' MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.---In this case the respondent, who was employed as Information Officer in WAPDA, on 15th July, 1980, was transferred from Lahroe to Multan. However, on his request the transfer was held in abeyance and leave granted to him for a period of 3 months from 19-12- 1980 to 28-3-1981 on compassionate grounds. On the expiry of this leave, he applied for extension for 5 months, which was refused vide authority's letter dated 29-3-1981. On the same date, he moved another application, reiterating his earlier request for extension of leave. This application was also turned down and he was required to resume his duty at Multan by 11-4-1981. As this direction went unheeded, the respondent was placed under suspension on 16-4-1981. This order was despatched to him by registered post acknowledgment due, on the same date, at his residential address in Mohallah Wassan Pura, Lahore, but it was received back by the Authority with the endorsement of the Postman that the respondent left that place of residence and was not traceable. This was followed by another letter dated 19-4-1981, again sent by registered post acknowledgment due, at the same address, which, too, was returned by the postal authority as undelivered with the similar remarks. Under this letter the respondent was accused of wilful absence from duty, disobedience of the orders of the Authority, keeping duplicate treatment books for medical facility with an ulterior motive and defrauding the Authority by availing of the facility of acquired residential accommodation, which was not physically occupied by him. The respondent was asked to submit his explanation within 14 days and further informed that if the explanation was not received within theistipulated period, ex parte action would be taken against him.
2. It appears that by his application dated 19-4-1981 received in the office of the Authority on 20-4- 1981; the respondent conveyed to them that he had shifted to his house in Jahanzeb Block, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore, with effect from 1-4-1981. Under Authority's letter dated 3-5-1981, the respondent was again mailed, by registered post, the suspension order and the letter dated 19-4-1981 at the said address. This communication was received by one Abdul Hamid on 5-5-1981, as is evident from his signature appearing on the 'Acknowledgment Due" receipt. Under this letter it was conveyed to the respondent to submit his explanation within a fortnight on receipt thereof. The appellants did not receive any explanation from the respondent even after the expiry of this time limit and chose to resort to substituted service through publication of notice in WAPDA's Weekly Publication "Khabarnama" dated 25-7-1981, but, despite this publication, there was no response from the respondent. The appellant thereafter proceeded under Rule 4 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline)
' Rules, 1978, and through an ex parte order dated 25-7-1981 imposed on him the major penality of dismissal from service.
3. It is discernible from the record that instead of straightaway preferring an appeal before the- Federal Service Tribunal, against his dismissal, the respondent filed a complaint under section 5/7 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, before the N.I.R.C., which was dismissed on 10-5-1982. He then filed a departmental appeal under Rule 11 of the said Rules, challenging the order dated 25-7-1981, which was rejected on 6-4-1982, by the Chairman WAPDA, acting as an Appellate Authority. It was, ' thereafter, that the respondent went in appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, who vide order dated 9-7-1984, under challenge before us, accepted the appeal and gave a direction that fresh proceedings be taken against the respondent in accordance with law. The operative part of this order runs as under:.
"There had been several attempts for serving the charge-sheet on the appellant, but when the service could not be effected in the ordinary way, a charge-sheet was published in the WAPDA "Khabarnama". The charge-sheet is undated, but from the record made available by the appellant, it appears that the press received for publication the aforesaid charge-sheet on 14-7-1981. It was sent to the Director-General, Public Relations of the Wapda on 27-7-1981. In other words, the charge-sheet was made after 27-7-1981. The order of dismissal of the appellant was passed on 25- 7-1981. It is thus evident that the order of dismissal had been passed before the service of the charge-sheet. This action on the face of it is illegal."
4. In support of this appeal, it is argued that the Authority made several attempts to serve the respondent, but in order to delay the disciplinary action, he has been trying to avoid service. It is to be noticed that according to the impugned order the printing material regarding notice issued to the respondent was passed on to the WAPDA Printing Press on 14-7-1981, and printed matter delivered to the Director General Public Relations on 27-7-1981, which creates an impression that the Wapda `Khabarnama' issue of 6th July, 1981, embodied an ante-dated information. The appellants' learned counsel vehemently repelled this inference and urged that according to the practice prevalent in WAPDA the documentation relating to the printing of (Khabarnama) was completed after its publication and that the same procedure was followed in publishing the notice in question. According to him the respondent refused to receive the copy of the `Khabarnama' on 11-7-1981 and 14-7-1981, and thus, was fully aware of the publication. He argued that even if the publication in the Khabarnama is excluded from consideration, the notice sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting the same by registered post to the respondent at his residential address in Jahanzeb Block, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore, irrespective of the fact that the Acknowledgment Due receipt was signed by one Abdul Hamid, in law is to be presumed to have reached its destination and that the letter containing the notice was received by the addressee. In the submission of the learned counsel, the learned Tribunal dealt with the case in a perfunctory manner, and did not advert to service by registered post, which fully satisfies the requirements of law.
5. There is much merit in these arguments. The procedure for service of charge-sheet is laid down in rule 6-A of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1978, framed by the Authority, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under section 18 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, under which: " the letter communicating the charge to the accused....Shall be sent to him at the last known address under registered cover, acknowledgment due. In case, the letter is received back with a report of refusal, or with a report that it has been received by a member of the family or is not returned within a period of 10 days from the date of its issue, it shall be presumed that the notice has been duly served on the accused."
