' The petitioner through this Constitutional petition has challenged the orders dated 13-3-1989 and 26-6-1986 of the respondents Nos.1 and 2
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner and respondent No,3 got married on 21-10-1985. The marriage was without the blessing of the parents of petitioner, therefore, failed. The respondent No,3 moved an application on 11-2-1986 before respondent No,2 for grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs,5,500. The said respondent after some proceedings and recording the statement of respondent No,3 proceeded to grant maintenance to her at the rate of Rs,2,200 per month. The petitioner impugned this order through a revision before respondent No,1. The same was dismissed vide order dated 13-3-1989. Hence present Constitutional petition. The petition was admitted to regular hearing and notices were issued to the respondents. The respondent No,3 alone has entered appearance through Advocate and contested the petition while the other respondents were proceeded ex parte.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the petition argued that there was no evidence, whatsoever, on record to support the quantum of maintenance, therefore, the orders of respondents Nos.1 and 2 are illegal. In this behalf, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the cases reported as Dost Muhammad v. Mst. Alam Khatoon etc. 1986 MLD 2583, M.
Ponnambalam v. Saraswa thi AIR 1957 Mad. 693 and H. Syed Ahmad v. Naghath Pervcen Taj Begum (AIR 1958 Mys. 128). The second submission is that the Arbitration Council was not properly constituted, therefore, the whole proceedings are illegal.
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent has argued that respondents Nos.1 and 2 fixed the maintenance allowance after taking into consideration the status of the petitioner as is apparent from the orders of both the authorities. The arguments are summed up with the submission that the Arbitration Council was properly constituted. This fact is clear from the order of respondent No,2.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record as well as precedent cases. The admitted position is that only the statement of respondent No,3 was recorded. The same is appended as Annexure 'D' with the writ petition. The statement is absolutely silent as to the paying capacity of the petitioner. So much so that she has not even given any figure as to rate of allowance. The case of Dost Muhammad squarely covers the proposition in hand. The orders of respondents Nos.1 and 2 are, therefore, liable to be set aside on this short ground.
6. Now coming to the second argument as to the constitution of the conciliation Court, it is clear from the third line of the order of respondent No,2 that Arbitration Council was constituted and this fact is also apparent from the remaining text of the order. This is not all. The order is only signed by the Chairman. This in my view is not proper and legal. It is not clear from the order whether it is a unanimous decision of the Arbitration Council or not because Members have not signed it. The orders of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 are liable to be set aside on this ground also.
7. The result is that this writ petition in allowed, impugned orders of respondent Nos.1 and 2 dated 13-3-1989 and 26-6-1986 are set aside. The matter is remanded to respondent No,2 to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law after affording the parties opportunity to lead evidence.
Since this is old matter, therefore, respondent No,2 is directed to decide the application of respondent No,3 expeditiously and in any case within two months of the receipt of is order.