DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabad, dated 19-2-1991, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.
2. I have heard Mr. Ahsanul Haq Siddiqui, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Hakim Ali Siddiqui, learned counsel for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellant was working as Messenger in the Habib Bank Limited, Thatta Branch when since 28-11-1985 he absconded from duty (total 80 days) without leave or intimation. By letter Ex.R-1, dated 3-12-1985 he was asked to resume his duty but he did not resume duty. He was issued a charge-sheet, dated 18-2-1986 viz. Ex. A/2, wherein he was shown to be absent from duty for 80 days from 28-11-1985. In reply to the charge-sheet he claimed to be lying ill vide Ex. A/4 and A/5. By Ex. A/5A he was asked to appear before Civil Surgeon on 19-3-1986 but vide letter A/6 he intimated that he received letter late and therefore could not appear before Civil Surgeon. A domestic enquiry was held wherein he remained absent and thereafter his services were terminated vide letter, dated 3-12-1986 Ex. A/8. He allegedly filed appeal Ex. A/9 and then gave Grievance Notice to the respondent on 18-1-1988 Ex. A/12. Failing to get any redress he filed Grievance Application on 14-6-1988.
4. The grievance petition has been dismissed by the learned Labour Court mainly on the ground that the grievance notice as well as grievance petition were time-barred. The order of termination of service, dated 3-12-1986 was admittedly received by the appellant against which he is said to have filed appeal Ex. A/9. He claims that because appeal was not decided therefore he waited upto 18-1-1988, when he sent the Grievance Notice by registered post. Obviously this Grievance Notice is beyond the period of three months as prescribed under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969. In Para 13 of his Grievance Petition he states to have filed appeal Ex. A/9 but no postal receipt has been produced. The respondents in Para 13 of their reply statement have denied the receipt of this appeal and there is no satisfactory evidence to the contrary.
5. The next contention of the appellant is that enquiry, if any, was held ex parte without notice to him. The witness of the respondents Akhtar Ali has stated in Para 11 of his affidavit-in-evidence that the appellant vide letter, dated 14-5-1986 was directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 20- 5-1986 at 2-30 p.m. In the Zonal Office, Station Road, Hyderabad alongwith the material evidence but the letter was returned with the remarks that the applicant/respondent had left the house.
Photostat copy of the letter was produced as Ex. R/6 alongwith the photostat copy of the envelope Ex. R/7. This Ex. R/7 bear the same address of the appellant on which charge-sheet Ex. A/2 was despatched and which was admittedly received by the appellant. This appears to be the only address of the appellant available with the respondents as there is no evidence, that any other address was supplied by the appellant to the respondents. It is sufficient compliance of law by sending the notice of enquiry on the address of the appellant, which was available with the respondent. The respondents had thus complied with the requirement of principles of natural justice. Reliance is placed on the case of Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah and another PLD 1981 Supreme Court 225. In the reported case notice sent to one of the respondents for appearing before the Enquiry Officer was returned undelivered and enquiry was held in absence of the witnesses. Their Lordships observed 'In such a case it was not necessary to have resort to substituted service as the workman could not complain of not having been actually served, because workman was also under obligation to keep the management informed of his whereabouts and failing to do so amounts to impeding obligation of Management to afford him opportunity of, being heard and the workman cannot complain of decision having been taken in his absence.'
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon certain decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Mst. Rehmat Bibi and others v. Punnu Khan and others 1986 SCM R 962, their Lordships held that `principles of limitation was not applicable, when order was a nullity in law.
Where the impugned order was issued without hearing and notice to a party, whose presence otherwise was necessary, such order would be a nullity in eye of law and no question of limitation would arise'.
7. In the case of Malik Khawaja Muhammad and others v. Marduman Babar Kahol and others 1987 SCM R 1543 their Lordships held that 'decree in a suit passed in utter contravention of mandatory provisions of law was nullity against which no limitation runs'.
8. It would be seen that these two authorities would not be applicable to the case of the appellant.
As held by their Lordships in the aforementioned case of Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah and another PLD 1981 Supreme Court 225, sufficient compliance of requirement of law had been.
Made by the respondent when notice of enquiry was sent on the address of the appellant available with the respondent and where appellant has not left with the respondents his new address.
Therefore, the order of dismissal cannot be considered nullity in the eye of law so as not to attract the limitation prescribed under the I.R.O., 1969.
9. As pointed above the order of dismissal was passed on 3-12-1986, therefore the grievance notice had to be given within three months as required under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969, but grievance notice was given on 18-1-1988 viz. After more than twelve months, which delay is not satisfactorily explained. Similarly from the date of grievance notice, even if reply has not been received by the appellant grievance petition had to be filed within two-and-half months whereas grievance petition was filed on 14-6-1988 viz. Nearly after about five months. This delay is also not satisfactorily explained.
10. The learned Labour Court has discussed and given cogent reasons for rejecting the pleas raised by the appellant and I see no reason to disagree with the view taken by the learned Labour. Court that the grievance notice as well as grievance petition were hopelessly time-barred. Appeal is dismissed.