ABDUL RAHIM KAZI, J.- Briefly the facts of the present petition are that the petitioner being M.A. In International Relations and having some past experience applied for a suitable job in the establishment of respondent No. 1 and was appointed as Public Relations Officer in Pay Group-VI vide letter dated 19- 11-1989. Since the petitioner felt that she was entitled to higher post, she made such representation to the Chairman of the respondent No. 1, who after interviewing her ordered the modification of her appointment to Pay Group-VII. Thereafter the petitioner is said to have been, transferred to Marketing Department and also claim to have completed a course of respondent No. 1 and was lastly working as the Assistant Manager Sales Department in Pay Group- VII when by a letter dated 6-8-1991, the petitioner was informed that a Committee was appointed to review the cases of irregular appointments and by this letter she was reverted back to Pay Group-VI. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed this petition with the following reliefs; "In view of the above submissions, it is respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 6th August, 1991 (Annexure-J) and declare the same to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect, further it may be declared that the petitioner ever since her appointment is in Grade- VII, continues to be an employee in Pay Group- VII as if she has never been reverted to Pay Group-VI vide impugned order dated 6th August, 1991 and is entitled to all consequential relief including pay and allowance difference and seniority in her original pay scale.
Award cost against the respondent. No. 1.
2. We had called for comments from respondent No. 1, who have filed the comments wherein it is stated that the petitioner did not possess the qualifications as required even for the appointment in Pay Group-VI; and that she did not produce her degree of M.A. Although she had undertaken on 7-12-1989 to do so within three months. It is further stated in the comments that the petitioner was appointed in Pay Group-VII on account of certain pressure brought on the then Chairman of respondent No. 1.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. At the very out set Mr. Mahmood Alam for respondent No. 1, has submitted that the employees of the respondent No. 1 are governed by law of Master and Servant as there are no statutory rules governing their employment.
Mr.M.L. Shahani, learned counsel for the petitioner in reply to the above referred us to the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956 wherein section 31 provides as under; "31. Rules and regulations to be laid before the Legislature.- All rules and regulations made under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette, and shall come into force upon such publication and shall be laid thereafter as soon as may be before the National Assembly."
He has further submitted that under the said provision of the P.I.A.C. Act, service Regulations were framed in the years 1985 titled as Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985. He has submitted that these Regulations having been framed under the said section 31 of the P.I.A.C. Act have the force of statutory rules and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the Constitutional guarantees in regard to her employment; and that law of Master and Servant will not govern to the relationship.
3. We have given anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parlies. In the first instance the above said section 31 of the P.I.A.C. Act empowers the Board to frame the Regulations with the prior sanction of the Federal Government but it has not been shown if these Regulations have been published in the Gazette. The provisions of section 31 provide that such Regulations shall be subjected to Publication which then shall be laid thereafter before the National Assembly as soon as possible. From the above, it may be observed that laying of the said Regulation before the National Assembly is not a pre-requisite for giving the effective force to the said Regulations but publication is a statutory requirement. Since these Regulations admittedly are not subjected to publication the said Regulations cannot be said to have any statutory force.
Reliance may be placed on the case of Mohammad Yousuf Shah Vs PIAC (PLD 1981 S.C. 224) wherein while dealing with the case of an employee of the respondent No. 1 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the case was not covered under any statutory rules or Regulations and thus law of Master and Servant is applicable. Similarly in the case of A. George vs. P.I.A.C. (PLD 1971 Lahore 748) a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court has held that though the respondent No. 1 is a statutory body and amenable to various controls by Central Government yet it is not a branch of Government and employee of such Corporation is not a servant of State and, therefore, nor entitled to guarantees and safe-guards provided to said servant under the Constitution of Pakistan; and that the relationship of the Corporation and the respondents is purely that of Master and Servant under general law. It is further observed in the above cited case that the terms and conditions of the service of employee prescribed by Corporation in the form of service code do not have the force of statutory rules made by the Central Government under section 29 of the P.I.A.C.
Act, 1956 or Regulations made under section 30 of the Act. Similarly, in the case of Sindh Road Transport Corporation vs Mohammad Ali Khokhar (1990 S.C.M.R. 1404) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that their being no statutory rules in the field, the employee could not invoke Constitutional jurisdiction and the High Court could not have issued a writ declaring the order of termination of his service as without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
4. In view of the above discussion it can safely be concluded that in the absence of any statutory rules the terms and conditions of the service of an employees of a corporation are to be governed by the law of Master and Servant and such employee would not be entitled to any Constitutional grantees not can a writ be issued in such cases. We have already observed above that the service Regulations referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not the statutory rules as the statutory requirements provided under section 29 and 30 of the Act have not been complied with.
In view of above discussion, we are of the view that there is no force in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed in limine.