The only point calling for decision in this Constitution petition is `whether Federal Investigation Agency constituted under section 3 of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (Act VIII of 1975)
(herein described as the Act) has the power to register and investigate the case for commission of offences scheduled in the Act by the employees of Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Limited (shortly stated as PASCO).
2. The essential facts in the background of this petition are not in dispute. These are; that petitioners Nos.1, 2 and 3 are the employees of PASCO. Petitioner No.1 is the Assistant Purchase Inspector PASCO, Tehsil Dunyapur District Lodhran while Malik Munir Ahmad, petitioner No.2 and Sultan Ahmad Zafar petitioner No.3 are Purchase Officer and Purchase Inspector, Tehsil Dunyapur District Lodhran respectively. On 25-6-1991 an F.I.R. Bearing No.18/91 was registered at Police Station F.I.A., Multan on the direction of Deputy Director, F.I.A. Under section 420/468/471, P.P.C. Read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against the petitioners. Pursuant to this, respondent No.2 started investigation against the petitioners: Feeling aggrieved the petitioners approached this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction for granting declaration to the effect that petitioners were employees of PASCO; were not public servants and as such F.I.A. Had no jurisdiction to register the case and investigate the same against the petitioners.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the PASCO was a public limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1913. It was governed by its Memorandum and Articles of Association and was therefore, a distinct corporate body. Its employees were also governed under the rules framed under Memorandum and Articles of Association by Board of Directors who wield executive authority of this Corporation. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners are not public servants within the meaning of section 2 of the Act, and as such the F.I.A.
Had no legal authority whatsoever to register the case and investigate the same against the petitioners. According to the learned counsel the proceedings from commencement were totally devoid of lawful authority. Reliance was placed upon Ikram Ali v. The State and another PLD 1980 Lah. 597, Moosa Karim v. The State PLD 1985 Kar. 720, The State v. Hazar Khan 1987 P Cr. L J 586, Project Director v. Presiding Officer P LD 1989 SC 152.
4. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.1, 2 and 3 took up the position that PASCO was a public limited company which was founded and controlled by the Federal Government, as such the petitioners were the employees of a Corporation set up by the Federal Government and fell within the jurisdiction of F.I.A: under section 2 of the Act. Reliance was placed on .The State v.
Muhammad Irshad Salik Lodhi and another PLD 1984 Pesh. 139.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of PASCO maintained that PASCO was a public limited company; was incorporated as such under the Companies Act, 1913 vide a certificate of incorporation C-147/LR of 1972-75, issued by the Assistant Registrar of Joint Stock Companies.' He placed on record the synopsis dealing with the status of PASCO. According to his view F.I.A. Has no authority to register/investigate the case against the employees of PASCO.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length. Answer to point for determination turns upon the interpretation of clause (e) of section 2 of the Act which reads as under:-- "`Public servant' means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 18110) and includes an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled or administered by the Federal Government."
Before I proceed to examine this clause, it seems appropriate to note a few principles of interpretation of the statutes. It is well-settled principle of construction of statutes, that words and phrases used in a statute arc to be A given their ordinary meaning according to the rule of grammar. This principle is stated in a celebrated treatise of Interpretation of Statute by Maxwell in, Chapter 2. It reads as under:-- "The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to- be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. The length and detail of modern legislation, wrote Lord Evershed M.R., has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule'. If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases."
Equally well-settled are canons of construction of Statutes that acts are to be regarded as a whole.
One of the safest ways to construe the words is that they are to be examined in the context of the sections in which they occur and by examination of whole statute. Previous legislation may be relevant 'to interpretation of later statute in two ways. The statement on this rule given in Maxwell is worth quoting:-- "(i) The course which legislation on a particular point has followed often provides an indication as to how the Act at present in force should be interpreted.' '
(ii) Light may be thrown on the meaning of a phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same subject-matter.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they deal with the same person or thing or class: it is not enough that they deal with a similar subject-matter. Section 1 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856, is in pari materia with section 5 of the Evidence by Commission Act, 1843, for both deal with the obtaining of testimony, one for course in the United Kingdom and the other for foreign Courts..."
