1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---The facts of the case necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that Sardar Abdul Aziz, respondent, filed a suit in the Court of District Judge Muzaffarabad on 28th of February 1977 for the recovery of Rs,63,517.80 in connection with the service he had rendered in Water and Power Development Authority as a deputationist from the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The learned District Judge passed a decree for Rs,21,806.92 against the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with 9% interest. It was also ordered that respondent Abdul Aziz was to be paid one year's salary and one month's leave salary. In the decree no liability was fixed on Water and Power Development Authority. Sardar Abdul Aziz filed an appeal before the High Court which was decided on 5th of June, 1985. In addition to the amount decreed by the learned District Judge against the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, the High Court decreed a further sum of Rs,16,865, with 9% interest, on account of deputation allowance and one month's salary minus pension. These sums were decreed jointly against the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Water and Power Development Authority.
2. ' During execution proceedings being taken by the learned District Judge Muzaffarabad an application was moved praying that an accounts expert may be appointed as a local Commissioner and should be directed to calculate the exact amount which was payable for the decree-holder and also apportion the liability between Water and Power Development Authority and the Azad Government. This application was decided by the executing Court on 28th May 1986 whereupon a revision petition was filed in the High Court by Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Sardar Abdul Aziz decree-holder and Wapda were arrayed as the respondents.
3. ' On 10th of July, a learned single Judge of the High Court, Muhammad Akram Khan, J., who was seized of the case, ordered that a notice shall issue to the respondents for 12th of July. The relevant file shows that notices were issued to the respondents but the process was not served on any of them. On 12th of July, when the case came up for hearing, the counsel for Azad Government, petitioner before the High Court, and respondent Sardar Abdul Aziz in person were present. Since Water and Power Development Authority had not been served, nobody was present on its behalf.
4. The learned Judge did not take notice of the absence of WAPDA and proceeded to hear the arguments of the learned counsel for the Government and respondent Abdul Aziz in person and recorded an order immediately thereafter. In this order the learned Judge observed that some material points had been left unexplained in the decree drawn up in consequence of the judgment of the High Court recorded on 15th of June 1985, for instance, it was not explained as to how much money had to be paid by the Water and Power Development Authority and how much by Azad Government, whether interest was compound or simple and whether house rent was included in the privileges decreed in favour of the decree-holder. The learned Judge ordered that the decrees may be corrected in accordance with the clarification made by him in the order although there are no such clarifications in the order. We find that an amended decree was drawn up after the recording of this order.
5. ' The details of the decree thus amended need not be noticed because we do not propose to deal with them.
6. ' On coming to know of it, Water and Power Development Authority, the appellant herein, felt aggrieved and filed an application in the High Court on 24th January 1987 praying that the decree drawn up in consequence of the order passed by the learned single Judge on 12th of July 1986 may be modified and the execution proceedings taken in consequence thereof may be quashed. It was stated in the application that WAPDA had neither been summoned nor heard when the order was passed. An attempt was made to explain with facts and figures that the amounts which were due from WAPDA had already been paid to the decree-holder and that nothing was left to be recovered from it. It was submitted that the executing Court had declined to consider these submissions on the ground that it was bound by the decree of the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 10th of January 1990 dismissed the application in relation to the main subject-matter but corrected a clerical mistake. The High Court treated the application as one under section 152, C.P.C. And formed the view that this provision of law did not include the authority to amend an order or decree passed by a Court after conscious application of mind. The learned Judge observed that when Muhammad Akram Khan, J. Ordered that the interest leviable on the amount payable as a consequence of the decree shall be compound interest and that decree-holder would be entitled to some other amounts, it was the result of a definite application of mind and therefore these could not be termed as accidental or arithmetical mistakes within the meaning of section 152. The learned Judges relied on `Talib Hussain and another v. Amina Bibi and 4 others' (PLD 1982 SC AJ&K 42), 'Llaji Ishtiaq Ahmed and 2 others v. Bakhshaya and 7 others' (1976 SCM R 420) and `Mst. Farosha v. Fazal Gul and others' (PLD 1983 SC 220) in support of the conclusion reached by them.
7. ' Water and Power Development Authority has with our leave, appealed to this Court against order of High Court passed on 10th of January 1990. Shaikh Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for WAPDA, vehemently contended that the order of the High Court recorded on 12th July which was sought to be modified by moving an application before the same Court, had been passed behind the back of his client and that it was, therefore, void ab initio. He submitted that in any case it was not binding on Water and Power Development Authority and its effects have to be confined to the decree-holder and the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the two parties which were present before the Iiigh Court when the order of 12th July was passed. The learned counsel submitted that relief could be given to the appellant under Section 152 of the C.P.C. He alternatively submitted that the High Court had ample powers to declare that the order passed on 12th July, 1986 was void and was to be ignored.
8. ' Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, counsel for decree-holder Sardar Abdul Aziz contended that no new liability had been imposed on WAPDA by Muhammad Akram Khan, J. But the learned Judge had only amplified the liability. He pleaded, therefore, that there was no question that the decree may be termed as a nullity. He also contended that the order had been passed by a Court which was competent to pass that order and it was not possible in law to treat it as a void order. Raja Muhammad Hand Khan, the learned counsel for the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, also supported the contention that by the order of the High Court passed on 12th of July, 1986 nothing new had been introduced in the decree. It only explained certain matters without which it was not possible for the executing Court to execute the decree.
