Petitioner, a Grade-18 Officer in EX-PCS Cadre was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, when he was placed under suspension with immediate effect vide Notification dated 15-12-1990 (Annexure 'B') issued under the signatures of the Deputy Secretary (Services), Government of Punjab, Services, General Administration and Information Department. Period of petitioner's suspension was later extended for three months with effect from 15th March, 1991 vide Notification, dated Ist April, 1991 (Annexure E) and again for another three months commencing from 15th June, 1991 vide Notification, dated 29th June, 1991 (Annexure V). In the meantime the Chief Minister appointed Mr. Jeewan Khan, Additional Chief Secretary, as Authorised Officer under Rule 2 (1) (c) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, hereinafter called E & D Rules to proceed against the petitioner under Rule 3 (b) & (c) of the said Rules i.e. On the charges of misconduct and corruption. The Authorised Officer on consideration of the facts of the case decided under Rule 6 (2) of the E & D Rules that an inquiry was necessary in the interest of justice.
He, therefore, vide order dated 26th March, 1991 (Annexure 'G') appointed an Enquiry Committee comprising the following Officers to enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner:-- (1)Ch. Muhammad Aslam,Convener Member, Planning and Development Department.
(2)Mian Ihsan-ul Haq, Secretary (Revenue), Board of Revenue.
(3)Mir. Usama Maud, Additional Secretary, Education Department.
On the same day viz. 26th March, 1991, charge-sheet (Annexure 'H') together with a statement of allegations containing the following nine charges was issued to the petitioner requiring him to submit his written defence to the Enquiry -Committee within ten days of the receipt of the charge- sheet:-- "(i)On the 18th October, 1990 you extorted Rs.50,000 from Messrs Ghulam Dastgir Khan (now M.N.A.), Usman Ibrahim (now Minister for Education, Punjab) and Mehr Mohammad Saleem (now M.P.A.) through Babu Muhammad Javed by extending threat of falsely implicating their workers in criminal cases.
(ii)In April, 1990, you stopped the construction of second storey of the house of Mr. Liaqat Ali son of Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din resident of D.C. Road, Gujranwala, had his masons, labourers arrested illegally and allowed construction of the second storey as well as release of the arrested persons after receipt of Rs.50,000 as illegal gratification.
(iii)On 20th September, 1989 you obtained Rs.,35.,000 as illegal gratification from Muhammad Salim son of Haji Muhammad Siddique resident of Khokhar Street, Gali No.42, Gujranwala to help him in getting the land situated in Kotli Mughlan, District Gujranwala transferred in his name. The land in question belonged to Ali Ghaus, son of Badar Din and it was in your knowledge -that not only the question of identity and inheritance of Mr. Ali Ghaus was in dispute but there had been strong indication that he might have died issueless and his property was, therefore, liable to be escheated to State. You, as a District Collector and a guardian of the Provincial Government's interest, instead of filing an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Court dated 21-5-1989, exercised your official influence on the subordinate offices and got the land mutated in the name of the abovesaid Muhammad Salim son' of Muhammad Siddique and three others.
(iv)You purchased Plot No.935 measuring 19 Marlas and 125 sq,ft. In 1987 and Plot No.935-A measuring 6 Marlas and 78 sq. Ft. In 1988 in Shadman Colony, Lahore in the name of your wife Mrs. Tanvir Akhtar. Houses were also built on both these plots. You did not file declaration of assets disclosing purchases of these plots.
(v)By ante-dating an order unlawfully you transferred Mr. Majid Hussain, Junior Clerk/ Telephone Attendant, D.C. Office, Gujranwala and posted him as Additional Moharrir Registration, Hafizabad on 18th December, 1990 when you had been placed under suspension and had ceased to be Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.
(vi)You accepted an illegal gratification of Rs. 1 iac from Khalid Salim son of Nazir Ahmad Agha, resident of Gujranwala in connection with his request for grant of permission to arrange a Recreational Mela. You also misappropriated Rs.13,000 per day by insisting that said Khalid Salim son of Nazir Ahmad Agha shall pay an amount of Rs.15,(W per day but will be given a receipt only for Rs.2,000.
(vii) You deliberately delayed the case of Abdul Aziz son of Ch., Bahawal Bakhsh regarding setting up of a petrol pump to provide undue favour to Mr. Navid Zafar lqbal of Messrs NA. Company who was also interested in setting up a petrol pump. This act amounted to misuse of your official position.