These principles of interpretation were noted with approval in Haji Mian Muhammad and another v.
Ghulam Mustafa PLD 1973 SC 394. In this case Ghulam Mustafa had instituted a suit to pre-empt a sale of property described as Sarai situated on Cinema Road outside Kabuli Gate, Peshawar City. It was stated in the plaint that the property was not Sarai but was a residential house and therefore, subject to pre-emption. The suit was resisted by the vendees mainly on the ground that the property in dispute was Sarai and hence exempt from pre-emption in terms of section 5 of the N.- W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that the property although described as Sarai, was in fact, a business premises and as such it was a shop and was net pre-emptiable. On appeal the Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, at Peshawar, accepted the appeal, reversed the decision of the trial Court and decreed the stilt for pre-emption by holding that the defendant had pleaded the exemption from pre-emption on the ground that the property was Sarai and, therefore, he could not subsequently plead that the property was exempt from pre-emption on account of being a shop. On merits it was held that the property was not business premises. On appeal, the Supreme Court, dismissed the appeal by coming to the conclusion that the word `Sarai' used in N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 did not mean business premises. The Court relied upon the dictionary meaning of word `Sarai' as well as the interpretation of word `Sarai' by the High Court in Regulations of Public Sarais and Paraus Act (Act XXII of 1867). It will be advantageous to quote in extenso the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case supra as under:-- "The Act does not define the terms used in the two exemption clauses and, therefore, the question is what meaning should be attached to the term `Sarai' as used in clause (a) of this section. In the absence of an interpretation clause embodied in the statute itself, the general rule would appear to be, as observed by Lord Esher M.R., in Clerical, etc., Assurance Co. v. Carier (1889) 22 QBD 444, that the words arc presumed to have been used in their popular sense. The same rule was stated by Lord Tenterden in Attroney-General v. Winstanley (1831) 2 D & Cl. 4(32, namely, that `the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art are to be construed as they are understood in common language. Critical refinements and subtle distinctions are to be avoided, and the obvious and popular meaning of the language should, as a general rule, be followed.
Understood in the popular sense, as used in common language, the word `Sarai' has always been regarded as meaning a building or premises used for the temporary accommodation of travellers, where the general public has access to the interior. This meaning (lows from the etymology of the word which is of Persian origin and in its strictly correct literal form should be called Sar-e-rah, i.e. On the road-side. 1t seems to us that the nearest equivalent in the English language to the word `Sarai' would be the word `inn'.--- The learned Judges went on to hold:-- "In view of the interpretation we have already placed on the term `Sarai' as appearing in the relevant clause of section 5 of the Act, it is hardly necessary to dilate upon its meaning with reference to the definitions as appearing in other statutes. However, as this particular matter was also argued at some length by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is necessary to state that the rule applicable in such cases, as enunciated by Craies on Statute Law at pp.132-133, is that in each case it is necessary to ascertain `as to what assistance may be derived, firstly, from statutes which are in pari materia with the statutes under consideration; and secondly, from earlier statutes not precisely in pari materia, but in some way relating to or affecting the same subject-matter."
While dealing with a similar question, this Court has laid down in Abdul Bari v. West Pakistan Soil Reclamation Board PLD 1966 SC 451, that:-- "Where certain words have been given a statutory definition in one statute and the same words are used in a similar connection in a later statute, it may be presumed that the same meaning attaches to the said words."
In that case the Court was dealing with .The question of the meaning to be attached to certain words appearing in the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952, and assistance was sought to be derived from the meaning given to these words in the earlier statute entitled the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. Keeping these principles in view it appears to us that although the objects underlying the three enactments under consideration, namely, the Regulation of Public Sarais and Paraus Act, 1867, N.-W.F.P., Pre-emption Act, 1950, and the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, are different from each other, yet they do seek to regulate, inter alia, certain matters connected with Sarais, and to that extent it would be permissible to seek assistance from the earlier and the subsequent statutes for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning to be given to the term `Sarai' as used in the Pre-emption Act. It is significant that the meaning appearing from these two enactments are in line with the interpretation placed on this term by the judicial, authorities to which we have already referred."
