1. ' MUNAWAR ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).---The appellant, Syed Ghulam Rasool Shah has filed this appeal against the order of his reversion, from the rank of Head Constable to that of Constable, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Khairpur on 3-5-1988. Before filing the present appeal he challenged the impugned order in departmental appeal, preferred to the D.I.-G.P. But the same was rejected vide his order dated 27-10-1988. The appellant then went in revision before the I.-G.P. But there too he did not succeed vide I.-G.P's order dated 19-2-1989.
2. ' On the same day, the order of his reversion was passed, the appellant was also placed under suspension. Four days later on 7-5-1988, he was served with charge-sheet accompanied by statement of allegations. It transpired from the said documents that the appellant had arrested one Haji Ghulam Muhammad Katoher who was however released by him after accepting illegal gratification of Rs,650. This amount was shared by the appellant with the S.I.P. Muhammad Moosa.
3. After the appellant submitted his reply to the above charge, the charge-sheet was converted into show-cause notice and the appellant was awarded minor penalty of fine equivalent to his one- month's pay. The DIGP's separate order dated 14-11-1988 placed on record by the appellant disclosed that the S.I.P. Muhammad Moosa, who had allegedly sbared the illegal gratification with the appellant had to undergo the same ordeal. Like the appellant he too was reverted from the S.I.P's position to that of ASI, besides having been awarded minor punishment of fine equal to his one-month's pay. The said order however shows that on recommendations of the two successive S.Ps. The said Muhammad Moosa was restored to his original position of SIP.
4. ' We heard arguments of Mr. M.L. Shahani for the appellant and Mr. Salman Ansari, on behalf of the official respondents. We also went through all those documents relevant for disposal of this appeal.
5. ' It appears from the above narrative of facts that two adverse orders were passed against appellant: one of reversion and another of imposing minor penalty upon him. This appeal is however directed only against the order of reversion. The appellant's main contention against the latter order, as stated in para. 3 of his memo. Of appeal is: "That vide order dated 3-5-1988 without any show-cause notice the appellant was reverted to substantive post of Constable and without any charge-sheet or explanation obtained from the appellant." In reply to the appellant's above objection the plea taken by official respondents is reflected in para. 3 of their written statement and it reads as under: "That the contents of para. No, 3 (of memo of appeal) are admitted to the extent that no show- cause (notice) was issued to him for reversion to his substantive rank of Constable. It is stated that reversion is no punishment and thus issuance of show-cause notice is not necessary. The reliance can be placed on Supreme Court's judgment reported in PLD 1959 SC (Pak.)
107. The applicant was found unfit for the post of Head Constable, therefore he was reverted to the post of Constable in the public interest".
6. ' From the above pleadings of the parties, the admitted position that emerges was that no show- cause notice was given to the appellant with regard to his reversion. Therefore the short point that now arises for our determination is whether the appellant was entitled to show-cause notice prior to his reversion from the post of Head Constable to that of Constable. In the case reported as Ali Muhammad Shabani v. Inspector-General of Police, Sindh 1987 PLC (C.S.) 205, this Tribunal had taken the view that despite the exclusion of the police personnel of the lower cadres from purview of the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, they continued to be governed by the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, and therefore as required by section 12 of the said Act a civil servant appointed to higher post or grade ad hoc or on temporary or officiating basis was liable to reversion to his lower post or grade without notice which was however mandatory in case of reversion carrying stigma. In the subsequent case reported as Abdul Haq v. Province of Sindh 1989 PLC (C.S.) 300, the attention of this Tribunal was drawn to the Supreme Court's authority reported as inspector-General of Police Punjab v. Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich and others PLD L985 SC 159 wherein the Supreme Court was pleased to hold the view that the Police Force was governed by the Police Act, 1861 and Police Rules, 1934, in respect of all the matters covered by the said Act and said Rules. Relying on that authority this Tribunal held: "After going through the above Supreme Court authority, we have no doubt in our mind that the police force even in the Province of Sindh is governed by the Police Act, 1961 and Police Rules, 1934 in respect of all the matters covered by the said Act and said Rules."