(viii) That you obtained Rs.25,000 as illegal gratification from Muhammad Ashraf son of Khushi Muhammad caste Qureshi resident of Mohallah Sayed Pak, Neechi Abadi, Dhulley, Gujranwala general attorney of Allah Ditta and Munir Ahmad and Sakina Bibi daughter of Shahra in connection with an application in respect of 'Fard Badar' relating to land measuring 7-Kanals, and 3-Marlas situated in Mauza Garjhak, District Gujranwala.
(ix)On the 18th December, 1990 after you had already been placed under suspension and were no longer Deputy Commissioner, you ordered withdrawal of Rs.50,000 from the Deputy Commissioner's Welfare Fund and distributed it to various persons according to your whim for which no proper account was maintained."
2. It is stated that the petitioner submitted his written defence before the Enquiry Committee on 30- 7-1991. The enquiry proceedings were still in progress when he invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court through the instant petition praying therein that "the proceedings initiated by the Chief Minister against the petitioner, culminating in his suspension from service by a notification dated 15-12-1990 and its subsequent continuation by other notifications dated 1-4-1991 and 29-6-1991, passed by the respondent No.3, appointing the Enquiry Committee and framing the charges in the charge--sheet dated 26-3-1991 by the respondent No.2, may kindly be declared as illegal and without lawful authority'.
3. Petitioner has assailed the validity of his suspension from service and the disciplinary action initiated against him on a number of grounds. His first contention is that he was placed under suspension on the verbal orders of the Chief Minister who in law was not competent to suspend him. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under rule 6 (1) of E & D Rules, a civil servant accused of subversion, corruption of misconduct can be placed under suspension either by the 'authorised officer' with the prior approval of the Cauthority' or by the 'authority'. According to the learned counsel, under the E & D Rules read with the Delegation of Powers Rules, 1978, Chief Secretary is the 'authority' in matters of disciplinary action against the officers in Grade-18. Reliance in this behalf was placed on a Notification SOR-1 (S&GAD) 1-50/82, dated the l9th September, 1982 (Annexure 'A') whereby the Governor designated the Chief Secretary as 'authority' for officers in Grade-18 in matters of disciplinary action.
It was next contended by the learned counsel that the E & D Rules contemplate initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the 'authority' whereas in the present case, proceedings against the petitioner have been initiated on the direction of the Chief Minister by-passing the 'authority'.
According to the learned counsel, only the approval of the Chief Minister is required in certain cases covered by the Rules of Business but granting the approval is not the same thing as initiating the action.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon P.R. Nayak v. Union of India (1972 S.L.R. 219) also submitted that the order of suspension envisaged under rule 6 (1) of the E & D Rules could only be made after the disciplinary proceedings were formally initiated in terms of rule 5 (1). Suspension order in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings would thus be devoid of lawful authority. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that, in the instant case, no proceedings were initiated on 15-12- 1990 when the petitioner was placed under suspension and as such the order of suspension issued vide notification dated 15-12-1990 was bad in law being violative of statutory rules and consequently subsequent extensions in the period of suspension were also without lawful authority.
Yet another objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that when the Chief Minister ordered the suspension of the petitioner, he had no material before him except an oral unsubstantiated complaint of an M.P.A. The impugned order of suspension dated 15-12-1990 was thus without any valid basis and so were the subsequent extensions of suspension which were granted mechanically without any application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and in total disregard of the rules and instructions on the subject which, it was submitted, had the force of law.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that most of the charges levelled against the petitioner, prima facie, disclosed commission of an offence of 'criminal misconduct' rendering him liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act and as such the departmental action at this stage was not permissible and in any event, in a case like the present one, the 'authority' could initiate the disciplinary action only on the recommendation of Anti-Corruption Establishment as envisaged in rule 15 (1) (b) of Punjab Anti--Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985.
4. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection questioning the very maintainability of the Constitutional petition in view of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution. It was submitted that the suspension of the petitioner rom service was a matter relating to the terms and conditions of his service. The impugned order of suspension was, therefore, appealable before the Service Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters and jurisdiction of this Court is ousted by virtue of Article 212 of the Constitution. Reliance for this submission was placed on Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer-in-Chief Pakistan Army, G.H.Q.
