to bring to the notice of the appropriate State functionaries the complaints received by him. Being the overall administrative head of the Revenue Board, it was within his competence to refer the complaint received by him from .He villagers to the subordinate revenue functionaries and, therefore, the action taken by the Member as a result of that complaint received from the Minister, does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is devoid of any force. The statutory functionaries alone are competent to pass order in respect of consolidation schemes under the Ordinance. The Minister for Consolidation has not been conferred with any authority in regard thereto in any manner whatsoever and he cannot be permitted to interfere either directly or indirectly in judicial/quasi judicial proceedings finalised by the competent authorities under the Ordinance. This tantamount to invasion into the field reserved for the statutory functionaries under the Ordinance. It also violates the constitutional right of the petitioners to be treated in accordance with law and to demand obedience to the Constitution and the law by respondent No. 1 including the Minister.
Clearly cognizance of the miscellaneous application by the Minister in respect of judicial/quasi judicial matter duly finalized by the Board of Revenue was void ab initio and should have been ignored and not acted upon by the learned Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue. Needless to say that if initial order passed by an authority is a nullity in the eye of law, all subsequent orders passed in regard thereto are also treated as void, nullity and of no legal effect. The same view was taken in Yousaf Ali Vs. Muhammad Aslam Zia (PLD 1958 S.C. 104) and Mst. Fakhra Malik Vs. Secretary to Government of the .Punjab Local Government and Rural Development Department and others (PLD 1982 Lahore 606), which I respectfully follow. Also refer Ahmad Khan Vs. Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others (PLD 1990 S.C. 1070), in. Which the same view was highlighted and under similar circumstances the order passed by the Board of Revenue under the direction of the Minister was declared as void ab initio. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ghulam Rasul Vs. Mahmood Ahmad and others (1992 SCMR 136). The cases of Ahmad Khan (supra) and Ghulam Rasul (supra) are identical with the case in hand. This by itself is a sufficient ground for quashing the impugned order.
5. It is true that before issuing the impugned administrative instructions, the Minister may be under no obligation to follow the procedure of a Court of Law, but here the impugned directions issued by him in respect of a matter finally decided by the revenue authorities in the statutory exercise of their powers under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, tantamount to abuse the official position and power vested in him as a Minister.
6. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 23.1.1991 passed by the learned Member.
(Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, is hereby declared as void ab initio and nullity in the eye of law and the consolidation scheme as confirmed on 22.4.1988 shall be deemed to be intact.
7. Before parting with th& judgment, it may be observed that Mr. Saeed- ur-Rehman's Farrukh, a Senior Advocate of this Court, represents the private respondents. Respondent No. 2 sought permission from the Court to engage another lawyer not because he had no faith in him or has any complaint against his counsel in the discharge of his professional duties. Respondent No. 2, however, submitted that engagement of another counsel would be beneficial to him and on this ground sought adjournment. The prayer does not appear to be genuine. Adjournment can only be allowed in aid of justice and not to abuse the process of law. h appears that respondent No. 2 wants to prolong this case by withdrawing the power of attorney of Mr. Saeed-ur-Rehman's Farrukh for which there is no justification. When this prayer was rejected, the respondent No. 2 gave back the brief to Mr. Saeed-ur-Rehman's Farrukh, Advocate, to argue the case, which he did to the best of his ability but was unable to support the impugned order in view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred in the preceding paragraph which are binding on this Court.
With the above observation, the writ petition is accepted with costs.