9. We agree with the High Court when it states the law that orders passed after application of mind cannot be corrected under section 152 of the Code, but the other aspect of the matter, namely, that the order was passed without hearing Water and Power Development Authority still needs to be examined. There is no manner of doubt that it was a clear illegality. The order may not be termed as void in the sense that it had not been passed by a Court competent to pass it but an order passed without hearing is also equitable with an order without jurisdiction. Therelore, there cannot be any hesitation in holding that the order under reference was so and thus not binding on Water and Power Development Authority. No student of law should have any cavil with this proposition.
10. ' Now we may pass on to the real question before us, namely, whether the order passed by Muhammad Akram Khan, J. Could be corrected or modified on an application under section 152 of the C.P.C. In the order of the High Court while dealing with the scope of this section the following observations appear in para. 3:- "The language of Section 152 C.P.C. Clearly describes the dimension of scope of amendment of judgment, decree or orders wherein clerical or arithmetical mistakes cropped up by virtue of accidental slip or omission."
11. ' It appears that the High Court was under the impression that the power granted by this section is confined to clerical or arithmetical mistakes which might crop up as a result of accidental slip or omission. However, the phraseology of this provision of law reproduced below shows that it is not so:-- "152.-Amendment of judgments, decrees and orders.-Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising there in from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties."
12. As is clear, the legislature has provided that not only clerical or arithmetical mistakes but also accidental slips or omissions can be corrected by a Court in exercise of powers conferred by this section. In our view when Muhammad Akram Khan, J., passed his order it was due to accidental omission that he failed to notice that Water and Power Development Authority was being proceeded against behind its back. It is not conceivable that the learned Judge would have passed the order under reference without securing the presence of Water and Power Development Authority if he had become conscious of that omission. Even a cursory glance at the order makes the matter abundantly clear. The order is recorded in the hand of the learned Judge and the parties mentioned in the High Court are "Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v.
13. Sardar Abdul Aziz". Water and Power Development Authority is not mentioned as a party at all. In our view situation is squarely covered by the expression "accidental slip or omission" and relief could be granted by the High Court under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code.
14. ' We have been able to lay hands on two reported cases which give support to the view we have taken of the scope of section 152 C.P.C. The first is Muhammad Latif v. Border Area Committee (PLD 1978 SC 270). The circumstances in which the matter was taken to the Supreme Court were that Muhammad Latif and others were vendees of land in dispute from one Saeed Ahmed who had purchased it from Pultoo an allottee under the Border Area Scheme. The allotment from the name of Pultoo was cancelled by the Border Area Committee, the vendees filed a writ petition in the High Court to challenge that order. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court found that the order of the Border Area Committee was without lawful authority. It was manifest from the body of the judgment that the learned Judge had intended to remand the case to the Border Area Committee but the learned Judge omitted to give a clear direction to that effect. Apprehending that the judgment of the learned single Judge may not be understood as deciding finally and conclusively dispute between the parties, one of the respondents before the High Court filed a review petition.
15. The learned Judge passed an order on the review petition and clarified that he had in fact ordered a remand while deciding the writ petition. Against this order an appeal was filed by the successful petitioner before a Letters Patent Bench of the High Court but it was dismissed. Thereupon appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, with leave to that Court, was filed. It was pleaded that the order passed subsequently by the learned Judge could not have been passed in a review petition. The Supreme Court observed that in the circumstances of the case the only appropriate order that could be passed by the High Court was one of remand and then proceeded to hold that the application moved for clarification was not in the Strict sense a review petition and the learned Judge was empowered to correct its judgment and order upon principle embodied in section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
16. ' The other case is reported as Sindh Star Syndicate v.Synthetic Chemical Company 1980 CLC 1351.
17. The facts were that a suit was filed in the Sindh High Court on its original side for recovery of some amount in respect of contract entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. The defendant No.2 was impleaded in the plaint but the only averment made in the plaint about that defendant was that it was the parent establishment of defendant No.1. No relief was claimed against defendant No.2 specifically. The suit was decreed by a learned Judge but it was not specifically explained whether defendant No.2 would or would not be responsible to pay the amount decreed.
18. An application was submitted praying that the High Court may be pleased to rectify the decree by striking out the name of defendant No.2, a judgment debtor, and the writ of attachment issued against him may be recalled. The learned Judge of the High Court Ajmal Mian, J. (as he then was) formed the view that on the basis of the averment in the plaint and evidence on the record decree was not capable of being passed against defendant No.2. Therefore, in exercise of powers under section 152, C.P.C. Rectification of the judgment and decree was ordered. It was, ordered that word 'I accordingly decree the suit as follows' will be followed by the words "against defendant No.1". It was ordered that the decree may be accordingly amended and the writ of attachment issued against the judgment-debtor No.2 was to stand withdrawn.
19. As a result of the above analysis we are of the view that the High Court wrongly dismissed the application moved by WAPDA. We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and order that in the order passed by the High Court on 12th July 1986 and the decree drawn up in consequence thereof all references to Water and Power Development Authority would be deleted. The part of the order by which the amount of Rs,18,865 was corrected by the High Court shall however remain unaffected. Costs would also follow.