And another (1985 SCMR 63) and Khadim Hussain v. Chief Engineer, Irrigation 1981 PLC (C.S.) 826. In the first mentioned case, view taken was that the order of suspension is germane to the terms and conditions of service and a dispute with regard thereto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution. It was also observed that when the order of suspension has taken effect, it becomes 'final order' within the meaning of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act and therefore, appealable before the Service Tribunal. This view has been followed in the case of Khadim Hussain (supra). Learned Advocate-General also cited Muhammad Hayat v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 321) and Muhammad Azhar v. Province of Punjab (PLD 1975 Lahore 921) for the proposition that a Government servant has no vested right, merely by virtue of being a Government servant, to hold office and to perform functions thereof. Learned Advocate-General also produced an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeal No.6 of 1980 'Federation of Pakistan v. Mazhar Ali' wherein the question regarding maintainability of a Constitutional petition against the order of suspension and proceedings in a pending inquiry has been exhaustively dealt with.
Learned Advocate-General did not dispute the petitioner's contention that the Chief Secretary was designated as the 'authority' in matters of disciplinary action against the officers in Grade-18 but he took the stand that the petiti6ner though a Grade-18 officer was a Deputy Commissioner at the relevant time and the Chief Minister is not only the Appointing Authority of the Deputy Commissioners - but under the Rules of Business of the Government of Punjab, cases regarding the disciplinary action against the holders of such posts are also required to be submitted to him for his approval before issue of any orders. Reference in this behalf was made to Rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 whereunder the Chief Minister is the Appointing Authority for posts in BPS-18 included in Schedule IV of Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate-General that the post of Deputy Commissioner figures at serial No.10 (i) of Schedule IV. He also referred to Schedule VII, Part A of the Rules of Business which incorporates the list of cases to be submitted to the Chief Minister for his approval before issue of orders and pointed out that serial No.10 of this Schedule mentions, inter alia, the cases regarding disciplinary action against the members of All Pakistan Services or holders of appointments normally held by them (underlining is mine). According to learned Advocate-General, the post of Deputy Commissioner is normally held by the members of All Pakistan Service. It was, therefore, maintained that the case of the petitioner who at the relevant time was holding the post of Deputy Commissioner was required to be submitted to the Chief Minister for his approval. Proceeding on these premises learned Advocate-General argued that the suspension of the petitioner and the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him on the direction and with the approval of the Chief Minister did not suffer from any legal or jurisdictional infirmity.
Learned Advocate-General repudiated the petitioner's contention that the order of suspension could only be passed after the disciplinary proceedings were formally initiated. His submission was that there was no warrant for this proposition in the E & D Rules, rule 6 (1) whereof provided that "in a case where a civil servant is accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct, he may be placed under suspension '. Learned Advocate-General contended that the charges of corruption were levelled against the petitioner by an M.N.A. And M.P.A. And he could, therefore, well be placed under suspension in view of the provisions of rule 6 (1). Advocate-General also repelled the contention of the petitioner that since some of the charges, prima facie, amounted to an offence of 'criminal misconduct', - departmental action against the petitioner could only be taken on the recommendation of Anti--Corruption Establishment. It was pointed out that under rule 5 (1) of E&D Rules, the authority could proceed against a civil servant on the basis of its own knowledge or information placed before it, if it was of the opinion that sufficient grounds existed for proceeding against him.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner controverted the preliminary objection based on the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution by contending that the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court was not ousted because the impugned order of suspension was not passed by the 'departmental authority' as defined in the explanation appended to section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act and as such it was not appealable before the Service Tribunal. Precise submission of the learned counsel was that the appeal before the Service Tribunal lay only in those cases in which impugned orders were passed by an authority competent to pass them. It was thus argued that since the impugned order was not appealable before the Service Tribunal, provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution were not attracted with the result that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to examine the vires of the impugned order was not ousted. Learned counsel relied upon Mian Munawar-ud-Din v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1979 Lah. 699, Muhammad Aslam Javed v. Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways 1989 PLC (C.S.) 39 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Government of Punjab 1981 PLC (C.S.)
194. Learned counsel also cited Muhammad Azhar v. General Manager (Operation) Power, WAPDA (PLD 1990 Lahore 352) to contend that this Court -is empowered to issue appropriate directions and quash the proceedings pending before the departmental authority if the proceedings suffered from patent and apparent error and excess of jurisdiction.
