1. ' SYED ABDUR RAHMAN, J.---This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. The petitioner was a tenant of the respondents in respect of Shop No,22 consisting of three wooden cabins and a hotel situated adjacent to Dargah Abdullah Shah Ghazi, Clifton Karachi, at a monthly rent of Rs,600. It is alleged by the petitioner that initially the shop consisted of five wooden cabins and hotel. The respondent No,2 illegally and with mala fide intention and without the consent of the petitioner rented out two cabins to some other persons against which the petitioner protested with the result that respondent No,2 was annoyed and kept malice against him. It is further alleged that there was a mutual arrangement between the petitioner and the respondents and rent for five months together was being paid at a time. The petitioner had been regularly paying the rent according to this arrangement yet at the instigation of and in collusion with respondent No,2, the respondent No,1 illegally terminated the petitioner's tenancy vide letter dated 7-8-1990. The petitioner immediately approached the respondents and explained the correct position whereon the respondent No,1 assured the petitioner that no further action would be taken and the termination letter would be formally withdrawn. Rent was also accepted from the petitioner. The petitioner was then asked to submit a written reply so that orders for withdrawal may be passed. On 1-1-1991 the petitioner approached respondent No,2 for payment of rent but he declined to accept the same and threatened to dispossess the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter deposited the rent with the Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and informed respondent No,2 about his having done so. On this respondent No,2 again threatened the petitioner for eviction by force hence the petitioner filed Civil Suit No,31 of 1991 in the Court of IIIrd Senior Civil Judge South, Karachi. The plaint was rejected. The petitioner filed appeal before the IIIrd Additional District Judge South who admitted the same and passed orders for maintenance of status quo on 7-2-1991. The respondent No,2, however, illegally sealed the hotel on 3-2-1991. The petitioner finding that there was imminent threat of his illegal eviction, filed the present petition. He has urged that the order of sealing of hotel was void as no show-cause notice had been served upon him. He has also submitted that he does not have any alternate efficacious, effective and expeditious remedy. It is also urged that section 13 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was a bar to the ejectment of the appellant in this manner hence the prayer for desealing of the premises and the necessary declaration against the impugned order.
2. ' On behalf of the respondents Mr. Maqsood Baig, Manager of Auqaf has filed his counter-affidavit to application for interim injunction. Mr. Ikram Ansari has stated that this counter-affidavit be also treated as counter-affidavit to the main petition. It is averred by the respondents that show-cause notice was served on the petitioner on 9-10-1989. He was asked to explain his position. He submitted his reply orally which was found unsatisfactorily. Hence respondents terminated his tenancy by an order, dated 7-8-1990. It is alleged that the possession of the disputed premises has been taken over on 3-2-1991 and the tenancy has already been terminated. The alternate remedy of appeal under section 10 of Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 was available to the petitioner but he did not avail of-the same.
3. ' We have heard Mr. Mirza Yaqoob Baig for the petitioner and Mr. Ikram Ansari for the respondents.
4. The first contention of Mr. Mirza Yaqoob Baig is that no notice was given to the petitioner by the respondents prior to his ejectment and prior to sealing of the premises. His contention is factually incorrect. The respondent No,2 alongwith his counter-affidavit produced photostat copy of notice dated 9-8-1989 whereby the petitioner was called upon to show cause within 30 days. The photostat copy contains the signature of the petitioner in token of having received the same. Mr. Mirza Yaqoob denies that the petitioner was served with this notice. The contention does not appear to be correct because in the termination of the tenancy order dated 7-8-1990 there is also mention of the fact that a show-cause notice was served on the petitioner. The petitioner in his reply dated 2-10-1990 did not deny this fact and did not allege that no such notice was served upon him. Had it been so he would have stated in the reply that no such notice was served on him.
5. The sealing of the hotel has taken effect on 3-2-1991 which is obviously not only after issuance of the show-cause notice but even after the issuance of the termination order and after the written reply filed by the petitioner. Hence it is factually incorrect that respondents had not heard or given any show-cause notice to the petitioner. In this view of the matter there is no violation of the principle of natural justice audi alteram partem.