7. ' We see no reason to take a different view in this case. Accordingly the appellant is governed by the Police Act, 1961 and Police Rules, 1934 and not by Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and rules framed thereunder. In view of this finding we have to see if the Police rules entitled the appellant to any show-cause notice before his reversion. In this connection we may refer to rule 13.18 of Police Rules, which reads as under: "13.18. Probationary period of promotion.---All Police Officers promoted in rank shall be on probation for two years, provided that the appointing authority may, by a special order in each case, permit period of officiating service to count towards the period of probation. On the conclusion of the probationary period a report shall be rendered to the authority empowered to confirm the promotion who shall either confirm the officer or revert him. In no case shall be period of probation be extended beyond two years and the confirming authority must arrive at a definite decision within that period whether the officer should be confirmed or reverted. While on probation officers may be reverted without departmental proceedings. Such reversion shall not be considered reduction for the purpose of rule 16.4.
8. ' This rule shall not apply to constables and Sub-Inspectors promoted to the selection grade, whose case is governed by rules 13.5 and 13.14."
9. The above rule clearly shows that a Police Officer who is on probation following his promotion may and can be reverted without departmental proceedings. That is to say that show-cause notice need not be given for reversion of a promotee police officer during the period of his probation. It is not the case of the department that the appellant's reversion was ordered while he was still on probation. All that has been stated in the written statement filed on behalf of the official respondents is that "reversion is no punishment and thus issuance of show-cause notice is not necessary'. We regret our inability to subscribe to the above view. As stated above if reversion is not made during the period of probation, it amounts to reduction in rank which according to rule 16.12 of Police Rules is a major penalty. Before inflicting such penalty the procedure laid down in rule 16.24 of the'Police Rules has to be followed.
10. ' It is true that in para 3 of the written statement filed by the learn A.A.-G., it is stated that the appellant's reversion was made to his "substantial rank" of Constable, indicating as if the appellant was working as Head Constant only in officiating capacity. This does not necessarily mean that he was probation at the time of his reversion. Officiating capacity can continue even aft expiry of the probationary period until it is terminated on confirmation of tl official. There is no provision in the Police Rules permitting reversion without show-cause notice even from officiating position.
11. However, in this connection learned A.A.-G. Has relied upon the Supreme Court authority reported ; Pakistan v. Hikmat Hussain PLD 1959 SC (Pak)
107. In the reported case, respondent was appointed as officiating Post-Master General by the acting Prim Minister but later he was reverted to the post of Assistant Director-General. H challenged this reversion in High Court which decided in his favour.
12. In appeal t the Supreme Court, it was held: "When an officer is expressly appointed in an officiating capacity an until further orders Govt. Can at any time terminate his officiatin, appointment, and revert him to his original position, even if sue.
13. Reversion may amount to review of earlier order."
14. ' On the basis of above authority even if it is held that reversion can b; made from officiating position without show-cause notice, such reversion shall reversion simpliciter. The appellant's reversion was however not simpliciter. I was rather accompanied by the sting described in these words as he is found unfit to hold the rank of Head Constable." These words can be interpreted as reflection either on appellant's efficiency or on his conduct or both.
15. ' It is an admitted position that on the day of appellant's reversion, he was also placed under suspension which was again followed by disciplinar' proceedings against him, ultimately leading to his punishment in the shape of fine equal to his one month's emoluments. In these circumstances it will not b( possible to delink the appellant's reversion from his suspension and consequen disciplinary action, holding that it was altogether independent action divested from the departmental proceedings. As such the appellant's reversion was in the nature of his condemnation. Since he could not be condemned unheard, the( appellant was entitled to show- cause notice before his reversion was ordered This view is supported by the Supreme Court authority reported as Muhammad Ibrahim v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1972 SC 332) wherein it was held: "Government has the legal authority to terminate an officiating appointment at any time and it may do so for any reason relatable to exigencies of service. No show-cause notice is necessary in such a case But if it is intended to revert an officer to an interior post by way o penalty, a show- cause notice is necessary notwithstanding that the appointment to the superior post was in an officiating capacity."
16. In view of the above authority the appellant was entitled to show-cause tice before his reversion, as his reversion was obviously in consequence of the sounds for which he was not only placed under suspension but was also Itimately punished by imposing a minor penalty of fine equivalent to one on this pay on him. There would have been no objection to the appellant's .Eversion if it had followed rather than preceded the departmental proceedings taken against him. Furthermore since the appellant was duly punished for the charge of illegal gratification, his further punishment by way of reversion was incalled for. The S.I.P. Who had allegedly shared the illegal gratification with the appellant and was punished on that charge like the appellant was somehow restored to his original position. It was absolutely unjustified that in the precisely similar circumstances, the appellant's case was treated differently and his reversion was allowed to continue.
17. ' For the above reasons we are of the view that the impugned order of the E appellant's reversion is unsustainable and therefore, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs and the impugned order is set aside.