Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to this Constitutional petition are that Mehr Khan respondent, an allottee of the land in dispute under Chashma Barrage Scheme sought the ejectment of the petitioner on a number of grounds including the non-payment of 'Batai'. Petitioner, resisted the ejectment proceedings on the plea that the respondent had relinquished all his rights in the land in dispute in his favour by means. Of relinquishment deed. He further, claimed that he had spent Rs.50,000 on the improvement of the suit land. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues .
"(i)Whether relationship of tenant and landlord exists between the-parties and if so whether the respondent pays Batai or not? OPP.,
(ii) '' Whether the plaintiff requires t . He land for self-cultivation' and whether the respondent is spoiling the land? OPP.
(iii)Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit property for the purposes of court-fee, if so its effect? OPP.
(iv)Does the Court of AC-I has jurisdiction in the case or not? OPP.
(v)Whether the plaintiff was estopped from bringing this suit . By his words or not? OPD.
(vi)- Whether the defendant is entitled to Rs.50,000 as improvement expenses in case of decree?
OPD.
(vii) Relief."
2. Both the parties led evidence, oral As also documentary, in support of their respective contentions. Respondent produced three witnesses including Muhammad Ranizan, Lambardar who deposed that the petitioner was a tenant under the respondent. Respondent himself appeared as P.W.4 to rebut the petitioner's case. He denied the execution of relinquishment deed.
And stated that he was still paying the instalments of the price. Respondent tendered in evidence copy of Khasra Girdawari for Kharif, 1982 and Rabi 1983 (Exh.P-1) and Jamabandi for the year 1978- 79 (Exh.P-2), copy of Rapat Roznamcha dated 8-8-1983 (Exh.P.3) and copy ofjudgment of Addl.
District Judge (Exh.P.4). According to the Khasra Girdawari, respondent was the owner o the suit land and the petitioner was entered as a tenant thereof. Jamaband (Exh.2) showed the respondent as an allottee under Chashma Barrage Scheme Petitioner, on the other hand, produced two witnesses, who stated tha the petitioner cultivated the land in dispute as an owner and not as a tenant. Petitioner appearing as D.W.3 deposed that he had purchased the land in dispute. He is also shown to have contended that he paid the amount of instalments to the respondent who then paid them further on. Petitioner produced in evidence 'Dastbardari-Nama' (Exh.D-1) to show that the respondent had relinquished his rights in favour of the petitioner. He also produced affidavits Exhs.D-2 to D-4.
3. AC-I Mankera relying upon 'Dastbardari-Nama' (Exh.D-1) held that by virtue of this document, respondent had relinquished all his rights in the land in dispute in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, there did not exist any relationship of landlord and tenant between them. Issue No.1 was accordingly decided against the respondent and consequently his suit was dismissed vide order dated 27-12-1983. Respondent preferred an appeal which was accepted by the AC/collector, Mankera by order dated 13-6-1984. Learned Collector on consideration of the evidence. Did not accept the petitioner's plea that he had purchased the land in dispute. It was noted by the Collector that neither the petitioner nor his witnesses deposed anything about the purchase price nor any receipt was produced in that regard. The learned Collector observed that the respondent was still paying the instalments. On examination of the Jainabandi and Khasra Girdawaris, the learned Collector found that the respondent was an allottee of the suit land and the petitioner was a tenant thereof. It was finally held by the Collector that even if the respondent had executed 'Dastbardari-nama' without the previous sanction of the competent authority, it was void and created no rights in favour of the petitioner. On the question of improvements, finding recorded by the learned Collector was that "no specific improvements have been made on the land". With these findings/observations, learned Collector by order dated 13-6-1984 ordered the ejectment of the petitioner from the land in dispute.
4. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a revision petition before the-Addl. Commissioner who by his order dated 23-8-1984 accepted it on the short ground that the respondent having failed to file the Khasra Girdawaris of the last two harvests, his suit was not properly instituted. Respondent took the matter to the Board of Revenue in further revision. Petitioner conceded before the learned Member that the last two harvests were Kharif 1982 and Rabi 1983 and, therefore, the respondent had rightly produced with the suit copies of Khasra Girdawari for these two harvests. In view of this concession, learned Member set aside the order of the Addl. Commissioner and proceeded to decide the revision petition on merits instead of remanding. The case to the Addl. Commissioner. Learned member found on merits that the respondent was an allottee under Chashma Barrage Scheme and had not yet been awarded proprietary rights. It was accordingly held "the deed of relinquishment on which the learned counsel for respondent relies in support of his contention that the land stood transferred to the respondent has no legal value. ' The petitioner who is as yet an allottee, could not transfer any rights of ownership in respect of the suit land in favour of the respondent." Taking this view of the matter, the learned Member accepted the respondent's revision petition and setting aside the order of the Addl. Commissioner restored the ejectment decree passed by AC/Collector. This was vide order dated 12-2-1986.
5. Petitioner filed this Constitutional petition to call in question the aforementioned orders of the learned Member, Board of Revenue and of AC/Collector directing his ejectment from the land in dispute.
6. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was in possession of the land in dispute not as a tenant under the respondent but in his own right as the respondent had relinquished all his rights in favour of the petitioner. I am afraid, this contention cannot be gone into in the present proceedings in viewof the finding of fact recorded by the learned AC/Collector to the effect thatthe petitioner was a tenant under the respondent. Learned Collector came tothis conclusion after duly considering the entries in the revenue record (Exh.P-1 and P-2) as also the oral evidence led by the parties. It maypertinently be observed that this finding of the Collector has not been upset bysuperior Courts in the hierarchy. It may also be relevantly noted that although the relinquishment deed relied upon by the petitioner was said to have been executed much earlier, respondent was recorded as an allottee of the land in dispute-in the Jamabandi for the year 1978-79 Exh.P.2 - and the petitioner wasshown as a tenant in the Khasra Girdawari for Kharif, 1982' and Rabi, 1983(Exh.P-1). In the circumstances, the finding of fact recorded by AC/collector is not open to interference in writ jurisdiction.
7. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by virtue of the relinquishment deed executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner, the latter's possession was protected by the provisions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and as such he was not liable to be ejected from the land in- dispute. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon "Hassan Abbas v. Shahid Bashir and others" 1980 CLC 1422. The case cited by the learned counsel is distinguishable on facts. In the case, the execution and the validity of the agreement to sellthe property to the tenant was not questioned and it was also found that it was one of the terms of the agreement of sale that the tenant was not to pay any rent to the original owners. On these facts, it was held in the precedent case that in view of the provisions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant could successfully resist the ejectment proceedings on account of the agreement of sale in his favour. In the instant case, the execution of the relinquishment deed itself was in question and the learned AC/Collector on evidence placed before him did not accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent had sold/relinquished his rights in his favour. Be that as it may, it was further held by the Collector as also the learned Member, Board of Revenue that in any case, the relinquishment deed was hit by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The view taken by the Courts below appears to be unexceptionable. Section 19 of Act V of 1912 in terms expressly prohibits the transfer of any rights or interests vested in a tenant, through sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage or any other private contract, without the consent in writing of the Commissioner or of such officer as he may empower in that behalf. Section 19 lays down that any such transfer made without such a consent shall be void. The relinquishment deed set up by the petitioner clearly falls within the mischief of section 19 as it is not denied that at the time of its alleged, execution, the respondent was only an allottee under the Chashma Barrage Scheme and proprietary rights had not yet been conferred on him.
Respondent was, therefore, prohibited by law to transfer any rights in respect of the land in dispute without the sanction/consent of the relevant authorities. It is not the case of the petitioner that the requisite sanction was obtained from the competent authorities. Thus relinquishment deed relied upon by the petitioner was wholly void and it created no rights inter se the parties. Reference may pertinently be made to "Ghulam Rasul and others v. Muhammad Anwar and others" 1969 SCM R 254 wherein it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court: "It has now consistently been held that a transfer prohibited by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, is void as between the parties to the transaction ... ... ... ... ... .... ... ..
In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned orders of the learned Member, Board of Revenue and of the AC/Collector do not call for C interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.