1. ' The appellant filed case for ejectment against the respondent in respect of house on Plot No,B/135 Block 1, North Nazimabad, Karachi. The house was rented out to the husband of the respondent Mubarak Ali on monthly rent of Rs,700 and after his death the respondent continued to be the tenant on the same terms and conditions. The original tenancy was created under an agreement dated 3rd April, 1976, which was for a period of eleven months. According to clause 2 of this agreement the rent of the house was fixed at Rs,450 p.m. And was payable on or before 5th of each month. The ejectment was sought on grounds (1) default in payment of rent from May, 1985, (2) personal bona fide requirement, (3) unauthorised additions and alterations made by the respondent which had impaired the value and utility of the premises, (4) subletting of the premises, (5) change of use of the premises by the appellant for a purpose other than it was let out and (6) that the tenancy agreement had expired and therefore the respondent is liable to be ejected. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application and gave his findings on all issues against the appellant have heard Mr. Mustafa Lakhani. The respondent and his Advocate are absent. According to Mr. Lakhani the respondent has abandoned the premises and nobody is residing there. On his application Nazir was appointed as Commissioner to visit the premises and from his report it seems that it is in abandoned condition.
2. ' Mr. Mustafa Lakhani has taken me through the pleadings and entire evidence recorded by the learned Controller. In my view the appellant's case in respect of alterations, and additions, subletting and parting with possession, using it for any other purpose and the case based on expiry of agreement has not been established at all. Only two points which require consideration are personal requirement and default in payment of rent.
3. ' So far personal requirement is concerned the learned Controller has taken the view that it is not required in good faith by the appellant. Under Section 15(2)(vii) a Controller may eject a tenant if the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or his children. Therefore, from the very nature of provision authorising the Controller to eject requires good faith and not requirement simpliciter. The requirement should be in good faith and in this way the learned Controller has decided against the appellant. The respondent had all along been pleading that the premises is not required in good faith, but for the purposes of selling it away. Although there is no direct evidence of such sale or transfer, the learned Controller has considered the power of attorney which was produced by the appellant's Attorney in which clause 6 reads as follows:- "This General Power of Attorney is irrevocable and shall be binding upon me until it is revoked by the joint consent of my attorney and myself until and unless it is duly transferred in the name of the Vendee in all respects."
4. ' This clause is unhappily worded but gives the impression that the power of attorney is irrevocable till such time the property is transferred in the name of the vendee. This indicates some transaction behind the scene which has not come out in evidence but can be visualised and found out by looking into the meanings of the words used therein. It seems that this clause has been added to protect the interest of the vendee to whom the property has been agreed to be sold. Therefore, in such circumstances the learned Rent Controller was justified in holding that the property is not required in good faith.
5. ' The next question is about the default in payment of rent. According to the appellant rent, has not been paid from May, 1985. The respondent's contention is that the rent was offered through money order, but it was refused and therefore, she started depositing rent in Court, in Misc. Rent Case No,2440/85. According to the respondent the money order which is claimed to have been refused was remitted on 26th June, 1985. This was a money order for Rs,1,400 remitted in the name of Syed Abdul Bait the appellant. Thereafter, the rent amounting to Rs,1,400 was deposited in Court on 27th July, 1985. In her affidavit of evidence the respondent has stated that the appellant refused to accept the rent for the month of May, 1985 and therefore, it was remitted by money order which was not accepted and since then the rent was deposited in Court. Therefore, the admitted position seems to be that the rent was not paid from May, 1985, although the respondent claimed to have tendered it to the appellant. Therefore, on 26th June, 1985, when the appellant sent the money order it represented the rent for the month of May and June, 1985. This was refused and thereafter Rs,1,400 was deposited in Court on 27-7-1985. This was certainly the rent for the months of May and June, 1985. Thereafter the rent of Rs,700 was deposited on 4th September, 1985. This should have been the rent for the month of July, 1985. Again Rs,700 was deposited on 15th September, 1985, which would have been the rent for the month of August. On these admitted documents it seems that if the version of the respondent is accepted to be correct then there is a default in payment of rent. The agreement between the parties was that the rent shall be paid on the 5th of every month.
6. After the expiry of this agreement the terms and conditions of this agreement continued as held in Zarina Khawaja v. Agha Mahboob Shah PLD 198$ SC 190. The respondent was bound to pay rent within 15 days of the date fixed between the parties i,e. Up to 20th of every month. The money order was remitted on 27th June and thereafter rent has deposited in Court on 4th September, 1985.
7. Therefore, there was a default in payment of rent for the months of May and July, 1985. This aspect of the case has been completely ignored by the Controller who has proceeded on the premises that the respondent was entitled to grace period of 60 days. This treatment of the subject was completely erroneous. I therefore, on the ground of default allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Controller.