6. ' The next contention of Mr. Mirza Yaqoob was that section 13 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 provides that no tenant shall be evicted from the premises in his possession except in accordance with the provisions of that Ordinance. Hence the eviction of the petitioner under section 9 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 otherwise than by filing an ejectment case under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was illegal. He relied upon the case of Manager Auqaf and another v. Mazhar 1985 CLC 1794. In the reported case a tenant of Auqaf Department had been allowed by the Rent Controller to deposit rent under section 13(2) of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Manager Auqaf filed objection to the application contending that the Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The learned Controller upheld objection.
7. On appeal the Additional District Judge remanded the case, whereon the Controller held that he had the jurisdiction to entertain the application. Against this order F.R.A. Was filed in this Court. The learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Notification issued under section 3 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was not saved under section 27 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 nor similar Notification was issued thereunder, hence the Controller had jurisdiction to entertain the application.
8. ' This ruling does not apply to the facts of the present case. Apart from that the learned counsel who appeared in that reported case did not bring section 22 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 to the notice of the learned Civil Judge and therefore, the said section was not considered therein. Section 22 of Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 reads as under:-.- "22. Effect of orders, etc. Incosistent with this Ordinance.--- Every order made and every action taken under this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any document, decree or order of Court, deed, enactment or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such enactment other than this Ordinance."
9. ' The plain reading of this section would show that an order made or an action taken under this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any. ..
10. Enactment..."
11. We are, therefore, of the clear view that the inconsistency between the provisions of section 9 of Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 and section 13 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, if any, has to be resolved in such a way that the provisions of section 9 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 shall have to be given effect notwithstanding anything contained in section 13 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. This is all the more necessary because section 9 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 contained a provision of special nature while that contained in section 13 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance is a provision of general nature. Special provision is always to be given effect vis-a-vis a general provision.
12. ' In the end we would like to mention that the alternate remedy was available to the petitioner in the form of an appeal under section 10 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 which reads as under:-- "10. Appeal and finality.-- (1) Any person evicted under the provisions of section 8 or aggrieved by an order of termination of lease or resumption of tenancy made under section 9 may, within sixty days of such eviction or within thirty days of the order of termination of the lease or resumption of tenancy, prefer an appeal to the Chief Administrator, who may, after giving such person an opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or vacate the order made by the Administrator under section 8 or 9.
(2) If there is no appeal against an eviction under section 8 or an order of termination of lease or resumption of tenancy made by the Administrator under section 9, the eviction, termination of lease or resumption of tenancy, as the case may be, shall be final, and when there is an appeal, the decision of the Chief Administrator in appeal shall be final."
13. Reliance is placed in the case of Muhammad Arif Dar v. Income-tax Officer (PLD 1989 SC 109) where it has been held as under:-- "One of the conditions for grant of relief in writ jurisdiction of the High Court is that the petitioner before it should not have any alternate adequate remedy. In the present case, a remedy by way of appeal, was such remedy. Therefore, it is correct that no relief could be granted to the petitioner under Article 199 of the Constitution."
14. ' Mr. Mirza Yaqoob relied on PLD 1972 SC 279 and 1981 CLC 120 and submitted that mere availability of an alternate remedy would not necessary debar the petitioner from coming in writ jurisdiction of this Court. There can be no cavil with this proposition of law, but it is to be seen as to whether the alternate remedy is more efficacious, expeditious and effective. We feel that the appeal provided under section 10 of the Sindh Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 meets with all the requirements under the law.
15. ' The petitioner also does not appear to have any case on the moral plane either. Admittedly he is a habitual defaulter in payment of rent. His plea that the respondents had agreed to accept rent for 5 months at a time from him is unacceptable. Such a plea is to be rejected in rent cases even where private landlords are concerned, what to say of official landlords who are not supposed to grant such a concession.
16. ' We, therefore, do not find any merit in this petition and therefore, dismiss the same.