1. ' The petitioners through this petition have prayed the following reliefs:- "It is, therefore, prayed that this Honourable Court may graciously be pleased to declare the impugned order dated 1-3-1989 passed by respondent No, 1, as without any legal or lawful authority, of no legal effect and non-existent in the eyes of law and to pass such further order or orders as it may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
2. ' The facts, leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioners are running an establishment in the name of United Woollen Mills Ltd., at E-15, S.I.T.E., Karachi. Muhammad Pervaiz (deceased) husband of the respondent No, 2 was an employee of the petitioners till 19-7-1986. It is the case of the petitioners that for variety of reasons, they filed an application under Standing Order 11-A of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
3. Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before the IIIrd Sindh Labour Court for permission to close down their factory. The IIIrd Sindh Labour Court granted permission vide order dated 19-7-1986. As a result of which the petitioners had closed down the factory and terminated the services of all the workers including Muhammad Pervaiz. The said Muhammad Pervaiz died on 14-9-1986 in the National Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases. The respondent No, 2 filed a petition under Standing Order No, 10-B of the Ordinance. The respondent No, 2 claimed the amount of group insurance from the petitioners. The case of the respondent No, 2 as pleaded in the petition was that deceased Muhammad Pervaiz was under the treatment of Social Security Hospital, therefore termination of his services was illegal and in violation of Sindh Employees Social Security Ordinance.
4. ' On service of notice, the petitioners filed objections to the application. The petitioners pleaded that the respondent No, 1 has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The petitioners pleaded that the remedy lies before the Social Security Court.
5. ' The respondent No, 1 overruled the objection. The respondent No, 1, on appreciation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the respondent No, 2 was entitled to claim of Rs,30,000 as group insurance of her deceased husband and directed the petitioners to deposit Rs,30,000 within fifteen days from the date of the orders.
6. ' The petitioners being aggrieved filed the above petition.
7. ' I have heard Mr. Munawar Malik, learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the petition. The respondent No, 2 and her Advocate remained absent, for the reasons known to them.
8. ' The main contention of Mr. Munawar Malik was that the respondent No, 1 has no objection to entertainment of petition under Standing Order 10-B of the Ordinance.
9. ' In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is necessary to reproduce section 67 of the Sindh Employees' Social Security Ordinance which reads as follows:- "67. Prosecution.--(1) No prosecution under this Ordinance shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner or of an officer authorised by him in writing in this behalf.
(2) No Court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence under this Ordinance.
(3) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Ordinance except on a complaint made in writing within six months of the date on which the offence was discovered."
10. An examination of the Ordinance would show that it is a special statute, dealing with the special subjects, namely for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employment injury or death. It is a beneficial enactment. The provisions of Employees' Social Security Ordinance create new rights and obligations and prescribe Mode of its A enforcement and enjoyment. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that when a statute creates new rights and obligations and prescribes the mode of its enforcement, such provisions are considered mandatory and that legislature intends compliance of such provisions to be essential to the validity of the act or proceedings.
11. ' Applying the above principle of interpretation, it will be found that provisions of section 67 of this Ordinance are mandatory and therefore the petition under Standing Order 10-B of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance is not attracted in the instant case.
12. ' It is not in dispute that the petitioners filed an application under Standing Order 11-A of the Ordinance before the IIIrd Sindh Labour Court, Karachi, for permission to close down their factory which permission was granted to the petitioners vide order dated 19-7-1986. As a result of that permission, the factory was closed down and the services of the workers including Muhammad Pervaiz were terminated on 19-74986. In Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd., Hyderabad v. The Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Court, Lahore, and 2 others PLD 1965 SC 420 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed on page 425 as follows:-- "In the present case, there is no manner of doubt that there was a re-organisation carried out for a bona fide purpose of the industry, and the notices of discharge were given exclusively in relation to the redundancy which thus resulted and without any taint of victimisation. There was nothing in the nature of punishment or vindictiveness involved. We consider that the action of the Factory in respect of the employees retrenched in this case as surplus to requirements being bona fide, it did not attract the control of the Industrial Court under section 30 of the Ordinance..", The dictum laid down in the above case is fully attracted in the present case. In the instant case, the factory was closed down after seeking permission under provisions of Standing Order 11-A and the services of the workers including Muhammad Pervaiz were terminated.
13. ' The respondent No, 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Standing Order 10-B of the Ordinance. I accordingly hold that the impugned order of respondent No, 1 is without jurisdiction and is nullity in the eye of law.
14. ' The net result of the above discussion is that am of the confirmed opinion that the learned respondent No, 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the matter which was brought before it by the respondent No, 2 herein and declare that the impugned order dated 1-3- 1989 is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
15. ' The above are the reasons for the short order dated 16-10-1989 passed on conclusion of the arguments.