' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises out of an application for ejectment filed by respondents Nos.1 to 10 against the petitioner with respect to a shop in his occupation as a tenant under the said respondents at a monthly rent of Rs,200. The only ground, on which the eviction of the petitioner was sought, was default in payment of rent from January, 1986 to April, 1986. In the reply filed by him, the petitioner repudiated the assertion that he was a defaulter and pleaded that the rent was being paid to Khair Din, a `Munshi' of the respondents, and after his death, the rent for the months of January 1986 and February 1986 was remitted through money order in the name of Nisar Muhammad, one of the respondents, who refused to accept the same, whereafter, the rent was deposited with the Rent Controller.
2. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the respondent has committed default in payment of rent? OPA.
(2) Whether the respondent has damaged the shop in dispute? OPA.
(3) Whether the ejectment petition is frivolous and the respondent is entitled to claim special costs from the petitioners? OPR.
(4) Relief.
' In support of their case, the respondents examined Sheikh Nisar Ahmad, one of the landlords, who appeared as A.W.1. In rebuttal, the petitioner examined Muhammad Amin, Postman, as R.W.1. And he himself appeared as R.W.2.
3. On the basis of the evidence led before him, the Rent Controller held that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent for January and February, 1986. He, therefore, proceeded to direct the eviction of the petitioner, vide his order dated 17-9-1988.
4. Aggrieved by the above order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was heard by the Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, who, vide his judgment dated 12th of January, 1989, held that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent for the month of March, 1986 and that as the default was wilful, the petitioner was liable to be ejected.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it stands proved on record that the petitioner had on 21st of April, 1986, applied to the Rent Controller, for permission to deposit the rent for January, 1986 to April, 1986, but this application remained pending and was not decided till 29th of May, 1986, immediately where after, the rent was deposited on 2nd June, 1986. It is argued that there was as such no default and in any case it was a fit case for exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner.
' Chaudhry Mushtaq Ahmad Khan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos.1 to 10 has been heard in reply.
6. It stands established from Ex.R2 to Ex.R5 that on 21st of April, 1986, the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for permission to deposit the rent from January, 1986 to April, 1986. However, the Rent Controller, instead of deciding the application on that day issued notices to the landlords. The application was decided on only 29th May, 1986. There is no dispute that the entire rent was deposited by the tenant on 2nd of June, 1986. In the present case tenancy between the parties is admittedly oral and, therefore, the rent for the month of March, 1986, fell due on 31st of March, 1986, and could be paid by 1st of June, 1986, in view of section 13(2)(i) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The petitioner had applied for the deposit of rent on 21st of April, 1986, i,e. Much before the date by which the rent had to be paid. That being so the petitioner cannot be held to be a defaulter. If the Rent Controller had delayed the disposal of the application and had not permitted the petitioner to deposit the rent in time, no responsibility can be placed upon the petitioner.
7. The principle of law is firmly established that no one can be prejudiced by an act or omission of a Court. Legally speaking the petitioner was entitled to have the application for deposit of rent decided on the same day. If however, due to some procedural formalities, the application was decided later on and the deposit was made immediately thereafter the deposit in all fairness should relate back to the date on which the application was filed.
8. While considering somewhat similar situation though in another context it was observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Hayat and others v. Amir (PLD 1982 SC 167) that:-- "We cannot favour the view that the applicant should be made to suffer for delay caused in the Court, for that would amount to penalising him for no fault on his part. As such we are of the view that the relevant date is the one on which the application was filed and not the one on which it was accepted and the order of the Court impleading a new person a party to the suit must be deemed to have effect from the date on which the application to implead the party was filed." Again in South Industrial v. Mothey Narsima Rao (AIR 1927 Mad. 468) it was opined that "it appears to me to be obviously the right principle to adopt in the matter, as otherwise though an application might be made in time, as in this case, by the dilatoriness of the Court or by the manoeuvres of the opposite-party or by a mistaken decision of the Court, which had to be put right on appeal or revision, the order to which the party applying was entitled might not be made until the suit had become time-barred, and it would be unreasonable to leave the party who had applied in good time at the mercy of such chances."
9. Be that as it may, even if there was any default in payment of rent which according to Additional District Judge himself was only for one month it cannot be held to be willful in view of application for deposit of rent filed by the petitioner who was all along ready and willing to pay the rent. There could not be a better case for exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner and the authorities below acted illegally and arbitrarily in directing the eviction of the petitioner.
' As a result of what has been stated above, this petition is accepted and the impugned orders are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect with the result that the ejectment petition filed by respondents 1 to 10 stands dismissed with no order as to costs.