6. 1 have perused the files of the departmental proceedings produced in this Court. It appears that on the complaints made by an M.N.A. And M.P.A. Levelling serious allegations of corruption against the petitioner, the Chief Minister ordered his suspension on 15-12-1990 and on the same date, he was placed under suspension vide notification Annexure 'A'. The Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, was then directed to conduct preliminary inquiry against the petitioner which he held and submitted a report stating that, prima facie, all the charges levelled against the petitioner were made out. A summary was thereafter submitted to the Chief Minister through the Chief Secretary on 26-2-1991 requesting him to accord permission to proceed against the petitioner under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 and to hold a formal inquiry against him on the charges of corruption and misconduct. The Chief Minister was also requested to nominate Mehr Jeewan Khan, Additional Chief Secretary, Goverment of the Punjab as the 'authorised officer' to proceed against the petitioner. Permission sought was granted by the Chief Minister on 4-3-1991. This was followed by another summary submitted to the Chief Minister again through the Chief Secretary soliciting his orders to extend the period of suspension of the petitioner for three months with effect from 15-3-1991 as the inquiry proceedings against him were likely to take some time. The Chief Minister approved the proposal for extension of the suspension period on 26-3-1991 though he desired that the proceedings should be got expeditiously finalised. On the expiry of the extended period of suspension, a request was again made to the Chief Minister on 18- 6-1991 for further extension of the suspension period for another three months with effect from 15- 6-1991 on the ground that "The enquiry proceedings have not yet been completed. The accused, as reported by the Confidential Wing, has not so far submitted his defence". The Chief Secretary recorded a note that the petitioner be reinstated. The Chief Minister, however, allowed the request for further three months' extension in the suspension period but observed that in the meantime enquiry proceedings should be finalised without any further loss of time. Chief Minister further observed that "six months should have been a sufficient period for finalisation of E&D proceedings against the officer". It may pertinently be stated that during the pendency of this petition, a note was put up before the Chief Minister through Chief Secretary on 15-9-1991 seeking further extension of suspension period for another three months with effect from 15-9-1991 stating that "The enquiry proceedings have not yet been completed. The latest position of the enquiry is that out of twenty prosecution witnesses, the statements of seven witnesses on charges 1 -to 4 have been recorded.
Cross-examination of one witness concerning charges 5 to 9 is presently underway". The Chief Minister approved the proposal for extension of suspension period but again desired "timely conclusion of the proceedings". It may be stated that when this petition came up for preliminary hearing it was directed that the enquiry proceedings may continue but no final adverse order shall be passed.
7. 1 have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate-General. Main thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner was directed against the initial suspension of the petitioner on the direction of the Chief Minister.
His argument, as noted hereinabove, was that the Chief Minister was not competent to order the suspension of the petitioner. Only the 'authority' or the ---authorised officer' designated under the E&D Rules could place the petitioner under suspension. Exception was also taken to the subsequent extensions of the suspension period with reference to rule 7(6) of the E&D Rules which requires the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, as the case may be, to complete the enquiry proceedings within a period of sixty days commencing from the last date of submission of the written defence by the accused. It was also urged that the continuation of suspension was violative of the instructions on the subject emphasising that suspension should be resorted to sparingly; the case of the suspended officer should be finalised within three months as far as possible and the suspension, in any case, was not to exceed six months. Learned counsel also sought to assail the validity of pending disciplinary proceedings on the ground that they were initiated not by the Chief Secretary, the 'authority' in the case of the petitioner but by the Chief Minister who was not competent to do so.
8. As regards the competence of the Chief Minister, it may be noted that under rule 6 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, he is the Appointing Authority for the posts in BPS-18 included in Schedule IV of the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974.
Post of Deputy Commissioner which the petitioner admittedly held at the time of his suspension is included in Schedule IV of the Rules of Business. Chief Minister was, therefore, undoubtedly the.
Appointing Authority of the petitioner. I also agree with the learned Advocate-General that in matters of disciplinary action, no order could be passed against the petitioner without the approval of the Chief Minister. Reference in this behalf may be made to rule 5(2) and Schedule VII of the Rules of Business. Rtile 5(2) states that "No order shall be issued without the approval of the Chief Minister in cases enumerated in Part A of Schedule VII". Sechedule VII enumerates the list of cases to be submitted to the Chief Minister for his approval before issue of orders. Entry at Serial No.10 of Schedule VII in its relevant aspect reads as follows:-- "Cases regarding the conditions of service or promotion of or disciplinary action against members of All Pakistan Service or holders of appointments normally held by them It was submitted by the learned Advocate-General and I think rightly so that the post of the Deputy Commissioner is normally held by the members of All Pakistan Service. That being so, the petitione; was well within the disciplinary control of the Chief Minister.
