ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J: --Leave to appeal was granted to consider the following questions:- -
(a) Whether, in view of the pendency of the appeal proceedings relating to the ownership of the property, in the circumstances of this case, the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.
(b) Whether, this case is not distinguishable from other similar cases of ejectment forthwith on ground of default in payment of rent, after the decision of the issue relating to relationship against the tenant, without further examining the issue relating to default in payment of rent-The distinguishing feature being that it was not an old tenancy under the respondent who was the new purchaser and the default found by the learned Courts below was of very short period.
2. The facts, in brief are, that the respondent brought an eviction application under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, for the eviction of the appellant from the house in question on the grounds of default in the payment of rent and personal requirement. The respondent claimed to have purchased it from its former owner on 7-10-1985. The respondent had alleged default for the months of October, November and December, 1985. The application was contested by the appellant. It was averred that he had already entered into' a contract for sale with the previous owner on 5-9-1985 and that he had paid a sum of Rs. 20,000 as advance. An issue with regard to the relationship of landlord was framed by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller decided the - issue in favour of the respondent and directed the eviction of the appellant. The appellant challenged this order under section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act before the Lahore High Court. His appeal was dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had entered into an agreement with the former owner of the disputed house for the purchase of this house. Though, the suit has been dismissed but the appeal is still pending therefore, till the decision of that appeal, the order of eviction should not have been made by the Rent Controller. This contention has no force. The Rent Controller on the basis of evidence was competent to decide the controversy between the parties.
The Rent Controller has referred to the evidence on record and then decided the issue in favour of the respondent.
4. The learned counsel then contended that the rent for the month of October was due on the first of November, 1985 and the cause of action accrued to the respondent on 7th of January, 1986 as the respondent had purchased the house on 7-10-1985, therefore, the eviction application on the ground of default for the month of October could not be filed. This contention has also no force. The respondent had claimed the rent with- effect from October, 1985 and the period of 60 days had expired on 31st of December, 1985. The eviction application was filed on 6th of January, 1985. The learned counsel has referred to the written statement wherein the appellant had stated that he had made the payment of rent to the former owner but this fact has not been established. The respondent had stepped into the shoe of the previous owner, and therefore, entitled to the payment of rent for the-whole month of October, as the tenancy admittedly started on the 1st of each month. There is nothing on record to prove that the appellant had paid the rent to the former owner upto the 6th of October, 1985. As such, the default has been established.
5. It is next contended that no notice of transfer was served on the appellant. Though, there is no provision similar to section 13(a) in the Cantonments Act but he submitted that general provisions of Transfer of Property Act would apply and as the landlord had failed to issue notice to the appellant, therefore, the appellant could not be adjudged as a defaulter. This contention has no force. The transfer was made through a registered document and this. Itself is a public notice to all.
In fact, the appellant has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, it is the admitted position that he had not paid rent to the respondent.
6. It is next contended that the respondent may be the owner but not the landlord. This contention has no force. The respondent had purchased the house from its former owner. The appellant has not denied that the former owner was his landlord. Reference may be made to Allah Yar. v.
Additional District Judge 1984 SCM R 741.
7. It is further contended that discretion should have been exercised in favour of the appellant in view of the circumstances of the case. Leave to appeal had not been granted on this ground and the Courts below have refused to exercise their discretion in favour of the appellant in view of the fact that the appellant denied the tenancy.
8. There is no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.