' The petitioners who were five in number were elected as members of the Zila Council Sialkot from the non-Muslim seats in the election held in the year 1987. As a result of the creation of District Narowal, by the Notification, dated 16th March, 1991, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of powers conferred upon him under sections 6 and 7 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 had directed the division and reconstitution of the Zila Council, Sialkot into two separate Councils namely Zila Council Sialkot and Zila Council Narowal. One of the consequences of this reconstitution as provided in the notification was that the existing non-Muslim members, members representing Peasants, Workers and Women shall cease to hold the seats in the undivided Zila Council Sialkot w.e.f, 1-7-1991 and fresh election shall be held to elect members against these seats.
2. By this Constitutional petition it has been prayed that the above direction in the notification in question whereby the petitioners have been denuded of their status as members of Zila Council be declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
3. Mr. Taki Ahmad Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that there was no justification for the Government to have directed that the non-Muslim members of the Zila Council shall cease to hold office and shall not become members of the newly-constitued Zila Council although the Muslim members have been allowed to retain their seats. It was explained by the learned counsel that originally the entire Zila was the Constituency for the election to non-Muslim seats but subsequently these members were elected on tehsil basis and as such there was no difficulty in treating the petitioners to be the members of respective Zila Councils depending upon the tehsils from which they had been elected.
' Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, Advocate-General Punjab has been heard in reply.
4. The contention raised by the learned Counsel may appear to be attractive at first blush but cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that with the bifurcation of the District, the previously constituted Zila Council ceased to exist and instead two new Councils were set up one for each District. However, by virtue of section 7 (2) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 the directly elected Muslim members of the Local Council became members of the newly-constituted Zila Councils, but with regard to non-Muslim members, there is no such command of the Legislature. These members cannot, therefore, claim membership of the new Councils as of right.
5, It is also to be seen that under section 7 (1) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, the Government is empowered to specify in the notification consequences which shall ensue from the publication of the notification dividing the Local Council. One of the consequences, which have been specified in the Notification, dated 16th March, 1991 is that the non-Muslim members shall cease to hold their office. For this reason also the contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted.
5-A. Mr. Taki Ahmad Khan, Advocate, however, contended that the omission to provide that non- Muslim members had also become members of the newly-created Zila Councils was not deliberate and thus Court should supply "casus omissus" and construe the provision in such a manner so as to save the membership of non-Muslim. I regret my inability to agree with the learned counsel. The principle of casus omissus has no applicability in the present case. Under section 7 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, as it originally stood on the reconstitution of the Zila Councils, all members irrespective of the fact where they were Muslims, non-Muslims, or elected against special seats became members of the newly-constituted Councils. However; this provision was amended by the Punjab Local Government (Amendment Ordinance) Act XV of 1983 to read that only the directly elected Muslim members shall become the members of the new council. This contention of the learned counsel has thus no force.
6. Even otherwise it is well-settled that the Legislation has to be construed in accordance with the words used in the enactment and omission in a statute cannot as a general rule be supplied by the constructions. Crawford in his famous work known as Construction of Statutes (1940 Edition) says "thus, if a particular case is omitted from the terms of a statute, even though such a case is within the obvious purpose of the statute and the omission appears to have been due to accident or inadvertence, the Court cannot include the omitted case by supplying the omission. This is equally true where the omission was due to the failure of the legislature to foresee the missing case. As is obvious, to permit the Court to supply the omission in statute, would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the legislature".
' In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edition) at page 70 it is stated that:- "No case can be found to authorise any Court to alter a word so as to produce a `casus omissus', said Lord Halsbury in Mersey Docks v. Henderson. In Crawford v. Spooner, the Judicial Committee said. 'We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add any mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there.' In 1951, in Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v.
Newport Corpn., it was held by the House of Lords that a Court has no power to fill any gaps disclosed in an Act. To do so would be to usurp the function of the legislature.
' In other words, the language of Acts of Parliament, and more especially of modern Acts, must neither be extended beyond its natural and proper limits, in order to supply omissions or defects, nor strained to meet the justice of an individual case."
' The following statement of law appears in Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes (7th Edition):-- "Court cannot supply casus omissus." A casus omissus can in no case be supplied by a Court of law, for that would be to make laws, 'says Bullar, J., in Jones v. Smart. Whether the omission is intentional or inadvertent is no concern of the Court and a casus omissus cannot be supplied by a Court of law...........................................................
' It is not permissible for the Court to fill up this gap by a process of judicial interpretation. A Court must interpret the law as it stands and should not try to supply further facts or add to the meanings conveyed by the language of the section. It is an accepted proposition that no rule of interpretation can be invoked for the purpose of including cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words. It is not for the Court to supply the omission; it can only point out the omission.
' It is for the Legislature to consider and decide whether the omission should be supplied."
' There are of course certain exceptions to the above-noted general rule, but none of these is applicable here.
For the reasons aforesaid there is no force in this petition which is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.