9. Apart from what has been said above, the grievance agitated and the relief claimed by the petitioner in this Constitutional petition admittedly relates to the terms and conditions of his service for which Service Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction has been established by, vktue of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution read with sections 3 and 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. Article 212 in its relevant respect reads as follows:-- "212.--(l) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the appropriate Legislature may by Act provide' for the establishment of one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of--
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are or have been in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary matters;
(b) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(c) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * (2)Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of any mptter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends * * * * * * *--.
Relevant provisions of sections 3 and 4 9f the Punjab Service Tribunals Act are as under:- "3(l). The Governor may by notification in the official Gazette establish one or more Service Tribunals ---------- 2) A Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including disciplinary matters.
(2)
(4)
(5) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(6) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(7) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 4~Appeal to Tribunals.-- (1) Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether- original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that (a)Where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or any rules against any such order no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal or application for review or representation to a departmental authority and a period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or representation was so preferred; (b)no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade; and (c)no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority made at any time before the 1st July, 1969.
(2)
Egplanation.-- In this section 'departmental authority' means any authority other than a Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of-civil servants."
The aforenoted provisions place it beyond doubt that the Servicel Tribunal has been given exclusive jurisdiction in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of the service of the civil servants including disciplinarv matters and the jurisdiction of all other Courts in respect of matters falling within the competence of the Service Tribunal stands ousted. Needless to observe that non obstante clause in Article 212(2) gives it overriding effect with the result that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain any proceedings in respect of matters falling -within the ambit of Service Tribunal is completely excluded. Law to this effect is bv now fairly settled. Refer Muhammad Aslam Bajwa v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1974 Lah. 54 wherein the petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution pending before the High Court in relation to the matter failing With the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal were held to have abated in view of the jurisdiction-ousting clause of Article 212. This view was later approved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another PLD 1980 SC 22. A Full Bench of the Peshawar High Court in Mian Amanul Mulk v. N.-W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary PLD 1981 Pesh. 1 while dealing with Article 212 of the Constitution held that "The provisions of this Article on the very language oust the jurisdiction of all other Courts and as observed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Raja Mansoor Elahi v. N.-W.F.P. PLD 1980 Pesh. 81 an order of a departmental authority even if it is without jurisdiction or is mala fide can be challenged before the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and for that matter of the High Court is specifically ousted." In yet another case reported in PLD 1983 SC 100, Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under the new dispensation, the Service Tribunal- was made the sole arbiter of all disputes relevant to the terms and conditions of civil servants and the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts was altogether excluded in these matters".
10. There can be no cavil with the proposition that suspension of a civil, servant pending departmental inquiry against him felates to the terms and, conditions of his service and it also falls within the definition of 'discipline'. Order of suspension has been held to be appealable before the Service Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar (supra). In an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan passed in 'Federation of Pakistan V. Mazhar Ali' (supra) cited by the learned Advocate-General, the view taken was that the bar of Article 212 of the Constitution read with section 3 4 the Service Tribunals Act excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution and it was accordingly held that "the Constitutional petition riled by the respondent against his suspension and the show-cause notice was not maintainable".
11. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the definition of 'departmental authority' as contained in the Explanation appended to section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, suffice it to observe that in view of the afore-referred provisions of rule 6 of the F Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 read with the provisions of Rules of Business, the Cheif Minister certainly falls within the definition of 'departmental authority. His actions/orders are, therefore, appealable before the Service Tribunal.
12. Before concluding, I would like to briefly refer to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding maintainability of the Constitutional petition. Cases of Munawar-ud-Din (supra) and Muhammad Aslam Javed (supra) are of no help to the petitioner at all as the question of maintainability of the writ petition vis-a-vis the jurisdiction-ousting provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution was neither raised nor examined in them. In the case of Muhammad Nawaz (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court no doubt interfered with the order of suspension in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction holding that it was not passed by a competent authority in accordance with the relevant rules but this view, if I may say so with utmost respect, is not ' consistent with the trend of binding authority. It was also not examined in that case whether or not the authority who passed the order of suspension fell within the definition of 'departmental authority'. Case of Muhammad Azhar (supra) proceeded on its own peculiar facts.
13. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the writ petition is not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.
AA./A-60/L