' In the instant case there is enough material to substantiate that the letter dated 13-5-1981 containing suspension order and explanation letter dated 19-4-1981 was mailed by registered post to the respondent at his address "Jahanzeb Block-565, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore". The same address appears on the "Acknowledgment Due" receipt. The fact that at the relevant time the respondent resided at the said address has not been controverted before us. Thus, the despatch of the charge-sheet etc., to the respondent by registered post, is in conformity with the requirement of Rule 6-A, and from this it can be safely inferred that the respondent was duly served. The presumption envisaged by Rule 6-A is further strengthened by Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which was in force when the letter was despatched to the respondent. Reference may also be made to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which on proof of the fact that a pre-paid and properly addressed letter, containing a document, has been sent by registered post, gives rise to a presumption of due service. It would be useful to refer here to the observations appearing in Haribar Banerji and others v. Ramshashi Roy and others AIR 1918 Privy Council 102 wherein, relying on Gresham House Estate Co. v. Rossa Grande Gold Mining Co. (1870) 9 WN 119, it was maintained that: "...If a letter properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. That presumption would appear to their Lordships to apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register, and is not rebutted but strenghtened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself."
In this view of the matter, we hold that the service of the letter on the respondent by registered post, containing the charghe-sheet, is sufficiently proved and the publication of notice in WAPDA "Khabarnama" is merely an act of supererogation. The premises on which the Tribunal chose to interfere with the orders of the departmental authorities are wholly untenable.
6. It is true the presumption of due service is a rebuttable presumption, and the respondent denies to have received the letter or to have any relationship with Abdul Hamid, but when having regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct, upon the facts of a particular case, such a presumption is drawn by the Court in favour of one party, the burden of proof is shifted to the opposite side. The question is whether the respondent has succeeded in rebutting this presumption. This issue needs to be examined in the light of the facts of the case. Conceivably, the respondent would not have been unaware that the extension of leave was not automatic. It was, therefore, his obligation to have remained in touch with the departmental authorities immediately after the expiry of 3 months leave, to ascertain the fate of his application for extension of leave. As already maintained, this application was refused. It seems to us that he was posted with the knowledge of this refusal and deliberately repeated his request for enlargement of leave. There is also reason to believe that he was not unware of his suspension and consequential proceedings commenced against him by the Authority. In this behalf it has been urged before us that the respondent used every tactic and banked upon all the technicalities to delay the proposed disciplinary action. This allegation does not appear to be without substance. Indeed, the attitude displayed by him amply supports this assertion of the appellants. In this state of affairs, we are not persuaded to lend any weight to the respondent's denial and feel that the presumption drawn against him has remained unrebutted.
7. It is the requirement of Rule 6 that in case of charge of misconduct, calling for imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service, an inquiry should be held into the charge, evidence recorded in support thereof and in defence of the accused, as considered necessary by the Inquiry Officer or the Committee, as the case may be. Further, the accused is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him. According to the respondent's learned counsel, Rule 6 was grossly violated; no inquiry was held against him, and therefore, the action against the respondent was tainted with a grave illegality.
8. True enough, in this case no inquiry was conducted into the charges against the respondent, but that by itself does not vitiate punitive action taken against him. Rule 6 is subject to Rule 5 (iv) and it provides: "If the competent authority decides that it is not necessary to have an inquiry conducted through an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee, he shall--
(a) by order, in writing, inform the accused of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and the grounds of the action; and
(b) give him an opportunity to submit an explanation against the action proposed to be taken, within a period of not more than 14 days, and may also give the accused a personal hearing, if so desired by him."
It is manifest from the record before us, that the impugned action is saved by the said provision.
The Authority's letter dated 19-4-1981 fully answers the requirement of this Rule inasmuch as the respondent was informed of the grounds of action, the proposed penalty and given an opportunity to submit his explanation within a fortnight. He was further asked whether he wanted to be heard in person. We have already come to the conclusion that the respondent would be presumed to have been served with this letter. His dismissal, therefore, in our view, cannot be assailed on the ground that Rule 6 was violated by the Authority.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent has launched another attack on the validity of the action taken against him on the ground that while rejecting the departmental appeal he was not given any opportunity of personal hearing, by the Chairman, who exercised the powers of the Appellate Authority; his decision, being violative of the principle of natural justice, is rendered void.
10. This argument is to be evaluated on the rectitude of Rule 11, which deals with an appeal by an employee, on whom a penalty is inflicted under the Rules. Sub-rule (4) of this Rule furnishes certain guidelines to be followed by the Appellate authority entrusted with the hearing of an appeal. These guidelines are not exhaustive and enjoin upon the Authority, while deciding an rreal, to consider whether the facts on the basis whereof action is taken have been established and furnish sufficient ground to sustain the penalty and whether such penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate.
Having regard to these matters and compliance with the Rules, the Authority is empowered to pass such order "as it thinks proper".
11. Upon the language of Rule 11, it is nut possible to agree with the learned counsel. Expression "as it thinks proper" signifies that by and large the matter is to be settled by the Authority's discretion. Of course, in exercising the discretion, the Authority has to follow the rule of reason and act within the broad contours of Rules 11. It is to be remembered that the matter before the Appellate authority is not like the proceedings in a Court of law that in every case the appellant should be invited to present oral arguments. Indeed, such a course, in the area of departmental appeals, would amount to over judicialization of the departmenetal remedy. The Appellate Authority can regulate its procedure for proper disposal of the appeal, as considered lit by it. However, the position would be different if in the memorandum of appeal, opportunity of personal hearing is demanded by the appellant. Obviously, such is not the case before us. Even before the Service Tribunal no such grievance was voiced by the respondent. The plea now raised in this respect is merely an afterthought. The case may also be examined from another angle. It will be seen that Rule 5(iv) (b) specifically gives a right- of personal hearing to the accused, but Rule 11 does not make mention of any such right. The omission does not appear to be accidental and leads to the inference that right to advance oral arguments before the appellate authority was not intended to be conferred on the appellant.
' In view of the above discussion, this appeal is accepted and the impugned order set aside.
Consequently, the order dismissing the respondent from service stands restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.