7. Guided by the aforenoted principles of interpretation of statutes I now turn to examination of clause (e) of section 2 of the Act. From the bare examination of this clause it is clear that it has two parts. The first part relates to public servants of Federal Government as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code while second part pertains to employees of any corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled or administered by C the Federal Government. Very clearly clause
(e) is not wholly confined to public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code but is of wider amplitude and is inclusive of the employees of Corporation or other body or organisation which are set up, controlled or administered by the Federal Government. The Dictionary meaning of these words given in the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary are as follows:-- Set-up' means--- to erect; to put up; to exalt; to arrange; to begin; to enable to begin; to place in view; to put in type; to begin a career to make pretensions; to arrange matters so that another person is blamed." `Control' means-- restraint; authority; command; regulation; a check; a means of controlling or testing; a station for doing so; an experiment performed to afford; to provide; or (any of) the subjects providing a standard of comparison for other experiment." `Administer' means--- to govern; to manage as a steward, substitute, or executor; to dispense (justice, rites); to tender (an oath, medicine), to minister."
8. From the examination of the meaning of aforenoted described words, it is amply clear that the employees of the Corporation/Bodies/Organisations, established at the initiative of Federal Government, or which are controlled or managed by the Federal Government, are included within the ambit of clause (e) of section 2 ibid.
9. The words `set-up', `control' and `administered' used in the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act (XL of 1958), came into consideration in State through the Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar v. Muhammad Irshad Salik Lodhi and another PLD 1984 Pesh.
139. In this case an F.I.R.
Was registered against Muhammad Irshad Salik Lodhi and Shafi Ahmad, under `sections 468, 471 and 420 of Pakistan Penal Code, read with section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The learned Special Judge discharged the accused on the sole ground that the accused were employees of the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan, which was a public limited Company registered under the provisions of Companies Act and was governed by its memorandum of association and Articles of Association. Feeling aggrieved the State preferred an appeal under section 417, Cr.P.C. Before the High Court. The accused reiterated the pleas taken before the Special Judge. A Division Bench of Peshawar High Court, accepted the appeal of the State by holding that Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was set up and controlled by the Federal Government. As such its employees fell within the meaning of section 2-B of Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. Paras. 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment deal with the interpretation of word `control', `set-up' and `administer' used in section 2-B of Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958. These paras--are being reproduced in extenso as under:-- "(8) Now reverting to the impugned orders on merit we may point out that the only ground on which these orders were passed was that the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was a Private Limited Company registered under the Companies Act was not a Corporation set up by the Central Government and its employees could not be deemed as public servants. Section 2(b) of the Criminal `Law Amendment Act pertains to the definition of the term public servant and is as under:- - `Public Servant' means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any Corporation or other body or organisation set up by Central Government."
This definition was amended by Prevention of Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 (Act XIII of 1977) published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, dated 9th May, 1977 and the amendment was `set up by' the words and commas `set up, controlled or administered by, or under the authority of,' shall be substituted. Similarly in section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act the word 'by' was substituted by the words `controlled, or administered by, or under the authority of. Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code, besides sections 612 to 619 and 409, was amended and `public servant' was to include an employee of any Corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled, or administered by, or under the authority of the Federal Government."
(9) The Criminal Law Amendment Act is a comprehensive and self---contained Act and lays down both the powers of the Special Judge as well the procedure under which the cases are to be tried by him it is observed in R.R. Chari and another v. The State AIR 1959 All: 149 that barring that part of the Criminal Law Amendment Act which amends the Penal Code the rest of the Act is procedural and, therefore, retrospective. The retrospectivity of a procedural statute will not, however, affect the substantive right which had already vestal in a citizen. One such right is the right to continue the proceedings in the Tribunal before which the same had already commenced according to the state of law as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. The Prevention of Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act. 1977 came ill force during the pendency of the cases against the respondents in the Court of the Special Judge. Their learned counsel contended that the amendment shall not be applicable to these proceedings as these were not retrospective in character. Not withstanding this amendment the definition of Public Servant in section 2(b) of the Act shows that it means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up by the Central Government. It is evident that, besides the definition of public servant as given in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up by the Central Government was also to be treated as a public servant. The Amending Act of 1977 did not amend the first portion of section 2(b) with regard to section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code but amended the latter portion of it which did not form a part and. Parcel of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
It can, therefore, be said that the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code stood intact and the latter portion only was amended.
