1. ' The Applicant in this Revision Application is a grantee of agricultural land measuring 140 acres situated in Makan Kanderani, Deh Thiriri, Tapo Jherruck, District Thatta. The name of the Applicant is duly entered in the Revenue Records as such. The Applicant borrowed loan from Respondent No,4, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. The lands were developed, crops and mango gardens were raised on the land in question. The Deputy Commissioner, Thatta, cancelled the grant of the aforesaid land without giving any prior notice to the Applicant. The Applicant, therefore, filed a suit narrating the above facts and also stating in Para 9 of the Plaint that the Plaintiff/Applicant had filed appeal against the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner, Thatta, which appeal is pending before the Additional Commissioner, Hyderabad Division.
2. ' The suit proceeded ex parte but however, the learned Civil Judge, Thatta, dismissed the suit on the ground that although the Plaintiff/Applicant had filed an appeal but the suit was filed before decision of the appeal. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Thatta, was of the view that the suit filed during the pendency of the appeal is barred under section 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876.
3. ' The appeal filed by the Applicant was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge for the same reason. Section 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, reads as under:- "11. No Civil Court shall entertain any suit against the Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue Officer unless the Plaintiff first proves that previously to bringing his suit, he has presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force as, within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such suit, it was possible to present.
4. ' In the case of Muhammad Saleh v. The Deputy Commissioner, Tharparkar (PLD 1963 Kar. 613), it was laid down that the above provision of section 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, is mandatory and the suit was held to be barred by law as the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that he had exhausted the remedy available by way of appeal to the Revenue Authorities, before filing the suit. Same view was taken in the case of Province of West Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Juman and another (PLD 1960 Kar. 908). In the case of Abdul Ghaffar and another v. Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1983 Kar. 215) the view expressed in the case of Province of West Pakistan (Supra) was upheld, however, following observations were made: "7. The real question for consideration in these matters is whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits against the orders of the Revenue Authorities on the ground that they were passed on a misappreciation of evidence or on an erroneous view of the law. It is not contended before me that the learned Revenue Authorities, whose orders were challenged in the above- mentioned suits, have acted mala fide because in such an event the position would have been different and on such an allegation the Civil Court would be competent to go into the question of mala fides and set aside the impugned order, if it was based on such considerations."
5. ' In the present case the contention of the Applicant in the plaint is that the Revenue Officer entertained a false and frivolous application filed by a fictitious person and ordered an enquiry against the Applicant. No notice of the enquiry was served upon the Applicant and order of cancellation of grant was passed on 11-3-1989, without hearing the Applicant.
6. ' In the case of Shah Mardan Shah v. Chief Land Commissioner Sindh (PLD 1974 Kar. 375) Division Bench of this Court, after considering the case law, observed that an order held void in law by virtue of violation of principles of natural justice is nonetheless void than the one void as an act done coram non judice or mala fide. A void order is no order in law, its weight is zero in law, it A does not exist, and it need not be set aside, because law does not recognize its existence. If an act done coram non judice or mala fide is void, to the same effect is an act which violates the principles of natural justice.
7. In the present case, the Applicant was condemned unheard in violation of the principles of natural justice and as such the order challenged being a mala fide order, the bar contained in section 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, is not applicable.
8. ' The Revision Application is, therefore, allowed. The orders of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded for disposal on merits. There will be no order as to costs, as the Respondents have neither contested the suit nor Appeal or even this Revision Application.