' The petition is directed against the order of learned Sub-Judge, Muzaffarabad, passed on September 15, 1990, whereby request of the petitioner to consolidate three suits instituted by him separately against the respondents, was declined.
2. Taj Din brought a suit for declaration seeking cancellation of sale-deed executed in respect of suit property against Sher Muhammad and others vide Civil File No.
17. The second suit was instituted by him against Rehmat Bibi and others vide Civil File No.13. The third suit was instituted by the petitioner against Muhammad Hussain and others vide Civil File No.
16. In all the suits, the plaintiff-petitioner assailed execution of sale-deeds by the vendor in favour of the vendees, on the ground of deception and forgery. It was averred that the vendor was disabled person on account of insanity and amputation of fingers due to leprosy, as such the sale-deeds were not executed by him and the same were procured by deception and fraud. The alienations were effected on different dates. The vendees in all the three suits were also different. However, all the three suits were instituted on January 4, 1986.
3. The claim of the plaintiff-petitioner was repudiated in all the suits by the different vendees.
Separate trials were held and part of the evidence of the parties has also been recorded. It was late in the day that an application for consolidation of the suits was moved on November 19, 1989. The learned Sub-Judge declined to consolidate the suits as, in his opinion, it was not found feasible to dispose of the suits by a single order.
4. Mr. Ashfaque Kiani, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the ground of attack in all the suits was common and the property in dispute was alienated out of the common estate, as such it was conducive to the interest of justice to consolidate the suits. Moreover, it was pointed out that identical issues were raised in the suits and the evidence in respect of the issues was also of identical character. Therefore, to avoid contradictory decrees and multipticity of proceedings, it was in the interest of justice to consolidate and decide all the suits by one order. Mr. Ibrahim Zia, the learned counsel for the opposite side, controverted the aforesaid points and argued that the transactions of sale in the three cases were made at different times in respect of different lands and amongst different parties. The plaintiff and the vendor were, of course, common in all the suits but the cause of action, the parties amongst the defendants and the lands were different.
Therefore, it was not feasible to consolidate and dispose of all the suits by one order.
5. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contain a definite provision relating to consolidation of suits. However, the judicial consensus is that where parties are the same, the cause of action in different suits is common and there was likelihood of conflicting decrees, in order to avoid the chance of conflicting decrees, multiplicity of proceedings and inconvenience to the parties, it was permissible to consolidate such suits and to decide them by one order. Such authority is available in exercise of powers under Rule 6 of Order II and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code.
6. In present case, as described earlier, the plaintiff, in all the three suits, assailed the validity and properiety of the sale-deeds purporting to be executed by the vendor in favour of different vendees. The dates and year of the transactions of sale, admittedly, are different. The vendees are also different. It is also undenied that evidence in all the three suits has been recorded separately and one of the suits is at the final stage. It is, therefore, evident that the property, the parties and the causes of action are not common in all the three suits.
7. The plea of insanity of the vendor, raised in the pleadings of the plaintiff, is also to be adjudged in relation to the time of execution of the sale-deed. Likewise, the claim of amputation of fingers due to leprosy afflicted to the vendor is also to be ascertained in relation to the time factor when the different sale-deeds were executed. Therefore, the issues relating to disability of the vendor are to be determined in the light of the time factor in each case. It is, therefore, not right to suggest that only one set of evidence would suffice to discharge the onus of proof in all the cases.
8. May be that there is common plaintiff in all the three suits and the ground of attack against the sale-deeds is also common, but this fact alone is not sufficient to seek consolidation and joint disposal of all the three suits. An identical situation was faced by the learned Judge in Ch. Muhammad Siddique's case, 1980 CLC 657. The suits sought to be consolidated were instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants on different causes of action. Despite the fact that parties in both the suits were the same, yet in presence of different causes of action and diffferent nature of the suits, consolidation was disallowed. The learned Judge observed: "It may also be pointed out that there is no specific provision for consolidation of suits and the Courts have to exercise inherent power only to direct consolidation in cases where they find that it will be convenient for the parties to have a joint trial of two suits. It is in fact, intended to avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the parties. The deciding factor for directing consolidation of two suits, to me appears to be, whether in the long run it will be expedient and advantageous for all concerned to have two suits tried together as analogous cases."
' In H. Hamid and another's case AIR 1933 Patna 61, two different suits relating to payment of damages for libel were consolidated by the trial Judge against the consent of the parties in the counter suits. The order of consolidation was reversed as in view of the learned Judge, the similarity of issues in both the suits was of general character, as such it was not warranted to consolidate the suits against the wishes of the parties. It was observed that consolidation of the suits was likely to mislead the parties to prove their respective claims relating to payment of damages for libel. In that case both the suits were instituted for payment of damages for libel; the causes of action and the grounds of attack were also common but the parties were different. In presence of the aforesaid situation, it was not deemed feasible to allow consolidation.
9. In present case, as noticed earlier, the causes of action are different as the transactions of sale were made at different times. Therefore, the issue relating to deception and forgery due to disability of the vendor, is to be proved by relevant evidence in due consideration of the factor of relevant time. In case of consolidation, no doubt, the parties are likely to be misled in discharging the onus of proof placed on them.
10. In addition to the aforesaid factors, it is also noticed that the trial in each case has already reached an advanced stage. Consolidation of the suits at this stage is, therefore, not likely to advance the cause of administration of justice. The order of trial Court is, therefore, sustained.
However, keeping in view the interest of justice, it is deemed expedient to direct the trial Court to decide all the cases at one time to avoid any likely prejudice to the case of the parties.
' The petition is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.