(10) The Memorandum and Articles of Association of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited are before us. The certificate of incorporation shows that the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited had been registered as a private Company limited by shares. It is in Article 3 that the corporation is to be a private Company and any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures or debenture-stock of the Company is prohibited. It is manifest that the Corporation was exclusively financed by the Central Government to the exclusion of the public. It can, therefore, be said that this Corporation was set up by the Central Government. The words `set up' underlined by us are significant and we are of the view that its employees shall fall within the ambit of the definition of public servant as contained in section 2(b) of the Act. The mere fact that the Corporation was set up by the Central Government and incorporated under the Companies Act would not take it out of the four corners of section 2(b). It is pertinent to note that Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan has been duly incorporated under the Companies Act. According to the Black's Law Dictionary the word `incorporate' means to create a corporation and, according to Wharton's Law Lexicon, it means united in a legal body whereas `incorporation' means formation of a legal body with the quality of perpetual existence of succession except as limited by the Royal Charter or Act of Parliament affecting the Corporation. Generally there are two kinds of companies, namely, those which are conferred the status and attributes of Corporation on satisfaction of certain pre-requisites and registration under the Companies Act and those which owe their origin and life to a statute or an Act of Legislature. The Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan falls within the first kind of Companies and not the second as it is not a creature of statute. It follows that the reasons given in the impugned orders are fallacious and the respondent I being an employee of the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was a public servant as the same had been set up by the Central Government."
10. In the light of foregoing discussion and the interpretation of the words `administer', `control' and `set-up' in, PLD 1984 Pesh. 139, 1 have no doubt in my mind that the clause 2(e) of the Act is of wider amplitude and is inclusive of employees of Corporation/Organisation/Body set up, controlled and administered by the Federal Government. Applying this principle to the facts and the circumstances of this case, it is clear from the Articles of Association of PASCO that it was registered by the Assistant Registrar, Joint Stock Companies at the initiative of the Federal Government. From the list of subscribers it is apparent that Mr. A. Jamil Nishtar M.D. N.B.P., Mr. Hamid D. Habib, Adviser, H.B.L., Mr. Abdus Sami Joint President, U.B:L., Mr. MAK Yousuf, M.D. Allied Bank Ltd., Mr. Siraj Yousuf Khan, Joint Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Finance, Mian Rat-ud-Din, Chairman, A.D.B.P., Mr. E.A. Garda, M.D. Muslim Commercial Bank and Mr. Humayun Sadiq, Ex- Director, N.B.P., were the first subscribers as ex-officio Chairmen of the National Bank of Pakistan, Habib Bank Ltd., U.B.L., Allied Bank Ltd., A.D.B.P., Muslim Commercial Bank. The paid-up share of the Federal Government was 25%. These facts are completely owned by Synopsis furnished by the Legal Adviser PASCO which were brought on the record with the consent of the parties. The Synopsis further indicates that the PASCO purchases wheat from the procurement areas in various provinces with the concurrence of these provinces. This venture is carried out to distribute the wheat in deficit areas of Pakistan as well as Army in consonance with the mandate of the Federal Government. This synopsis further shows that any other venture business/activity can be taken by the PASCO only in accordance with the mandate of the Federal Government. From the examination of synopsis as well as memorandum of association and Articles of Association, it is crystal clear that the PASCO was registered by the Registrar, Joint Stock Companies at the instance of Federal Government in order to supply wheat to deficit areas in Pakistan. This Corporation was financed by the Federal Government, is controlled by the Federal Government and carries its commercial activities within the mandate of the Federal Government.
11. The result of whatever has been stated above, is that the employees of the PASCO are employees of the Organisation/Corporation set up/administered/controlled by the Federal Government. Therefore, they are employees within the meaning of clause 2(e) of the Act and the Federal Investigation Agency had the authority to register and investigate the scheduled offences against them within the framework of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974.
In the light of foregoing discussion this petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
A.A./A-153/L,